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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/76862
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/76862


    Title: 民營化與經理人薪酬對聯貸條件之影響
    Authors: 吳周燕
    Wu, Chou Yen
    Contributors: 張元晨
    Chang, Yuan Chen
    吳周燕
    Wu, Chou Yen
    Keywords: 民營化
    政府股權
    聯合貸款
    聯貸費用
    經理人薪酬
    聯貸利率加碼
    財務限制條款
    privatization
    government ownership
    syndicated loan
    fee
    executive compensations
    spread
    covenants
    Date: 2015
    Issue Date: 2015-07-27 11:21:58 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 【第一部份論文中文摘要】
    本文使用1993 年至2007 年間67 家實施部分及完全民營化公司為樣本,探討國營企業民營化後對聯貸條件之影響。實證結果顯示,民營化後若政府沒有控制權,則聯貸利差擴大,若完全民營化則會被銀行要求提供擔保品,此外,借款公司的信用風險比較會透過聯貸利差及相關費用反映出來,比較不會透過聯貸金額或到期日等條件反映。這些實證結果與本文假說一致,顯示政府保證效果在民營化過程中對於銀行借款是一項重要因素。

    【第二部份論文中文摘要】
    本部分論文以美國1992年至2010年有銀行聯貸之1,560家借款公司及71家銀行為樣本,探討銀行CEO薪酬對於銀行風險及聯貸條件的影響。實證結果顯示非銀行業借款公司CEO的Vega與股票報酬變動度、系統性風險及非系統性風險間為顯著負向關係,但是其Delta則與股票報酬變動度為顯著正向關係,隱含CEO的Vega不會顯著提高股票報酬的風險,但Delta則會顯著提高股票報酬的風險。在探討CEO薪酬對聯貸條件影響時,結果顯示Vega及Delta與聯貸利率加碼間為顯著負向關係,但與財務限制個數間並無顯著關係存在。CEO相對負債權益比與聯貸利率加碼為顯著負向關係,隱含當CEO相對負債權益比較高時,的確會傾向降低公司風險,因此聯貸利率加碼較低。

    銀行業借款的實證結果顯示,銀行CEO的Vega及Delta均會顯著提高股票報酬的風險,且與Z-Score有負向關係但並未具統計上顯著性。此外,銀行CEO的Vega均與聯貸利率加碼及財務限制條款之個數間為正向關係,Delta則與聯貸利率加碼有正向關係,與財務限制條款之個數間為負向關係,但以上結果不具有統計上之顯著性。實證結果隱含,由於銀行業彼此間有資訊優勢,CEO的風險性薪酬對銀行營運之影響反而無法如同一般產業之公司明顯反映於聯貸條件上。
    【第一部份論文英文摘要】
    Using a sample of 67 partially and fully privatized firms, this paper investigates the effect of privatization on loan conditions from 1993 to 2007. The empirical results show that loan spreads widen when governments have no control right after privatization. In addition, loans are more likely to be secured when firms are fully privatized. The empirical results also show that credit risk of borrowing companies is more likely reflected through price-term conditions. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that implicit government guarantee is an important factor for bank loans during the privatization process.

    【第二部份論文英文摘要】
    Using sample of syndicated loans by 1,560 borrowing companies and 71 banks from 1992 to 2010, this paper investigates how CEO risk-taking incentives affect the syndicated loan conditions. For the results based on industrial firms’ syndicated loans, we find that CEO’s Vega is negatively related with stock return volatility, systemic risk, and idiosyncratic risk. Besides, there is a significantly positive relation between CEO’s Delta and stock return volatility. The results imply that CEO’s Vega lowers stock return volatility. However, CEO’s Delta raises the risk of stock return volatility, which is consistent with the findings in previous literature. We also find that both CEO’s Vega and Delta have negative relation with loan spreads but insignificantly related to financial covenants. Moreover, CEO’s debt to equity ratio to firm’s leverage has negative impacts on loan spreads. This implies that higher CEO’s debt to equity ratio to firm’s leverage promotes CEO to reduce firm risk resulting in lower spreads.

    For the results based on banks’ syndicated loans, we provide evidence that both bank CEOs’ Vega and Delta have significantly positive relations on the risk of stock returns. In additions, they have insignificantly negative relation with banks’ Z-Score. We also find that higher CEOs’ Vega leads to higher loan spreads and more covenants. Higher CEOs’ Delta are associated with higher spread but fewer covenants. The results imply that banks in the financial industry are familiar with each other, thus CEO risk-taking incentives may have insignificantly impacts on loan conditions relative to industrial companies.
    Reference: 【第一部份論文】
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    Description: 博士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理研究所
    98357501
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098357501
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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