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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/73316

    Title: 租稅的三篇文章
    Three essays on taxation
    Authors: 陳韻旻
    Chen, Yun Min
    Contributors: 楊建成
    Yang, C.C.
    Chen, Yun Min
    Keywords: 社會福利
    social security
    political economy
    optimal taxation
    adverse selection
    Date: 2014
    Issue Date: 2015-02-03 10:29:54 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 吾人於第一章分析隨收隨付社會福利制度的動態問題。吾人就政治經濟觀點出發,探討隨收隨付制的提撥率會如何隨著人口變化調整。該章引進兩種效果: (1) 前一期的社會福利政策將成為本期是否要進行社會福利改革的參考點; (2) 政府除了關心當期選民的福祉之外,也考慮未來世代的利益。吾人獲致提撥率的解析解,利用該公式與資料,分析日本、英國與美國的社會福利規模,並展示出該解析解具備解釋現況的能力。
    Mirrlees (1971)提出靜態模型,分析當個人的生產力為異質且不可觀察時,政府該如何設計最適租稅制度,使得租稅制度讓個人不會向政府謊報自身生產力,意即滿足個人誘因相容的條件。爾後,Golosov(2006)等人,Mirrlees模型拓展至動態架構,允許個人(idiosyncratic)與總體(aggregate)不確定性的考量,發展出NDPF(New Dynamic Public Finance)的動態Mirrlees文獻。
    吾人提出並於第二章介紹拉格朗日乘數法(multiplier approach),分析動態Mirrlees最適稅制問題。就目前文獻而言,處理動態Mirrlees模型是一棘手問題,特別是在當模型包含多種不可觀察異質性時,原先的辦法更是無法提供解答。但拉格朗日乘數法可用於分析此類問題。第二章利用兩期模型,說明此方法的操作過程,並使用乘數法獲致目前NDPF文獻的所有理論結果。吾人並將乘數法延伸至多維度(multi-dimension)的Mirrlees問題。
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    Description: 博士
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097255502
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

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