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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 企業管理學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/65559


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/65559


    Title: 資訊不對稱下，借款者型態與放款契約中擔保品、利率間之關係－不連續情況
    Authors: 俞海琴;劉維琪;林烱垚;陳隆麒
    Contributors: 企管所；財管系
    Keywords: 資訊不對稱;代理理論;逆選擇;銀行放款契約;最適契約;次佳契約;擔保品與利率
    Asymmetric Information;Agency Theory;Adverse Selction Bank Loan Contract;Optimal Contract;Second-best Contract;Collateral and Interest Rate
    Date: 1992.11
    Issue Date: 2014-04-22 18:01:10 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文係將主理人(Principal)與代理人(Agent)間的契約關係，用於銀很放款市場銀行（主理人）與借款者（代理人）間。文中分理論模式與實證研究兩部分。在理論模式方面，本文引進了當市場上存在「不對稱資訊」(Asymmetric Information)時，銀行在訂定放款契約時，應考慮「誘因機制」(Incentive Mechanism)功能的觀念，誘使借款者能誠實提供財務資訊，以減低市場存在的不對稱資訊程度。文中並探討了在完全訊息下及不完全訊息下，銀行放款約中擔保品及利率的訂定準則。在實證研究方面，本文係以理論模式推導的結論，發展出六個研究假說，再以自行發展的兩套問卷，由銀行與借款者雙方去蒐集資料，並加以驗證與檢定。實證研究發現如下：1．廠商經營條件愈強，銀行所給予的借款利率愈低。2．廠商經營條件愈弱，銀行所要求的擔保品愈多。3．廠商經營條件不同，在借款利率與擔保品水準二變項之借款條件上，有顯著不同。故本國銀行放款契約除價格因素－利率外，非價格因素－擔保品的確扮演了相當關鍵的角色，並傳遞某些重要的訊息。各借款者為如數借到所需金額並從事投資，會願意出具不同價值的擔保品，銀行則可視此擔保品為一“信號”(Signal)，推斷其經營條件，俾決定合理的利率水準。
    This paper attempts to apply the principal-agent problem to analyze the relationship between banking firms and borrowers. This paper contains two parts of theretical model and empircial study, In the first part, we emphasize the importantance of asymmetric information in the model that banking firms should be concerned with the function of incentive mechanism in making loan contracts. This mechanism will induce the borrowers to provide truthful financial information that may be helpful to reduce the asymmetric information in loan market. Except the above analysis, we also develope the rule of collateral and interest rate in Optimal Contract and Second-best contract. Secondly, this paper developes three hypothesis based on the conclusions of theoretical model, and designs two sets of questionare to collect data from banking firms and borrowers. After processing these oringinal data, we try to test three hypothesis and find the following important conclusions: (1) The better qualification the firm is, the more lower loan rate the banking firm will charge. (2) The worse qualification the firm is, the more collaterals the banking firm will request. (3) If the qualification between firms are different, then the required borrowing terms of loan rate and collateral between firms will be significantly different.Finally, this paper also tells us that non-price factor of collateral indeed plays a very important role in loan contract except interest rate. Each borrower will provide different collaterals in order to get the loan contract. And from the value of collateral the borrowers provides, banking firm may view as a signal to judge the qualification of firm and decide to charge a reasonable loan rate
    Relation: 管理評論, 11, 59-79
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[企業管理學系] 期刊論文

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