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    題名: 租稅的三篇文章
    Three essays on taxation
    作者: 陳韻旻
    Chen, Yun Min
    貢獻者: 楊建成
    Yang, C.C.
    陳韻旻
    Chen, Yun Min
    關鍵詞: 社會福利
    政治經濟
    最適稅制
    逆選擇
    social security
    political economy
    optimal taxation
    adverse selection
    日期: 2014
    上傳時間: 2015-02-03 10:29:54 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 吾人於第一章分析隨收隨付社會福利制度的動態問題。吾人就政治經濟觀點出發，探討隨收隨付制的提撥率會如何隨著人口變化調整。該章引進兩種效果: (1) 前一期的社會福利政策將成為本期是否要進行社會福利改革的參考點; (2) 政府除了關心當期選民的福祉之外，也考慮未來世代的利益。吾人獲致提撥率的解析解，利用該公式與資料，分析日本、英國與美國的社會福利規模，並展示出該解析解具備解釋現況的能力。
    Mirrlees (1971)提出靜態模型，分析當個人的生產力為異質且不可觀察時，政府該如何設計最適租稅制度，使得租稅制度讓個人不會向政府謊報自身生產力，意即滿足個人誘因相容的條件。爾後，Golosov(2006)等人，Mirrlees模型拓展至動態架構，允許個人(idiosyncratic)與總體(aggregate)不確定性的考量，發展出NDPF(New Dynamic Public Finance)的動態Mirrlees文獻。
    吾人提出並於第二章介紹拉格朗日乘數法(multiplier approach)，分析動態Mirrlees最適稅制問題。就目前文獻而言，處理動態Mirrlees模型是一棘手問題，特別是在當模型包含多種不可觀察異質性時，原先的辦法更是無法提供解答。但拉格朗日乘數法可用於分析此類問題。第二章利用兩期模型，說明此方法的操作過程，並使用乘數法獲致目前NDPF文獻的所有理論結果。吾人並將乘數法延伸至多維度(multi-dimension)的Mirrlees問題。
    第三章吾人利用拉格朗日乘數法，於一Mirrlees靜態模型中分析最適所得稅制。吾人發現，根據拉格朗日乘數所計算的Pareto-Negishi權重，恰為最適邊際所得稅率之充分統計量。拉格朗日乘數法可用於計算，當模型中的生產力類型個數為有限但多個時的狀況。吾人根據拉格朗日乘數法，提供一簡單演算法，可計算出Mirrlees最適靜態問題中的所有個人配置以及刻劃最適稅制為何。此外，若模型的不可觀察異質性包含生產力與偏好時，本章亦獲致最適邊際所得稅率，仍然取決於Pareto-Negishi權重相對大小之結果。
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    描述: 博士
    國立政治大學
    財政研究所
    97255502
    103
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097255502
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[財政學系] 學位論文

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