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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/76413
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/76413

    Title: 薪酬委員會設置對家族企業之影響
    The Impact of Compensation Committee on the Relationship between Family Firms
    Authors: 翁郁媚
    Weng, Yu Mei
    Contributors: 戚務君
    Weng, Yu Mei
    Keywords: 薪酬委員會
    Compensation Committee
    firm value
    family firms
    Date: 2015
    Issue Date: 2015-07-13 11:05:50 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 為強化公司治理,我國強制上市(櫃)公司須於2011年底前設置薪酬委員會,本研究首先探討公司自願在2011年底前設置薪酬委員會之因素。因為法令還未強制設置薪酬委員會前,我國已自願設置薪酬委員會之公司約2%,無法使用差異中之差異法(Difference-in-difference),故本研究以我國家族企業為研究對象,探討相較於非家族企業,薪酬委員會設置對家族企業之公司價值的影響。
    In order to enhance corporate governance, the R.O.C. Securities and Exchange Act was amended in 2010 to force listed companies to establish a Compensation Committee by the end of 2011. First, this study is to investigate which determinants may encourage companies to voluntarily establish the compensation committee. Then, we investigate whether setting compensation committee or not can increase firm value in family firms more than non-family firms. Because of few volunteers, we can’t use difference-in-difference.
    The results implicate that voluntary formation of compensation committee is associated with leading enterprise in industry which establishes compensation committee, greater size of the firms, higher return on equity and higher independence of the board of directors. In addition, on comparing Compensation Committees established or not, there appears to be no significant correlation with firm value between family firms and non-family firms.
    Reference: 王麗莉,2014,法制化的規範對公司治理之效益探討-以審計及薪酬委員會為例, 私立東吳大學會計學系碩士在職專班論文。
    李伶珠與劉毅馨,2011,設置薪酬委員會之實務議題,會計研究月刊第308期(7月):62-66 。
    林國全,2012,「從強制設置薪酬委員會談起」,月旦法學雜誌,第202期(3 月):22-37。
    謝易宏,2009,薪甘勤願--簡介美國「薪酬委員會」,月旦民商法雜誌,第26期(12月): 144-170。

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    Description: 碩士
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102353025
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

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