English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 94188/124659 (76%)
Visitors : 29657170      Online Users : 388
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/71048

    Title: 保障善意第三人的重覆賽局均衡
    Other Titles: Protection of the Bona Fides Third Party: An Application to Repeated Games
    Authors: 王智賢;陳恭平
    Contributors: 財政系
    Keywords: 重覆賽局;保障善意第三人;單向連結賽局
    Repeated games;Protection of bona fides third party;One-way-joint game
    Date: 1997.09
    Issue Date: 2014-11-03 14:58:36 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文嘗試以民法學說上保障善意第三人的概念來修正(refine)重覆賽局中的子賽 局完全均衡。在作法上,我們定義一個三人單向連結賽局(one-way-joint game)來強調問題 的本質,並提出保障善意第三人均衡的概念來主張我們對此種型式賽局均衡所要求的修飾方 向。我們的結論是:三人單向連結賽局中,若是以應得權益來保障善意第三人時,則其可成 為重覆賽局均衡解的集合大小,將與間接關係參賽者之間的利害衝突性質有關。
    We propose a refinement of subgame perfect equilibria for repeated games, which we call "protection of the bona fides third parry equilibrium". It requires that if a player is not a deviator, his continuation payoff on any out-of- equlibrium path should not be lower than that of the original equilibrium. We then define a one-way-joint game and apply our equilibrium concept to it. Our result shows that the size of the set of equilibrium payoffs crucially depends on the nature of the conflict of interests between the indirect players.
    Relation: 經濟論文叢刊, 25(3), 293-307.
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 期刊論文

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat

    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    社群 sharing

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback