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    Title: 誰掌控官僚體系?從代理人理論看台灣官僚體系的政治控制問題
    Authors: 陳敦源
    Date: 2000
    Issue Date: 2008-11-12 09:56:55 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 近十年公部門的改革運動,有三個重點,一是憲政改革,二是政府再造,三是國 會改革,這三項運動的共同目標,就是要為台灣建構一個民主且有效的治理機制 (governance),這目標也迫使改革者必須誠實面對存在民主與官僚間的根本矛盾。若從這個 角度觀察,我國民主改革期間所浮現的諸多問題,不應被簡化成決策程序的民主程度、或是 官僚體系行政效率良窳的問題,他們應是民主化後無法避免的民主與官僚關係定位的問題, 這也是所有追求民主及效率者所無法規避的議題。然而,我們一直缺乏一套整合性的概念架 構來看改革作為的實質內涵,更遑論對於台灣現況的解讀,這種認識的缺乏,使得吾等一直 無法從宏觀的眼光,來思考我國未來治理機制設計的問題。本文嘗試從民主治理體系最重要 的權力授予(delegation of power)概念出發,在代理人理論(agency theory)的指引之下,配合台 灣政治發展的現實來探討官僚體系的政治控制問題,將台灣公部門的改革,從民主行政的理 論層次予以整合。本文將首先從權力授予的概念討論官僚體系在民主政體當中的地位,更進 一步闡述官僚體系政治控制的方法及其限制;接著,本文透過代理人理論討論官僚體系控制 問題的實質內涵;最後,本文以前述理論為基礎,對於台灣目前民主與官僚關係的實況提出 三點批判性的回顧:(1)官僚的「不行動」;(2)被宰制的「頭家」;(3)國民黨的「鎖定」效果 等,藉此反思十年改革作為,並接著對台灣未來續階改革的方向提出三點具體建議以為總結。 For the past ten years, political reform on Taiwan has been concentrated on three main efforts : (1) constitutional reforms, (2) reinventing government, and (3) congressional reforms. All these works aim to bring in bore democratic and effective governance to our ruling system. This goal also impels us to face the classical perplexities between democracy and bureaucracy. From this viewpoint, many failed reform efforts should not be simply attributed to the problem of democracy in the public decision-making process, or to the issue of bureaucratic effectiveness. Those failures should be interpreted as problems of redefining the boundary between democracy and bureaucracy in Taiwan's governing structure. The political control of the bureaucracy is at the heart of the problem. From the concept of "delegation of power," author attempts to establish an unified framework to analyze the problem of bureaucratic control in the newly developed Taiwanese democracy. Building on the agency theory from the new institutional economics, author discuses different means and their limits to control bureaucratic activities in general. Then, author derives three assertions from the theory to demonstrate the current situation concerning controlling bureaucracies in Taiwan. They are : (1) bureaucratic "inaction," (2) dominated populace; (3) KMT's (Kuomintang) "lock-in" effect. At the end. Author proposes three general directions for the democratic reform concerning bureaucratic control on Taiwan in the future.
    Relation: 公共行政學報, 4, 99-130.
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[公共行政學系] 期刊論文

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