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| Title: | 租稅規避與公司價值-以台灣上市櫃公司為例
Tax Avoidance and Firm Value-A Study in Taiwan Publicly Traded Company |
| Authors: | 陳典陞
Chen, Dian Sheng |
| Contributors: | 何怡澄
陳典陞
Chen, Dian Sheng |
| Keywords: | 租稅規避
公司價值
代理問題
Tax avoidance
Firm value
Agency problem |
| Date: | 2013 |
| Issue Date: | 2014-07-01 12:04:55 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 為釐清公司租稅規避行為是否對股東有利，本文以實證方法檢視租稅規避行為與公司價值之關係，並探究公司治理是否會改變前述兩者間之關係。本研究以Tobin’s q和普通股市值衡量公司價值，租稅規避行為採財稅所得差異與現金有效稅率衡量，公司治理則以外部法人持股比例衡量。研究對象為民國89年至101年之國內上市櫃公司，並排除性質特殊之金融業。本文先採普通最小平方法進行實證分析，其實證結果顯示租稅規避行為與公司價值間有顯著的正向關聯性，與傳統理論之預期一致，但並不支持代理觀點，即公司治理並不會顯著地影響租稅規避行為與公司價值之關係。其後，為解決普通最小平方法的內生性疑慮，本文以外生政策建構工具變數重新進行迴歸分析，實證證據顯示租稅規避行為與公司價值間具顯著關係，且公司治理對兩者間之關係無顯著的影響。
The main purpose of this paper is to clarify whether corporate tax avoidance activities advance shareholder interests. We employ empirical approach to examine the relationship between corporate tax avoidance and firm value and then the impacts of corporate governance on the aforementioned relationship. Firm value is measured by Tobin’s q and market value. Tax avoidance is measured by book-tax gap and annual cash effective tax rate, and corporate governance is proxied for by the level of external institutional ownership. We use a large sample of domestic listed firms for the period 2000-2012, and the financial industry is excluded from the sample owing to its special characteristics. The empirical evidence of OLS estimates indicate that the corporate tax avoidance is positively and significantly associated with firm value, as predicted by the traditional theory of tax avoidance. However, corporate governance has no significant impacts on the aforementioned relationship in OLS estimates, which is inconsistent with the agency perspective of tax avoidance. To resolve the concern from endogeneity, we construct instrumental variables estimates based on exogenous changes in tax regulations. The empirical evidence of instrumental variables estimates is consistent with OLS estimates. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計研究所
101353016
102 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1013530161 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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