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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/63973
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/63973


    Title: Corporate ownership structure and innovation: Evidence from Taiwan's electronics industry
    Authors: Chin, Chen-Lung;Chen, Yu-Ju;Kleinman, Gary;Lee, Picheng
    金成隆;陳俞如;G. Kleinman;李丕正
    Contributors: 會計系
    Keywords: Ownership structure;innovation;intellectual capital;patent;voting rights;cash flow rights
    Date: 2009-02
    Issue Date: 2014-02-18 16:37:14 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: The agency problem of listed companies in East Asia is closely related to their typically concentrated ownership structures. Tight control creates an entrenchment problem that allows the controlling owners' self-interested behaviors to go unchallenged internally by the boards of directors or externally by takeover markets. The primary objective of this paper is to explore the association between the ownership and control structure and innovation. The ownership and control structure is measured first as the divergence between the ultimate owner's voting rights and the ultimate owner's cash flow rights, and second by the presence of ultimately controlling shareholder's family member as CEO or Chairman of the board, or both. Innovation is measured by patent quantity and patent quality. This paper uses patents granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to measure innovation activities. We find that innovation is significantly and negatively related to the level of agency problems. We further find that innovation is lower for firms whose controlling owner is also either the chief executive officer or the chair of the board of directors. Our findings appear to be robust with respect to examining patent count and patent quality variables.
    Relation: Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 24(1), 145-175
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0148558X0902400108
    DOI: 10.1177/0148558X0902400108
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 期刊論文

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