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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/71637

    Title: The Role of Ownership on Control Right Allocation and Compensation Contract Design
    Authors: 胡聯國
    Contributors: 國貿系
    Date: 2011.03
    Issue Date: 2014-11-24 17:07:58 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: We propose a corporate control model that deals with control right allocation and compensation contract design. By drawing upon a special feature of human nature, that is the sense of gain and loss affiliated with initial ownership as described by the prospect theory in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), we find that it helps mitigate the inefficiency stemming from the agency problem. In particular, there exists a most desirable level of ‘managerial irrationality’ that completely offsets the social efficiency loss inflicted by the moral hazard problem. Moreover, less control right should be allocated to outside investors and more compensation should be granted to the manager as the latter reveals more serious concern about his ownership gain and loss.
    Relation: Applied Economics Letters,18(15),1421-1426
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2010.541148
    DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2010.541148
    Appears in Collections:[國際經營與貿易學系 ] 期刊論文

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