|其他題名: ||Divided Government and Local Democratic Administraton: "Budget for Local Infrastructure, "Local Factions, and Pork-Barrel Politics in Taichung County|
divided government;budget;pork-barrel legislation;factional politics
|上傳時間: ||2014-07-29 18:04:38 (UTC+8)|
|摘要: ||近年來，行政部門與立法部門分屬不同政黨所掌握的「分立政府」（divided government），似乎逐漸成為我國縣市政府普遍存在的型態；相對地，行政部門與立法部門皆由同一政黨所掌控的「一致政府」（unified government），卻有減少的趨勢。雖然府會分立可能造成立法遲滯或者政治僵局，但是若干研究亦指出其將有助於財政收支監督與遏止赤字擴張，因此可能增進地方政府的財政效能。吾人是否可以推斷，地方政治的黑金沉痾與行政效率不彰，會因為政黨輪替而獲得改善？本研究以台中縣第１３屆與第１４屆議會為研究對象，討論分立政府與一致政府對於「地方基層建設經費」編列的影響。該經費向來被視為議員爭取而來討好選區選民的肉桶性預算，再加上工程招標相關法令之不足，該預算亦成為地方政治人物酬謝其政治支持者的重要資源。因此，該預算的額度愈大，往往代表政府財政效率愈差。研究結果發現，除了政黨因素會影響該預算的編列，其餘的因素，如議會的派系結構及其所依賴的侍從體系，實有更深遠的影響。本文除藉此案例深入刻畫地方議會政治的生態與運作邏輯，並建議強化公民參與的制度，以鼓勵地方民眾監督預算審議及工程發包、施工過程，以改善議員對肉桶政治的需求。|
When the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Won the local elections overwhelmingly in 1997, many countries or cities entered a new stage of divided government, in which Kuomintang (KMT) still effectively controlled the city/county councils to challenge the executive branches. How would the local administrations be affected by such a new political situation? From a brighter perspective, the heavily criticized pork-barrel politics associating with financial inefficiency and corruption of local government might be corrected because the coordination force of the KMT had withdrawn to enable the underlying check-and-balance function to work. Nevertheless, by examining the cases of 13th and 14th Taichung County Council, we argue that political party was not the single determining factor. Rather, some factors of the informal sector, including local factions and patron-clientele relationships, have also played very important roles in affecting the amount of “budget for local infrastructure.” This pork-barrel budget is not a formal item to be found in budget books. Instead, it is only a nickname for a discretionary budget by every councilman to reward one’s political patrons in construction or estate business. The larger the budget is the greater possibility for corruption and the greater financial inefficiency could be. This research found that divided government had encouraged the councilmen to ask for more of such budget. Nevertheless, how the magistrate yielded to offer depended heavily on his ability to dismantle the collective bargaining action of councilmen by soliciting exclusive benefit to individual councilmen. When there was a dominant faction in the council, and the magistrate could successfully control it (as in the 13th Taichung Council), the pork-barrel budget would be less necessary to be a tool for soliciting councilmen’s cooperation. In contrast, when the opposition party gained the ruling status and the dominant faction broke down (as in the 14th Taichung Council), the magistrate had to yield, but still could maneuver among councilmen to avoid policy gridlocks and stalemates. We ended by suggesting more crystallization of the , budgeting process by encouraging more organized civil participation.
|關聯: ||中國行政評論, 12(1), 37-76|