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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 資訊管理學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/73094
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/73094


    Title: 群體能力、社會網絡與激勵政策對組織成員間知識分享的影響
    Other Titles: Influence of Collective Capability, Social Network and Organizational Incentive Policy on Knowledge Sharing between Members in an Organization
    Authors: 楊亨利;吳俊德
    Yang, Heng-Li;Wu, Ted C. T.
    Contributors: 資管系
    Keywords: 知識分享;群體能力;激勵政策;社會網絡;囚犯困境
    Knowledge Sharing;Collective Capability;Social Network;Incentive Policy;Prisoner's dilemma
    Date: 2009-01
    Issue Date: 2015-01-21 11:16:48 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 許多企業的經理人一直在尋求有效的政策以促進員工彼此分享知識。在組織中實施激勵知識分享的政策,因為存在著許多的個人與組織的因素,兩者相互作用會影響組織的成員知識分享的行為,政策的效果很難掌握。在實務上,不同的組織激勵的政策或手段的效果,欲通過田野調查或實驗設計來評估政策所帶來效果及對組織成員行為的影響不容易實現。因此,本研究嘗試運用一項新穎的研究策略-代理人基塑模(agent-based modeling),經由建構一個人造的世界來模擬組織成員知識分享的行為。在這個人造的社會中,研究者考慮了知識分享的報酬、組織成員的行動策略、不同組織的群體能力水準與組織激勵政策的設計等變數,藉以設計相關的實驗。模擬的結果產生了的幾項有趣的發現:(1)在沒有任何激勵政策的情況下,組織中代理人的群體能力愈差,愈會抑制知識分享的行為的發生,產生較多不分享知識的行為。(2)對於群體能力水準較高的團體,欲藉由知識分享的獎勵政策提升代理人知識分享的行為,施行定期審視固定獎勵的激勵政策其效果是有限的,甚至產生反效果,使不分享知識的行為增加。如果是依分享的行動給予獎勵的激勵政策則可以得到比較好的效果,可消除不分享知識的行為。(3)群體能力差的團體,無論採用任何一種激勵政策,皆可大幅減少不分享知識的行為與促成信任的組織氣候,但是施行激勵政策不見得符合經濟效益。對群體能力水準高的團體,依行動即時給予獎勵的政策,可以消除不分享知識的行為,但是無法促成組織信任的氣候。相對的,定期審視固定獎勵水準的政策,卻可讓大多數的代理人採用「完全合作」的策略,促成互信的組織氣候,但是可能發生較多不分享知識的行為。(4)最後,代理人間連結調適機制,會影響不同群體能力水準的代理人行為。對激勵政策的影響可能強化其效果,也可能破壞政策的效果。
    Mangers always look for effective policies to prompt knowledge sharing between members in an organization. It is difficult to evaluate the effect of incentive policies for stimulating knowledge sharing because there are many individual and organizational factors. In practice, it is not easy to assess the effects of different incentive policies or methods by the methods of experiment or field investigation. Therefore, a novel research strategy is applied in this study, which is called agent-based modeling. An artificial world was constructed to simulate the knowledge sharing interactions between members in an organization. This study considers some parameters including the payoff of knowledge sharing, the strategies of members, collective capabilities and incentive policies to design experiments in the agent-based model. The results of simulations produced some interesting findings: (1) without any incentive policy, the lower the degree of collective capability is, the more the behavior of not sharing knowledge is stimulated. (2) For an organization with higher degree of collective capability, periodic incentive policy is limited to stimulate the behavior of knowledge sharing, or it even causes a negative effect. If the organization adopts a reward policy according to the knowledge sharing action, the behavior of not sharing knowledge would be eliminated. (3) For an organization with lower degree of collective capability, any type of incentive policies, would decrease the behavior of not sharing knowledge and make the organizational climate trending trustier. For an organization with higher collective capability, the policy of reward according to knowledge sharing action could eliminate the behavior of not sharing knowledge, but not enable the trusty organizational climate. However, periodic reward policy would make agents to adopt ALLC strategy. It helps to make a trustier organizational climate, but may stimulate more behaviors of not sharing knowledge. (4) Finally, the mechanism of adjusting locally connections that agents adopt would influence the organizational agents' behaviors. It might strengthen or destroy the effect of an incentive policy.
    Relation: 資訊管理學報,16(S),21-55
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[資訊管理學系] 期刊論文

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