English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 94524/125052 (76%)
Visitors : 29727698      Online Users : 267
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/64014
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/64014

    Title: 公司股權結構與外資持股關係之研究
    Other Titles: Corporate Ownership Structure and Foreign Ownership
    Authors: 林美鳳;梁嘉紋;金成隆
    Lin, Mei-Feng;Liang, Jia-Wen;Chin, Chen-Lung
    Contributors: 會計系
    Keywords: 控制股東;外資持股;股票質押
    Ultimate controlling owners;foreign investment ownership;collateralized shares
    Date: 2010-03
    Issue Date: 2014-02-19 15:47:45 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 相對於國內機構投資者與散戶而言,外資在我國資本市場扮演了相當重要的角色。然而國內控制股東的代理問題嚴重,本研究的主要目的,即由控制股東的投票權與現金流量權的偏離程度、控制股東成員掌控的董監席次、與董監股票質押比率三個方面,探討公司股權結構與外資持股比例的關聯性。研究結果顯示,當控制股東的投票權與現金流量權的偏離愈大、或控制股東成員掌控愈多的董監席次,或董監事股票質押比率愈高時,將使得控制股東的代理問題愈為嚴重,因此,外資的投資意願較低,其持股比率也較低。然而,外資持股可能存在選樣偏誤的現象,同時,公司股權結構有可能是一個內生變數。因此,本文分別使用Heckman的方法,以及兩階段迴歸,克服可能的潛在計量問題;實證結果發現,本文的推論並未受到影響。同時本文也使用不同的外資持股替代變數,結果也相當穩健。
    In contrast to the domestic institutional and individual investors, foreign investors play a rather important role in Taiwan's capital market. As the concentration of corporate ownership has created agency conflicts between controlling owners and minority shareholders in Taiwan, the primary purpose of this paper is to explore the association between foreign investment ownership and ownership structure, as measured by the divergence between the ultimate controlling owner's voting rights and cash flow rights, the percentage of board members affiliated with the controlling owners, and the extent of shares collateralized by the board of directors. Our empirical results show that foreign investors hold fewer shares for firm with higher control divergence. Second, foreign investment ownership is negatively related to the percentage of controlling owner's seats on the board, as predicted. Third, we find that foreign institutional investors hold fewer shares on firms with a greater extent of shares collateralized by the board of directors. The results are robust to the alternative model specifications, including Heckman selection and simultaneous models. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged using alternative proxy for foreign investment ownership.
    Relation: 中山管理評論, 18(1), 101-142
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 期刊論文

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    101142.pdf1473KbAdobe PDF825View/Open

    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    社群 sharing

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback