近半個世紀來，「誰統治？」（Who Governs？）一直是政治學與政策研究中理論爭辯的重點之一。就此觀察共黨國家，以往大多數的文獻均強調共黨體系的黨國壟斷以及「自上而下」的決策特質，各項政策多是少數領導人意志的貫徹，而官僚部門也僅是毫無自主性的執行工具。而歷經30年的改革開放，中國經濟體制由計畫向市場邁進，與此同時，黨國的經濟治理機制也發生改變，這正好提供我們觀察其政策過程以及「誰統治中國？」的絕佳機會。針對此，本文將當前中國政策過程研究區分為「黨國中心」與「社會中心」兩種觀點以及指陳其限制，並以《反壟斷法》為例，解釋為何《反壟斷法》立法過程會如此複雜與冗長，進而說明官僚結構在政策制定與執行中所扮演的關鍵角色，並強調「官僚競爭」於當今中國政策研究的重要性。 For the past half century, “who governs?” is widely considered as one of the great theoretical debates in political science and policy studies. Most literature on policy-making in the communist system has highlighted the monolithic and top-down nature of the process. The prime concern has been with the monolith and its totality and the actions of a cabal of key leaders who transmit policy direction through the party to be implemented by a subservient bureaucracy. The reforms that began at the end of 1970s created opportunities for unprecedented scholarly access to understand the policy processes and “who governs?” in China. Over the past three decades, the Chinese economy has moved dramatically away from the model of socialist planning and into a new world of market forces. During this time, the CCP has made a wide-ranging effort to reform the institutions of economic governance. The party is no longer able to perform the vital role of integrating the bureaucracy to improve both formulation and implementation of policy. This article will illustrate the legislative process of the Antitrust Law to prove that the bureaucratic structure in China is highly fragmented, making consensus-building central and the policy process protracted, disjointed, and incremental. It offers us a viewpoint to explore the policy making and the impact of bureaucratic competition in contemporary China.