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| Title: | 上市公司邊際債務策略之探討
Probing the Marginal-Debt Corporate Finance Strategy |
| Authors: | 孔設毅
Cyril Couplet |
| Contributors: | 扈企平
Hu, Joseph
孔設毅
Cyril Couplet |
| Keywords: | 邊際債務
策略
Marginal-Debt
Strategy |
| Date: | 2013 |
| Issue Date: | 2014-07-14 14:00:47 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 上市公司邊際債務策略之探討
This thesis aims at understanding the corporate finance strategy of companies which have no or an extremely low debt to equity ratio. For this thesis, companies that have a debt-to-equity ratio less than 5% are defined as “marginal-debt” companies. We identify 167 U.S. public companies which could easily access to the financial market for debt. In order to find some explanations for the phenomenon of marginal-debt, we first examine the trade-off theory. According to the theory, it can be hypothesized that an extremely low corporate tax rate or a high marginal cost of bankruptcy could explain the minimal presence of debt for those marginal-debt companies. However, we find no evidence to accept this hypothesis. Marginal-debt companies have an average tax rate of 31.4%, compared to 29.8% for our sample of indebted companies. They also have a generally better financial health, even when deleveraging their financial ratios. Owing to that, neither bankruptcy cost explains the financial management strategy of marginal-debt. Hence, we expect this phenomenon to be purely behavioral. We therefore propose a survey questionnaire to better analyze the incentives for managers to adopt a marginal-debt strategy..
Keywords: Marginal-debt, Capital structure, Low leverage, Trade-off theory, Debt aversion |
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http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/27/us-financial-inditex-idUSTRE49Q01R20081027 |
| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
國際經營管理英語碩士學位學程(IMBA)
102933062
102 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102933062 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [國際經營管理英語碩士學程IMBA] 學位論文
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