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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/64017


    请使用永久网址来引用或连结此文件: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/64017


    题名: 董監持股、企業風險與技術投資對公司運用經理人工作誘因、內部監督機制之影響
    其它题名: Influences of Ownership of the Directors and Supervisors, Enterprise Risk, and Technology Investment on Incentive Schemes and Internal Monitor Schemes Applied to Enterprise Managers
    作者: 薛健宏;許崇源
    Hsueh, Chien-Hung;Hsu,Chung-Yuan
    贡献者: 會計系
    关键词: 董監持股;誘因;內部監督
    日期: 2012-03
    上传时间: 2014-02-19 15:48:26 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 管理機制可概分為內部監督與誘因機制兩類，而董監持股率為公司治理中的關鍵因子，亦是政府管制的重要指標。過去文獻基於財務連結度，而認為高持股的董監會更積極建立公司內部的監督制度，以維護自身投資，但Fernandez and Arrondo（2005）卻指出，股權集中度使得高持股的董監獨大，而缺乏制衡機制，公司內部的監督制度反而較差，故本研究對此進行實證。結果指出，隨著董監持股的增加並不會提高出席董事會的意願，除非公司正處於高風險階段，該類董監可能為維持既有的權力，並未積極訂立其他牽制經理人的內部監督制度，例如獨立董事機制。工作誘因、內部監督機制均屬企業的控管制度，傳統文獻多指出，工作誘因與內部監督機制具互換性，呈負向關係，但近年來，分析性文獻加入技術變數，認為工作誘因與監督機制呈互補關係，本研究對此進行實證，結果顯示兩者（工作誘因、內部監督機制）存在顯著正相關，且技術變數確實是造成工作誘因、內部監督機制同步提升的重要因子。 Management schemes include internal monitor and incentive, while ownership of the directors and supervisors is a key factor in corporation governance, and is the important measure regulated by the government. Based on financial alignment, the literature showed that the firm with high ownership of the directors and supervisors would actively establish the internal monitor system in company to protect their investment. However, Fernandez and Arrondo (2005) believed the stock concentration makes the directors and supervisors with high ownership grasp the super power without other constrain power, resulting in the poor internal monitor system in the company. We test it empirically on the mixed arguments. The results show the ownership doesn`t raise the willing to convoke and attend the board meetings, and they are passive to set other internal monitor system (e.g.: outsider director), due to the maintenance of their existing power probably except firms face high risk. Both of incentive scheme and internal monitor scheme are important control systems in the firm. Most of the traditional literatures argue that the incentive scheme and internal monitor scheme substitute each other, but the recent analytical papers involve technology, arguing complementary between the incentive and internal monitor. Accordingly, we check the relationship between incentive and internal monitor, and find the positive significantly result between the above two factors, and technology raises the use of incentive and internal monitor simultaneously.
    關聯: 證券市場發展季刊, 24(1), 67-110
    数据类型: article
    DOI 連結: http://dx.doi.org/10.6529/RSFM.2012.24(1).3
    DOI: 10.6529/RSFM.2012.24(1).3
    显示于类别:[會計學系] 期刊論文

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