English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  全文筆數/總筆數 : 75887/106369 (71%)
造訪人次 : 19528552      線上人數 : 478
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
搜尋範圍 查詢小技巧:
  • 您可在西文檢索詞彙前後加上"雙引號",以獲取較精準的檢索結果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜尋,建議至進階搜尋限定作者欄位,可獲得較完整資料
  • 進階搜尋
    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/64013
    請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/64013


    題名: R&D Horizon and CEO Compensation
    其他題名: 研發效用年限與高階主管獎酬
    作者: 梁嘉紋
    Liang, Jia-Wen
    貢獻者: 會計系
    關鍵詞: 研發效用年限;高階主管獎酬;管理激勵誘因;研發不確定性 
    R&D horizon;CEO compensation;Managerial incentives;R&D uncertainty
    日期: 2011-07
    上傳時間: 2014-02-19 15:47:32 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究探討研發投資的效用年限對高階主管獎酬之影響,研究結果顯示高階主管獎酬契約的設計會將研發投資的效用年限納入考慮。首先,本研究發現研發效用年限較長的公司,傾向於向上調整CEO的現金獎酬與研發支出變動的關聯性,以避免CEO的現金獎酬受到研發支出對盈餘有負面效果之影響,並補償CEO因為研發投資所面臨之風險增加;同時,也增加股票選擇權的獎酬與研發支出的敏感度以促使CEO將研發支出投入在較佳的研發案上。另一方面,研發效用年限較短的公司在決定CEO獎酬時,傾向於將研發支出當作費用。此外,結果顯示,當研發的效用年限較長時,CEO獎酬對會計績效的敏感度降低,說明了研發的效用年限降低了會計報酬率在績效衡量上的適當性。最後,本研究發現對新任的CEO,獎酬委員會增強研發效用年限與CEO獎酬對研發支出敏感度之影響,以鼓勵面臨高度不確定性的新上任CEO投資於具長期性質的研發支出,並降低研發效用年限與CEO獎酬對會計報酬率的敏感度之關連,因為繼任CEO任期中早期階段的會計績效很可能反映的是前任CEO對研發的投入。
    This study investigates the impact of the long-lived nature of R&D investment on CEO compensation, and provides evidence that the R&D horizon is contract-relevant. First, this study documents that firms with a longer R&D payoff period tend to adjust the association between CEO cash compensation and changes in R&D expenditures upward to shield CEO cash compensation from the negative earnings impact of R&D expenses as well as to provide compensation for the risks embedded in such R&D investment, while increasing option compensation to induce R&D investment in good projects. On the other hand, firms with a short R&D payoff period tend to treat R&D expenditures as an expense when rewarding CEOs. In addition, the results show that CEO compensation is less sensitive to accounting returns when R&D has a longer horizon, suggesting that the R&D horizon reduces the desirability of accounting return as a performance measure. Finally, I find that, for new CEOs, compensation committees tend to strengthen the association between R&D horizon and the sensitivity of CEO compensation to R&D expenditure in order to encourage new CEOs to invest in long-lived R&D and reduce the association between R&D horizon and the sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to accounting returns since accounting performance in the earlier stage of the successor's tenure is more likely to reflect the R&D effort of the predecessor CEO when R&D has a long horizon.
    關聯: 會計評論, 53, 109-138
    資料類型: article
    顯示於類別:[會計學系] 期刊論文
    [會計評論] 期刊論文

    文件中的檔案:

    檔案 描述 大小格式瀏覽次數
    53109138.pdf1157KbAdobe PDF804檢視/開啟


    在政大典藏中所有的資料項目都受到原著作權保護.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 回饋