English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 20 |  Items with full text/Total items : 90058/119991 (75%)
Visitors : 24107472      Online Users : 1145
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/72117

    Title: 中國準計畫行政體制:鄉鎮政府從企業經營到土地收租的軟預算財政
    Other Titles: The Making of a Chinese Semi-Planned Administration: Soft Budget Constraints and Local Transition from Entrepreneur to Rentier
    Authors: 劉雅靈
    Liu, Yia-Ling
    Contributors: 社會系
    Keywords: 準計畫行政體制;軟預算弊病;收租者;幹部目標責任制;社會主義父權制
    semi-planned administration;soft budget constraints;rentier;target responsibility system;state paternalism
    Date: 2010-12
    Issue Date: 2014-12-17 10:43:46 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文主要從「中國準計畫行政體制」的概念架構出發,探索溫州、無錫、建始三地農村基層政府從企業家轉型爲收租者的過程。本文強調「中國準計畫行政體制」中「幹部目標責任制、上級政府財政支出責任下移、社會主義父權制」的制度安排,不僅降低國家科層體制的監督能力,而且敗壞基層財政紀律。「中國準計畫行政體制」進一步形塑幹部個人理性思維與行動選項,壓縮鄉鎮基層與上級政府在財稅分配中的議價空間、降低鄉鎮負債的交易成本、提高幹部任期的政治折扣率,因而促使基層幹部只顧追求個人短期政績而犧牲地方長遠發展的理性抉擇,並使農村基層幹部從企業家走向資源掠奪的土地收租者,甚至負債,從而導致中國農村基層政府陷入赤字預算與債務的軟預算病態。
    The author constructs the concept of a Chinese semi-planned administration to explore the grassroots transition from entrepreneur to rentier in Wenzhou, Wuxi, and Jianshi, and to analyze the pathology of local soft budget constraints throughout rural China. The argument is made that the combination of the target responsibility system, cost-shifting strategy, and state paternalism crippled the capacity of the state's hierarchical supervision system, and corrupted local fiscal discipline. The Chinese semi-planned administration has shaped the rational thinking and patterned behaviors of township cadres, resulting in (a) squeezed spaces for township government leaders to negotiate with their superiors, (b) lower transaction costs for townships to carry debt, and (c) higher discount rates for township cadres. All of these factors have forced township cadres to pursue short-term goals in order to earn promotions, rather than long-term development goals that can benefit their localities. In addition to supporting the transitioning of township governments from entrepreneurs to rentiers, these actions also soften local budget constraints.
    Relation: 台灣社會學刊, 45, 163-212
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[社會學系] 期刊論文

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    163212.pdf3824KbAdobe PDF628View/Open

    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    社群 sharing

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback