|Abstract: ||這個計畫包含二個子題: (1) 會計師事務所總部的品質控制對於分所審計品質的影響 (2) 審計報告係由會計師事務所經協理簽字對審計品質的影響 在中國，所有的執業註冊會計師都必須接受各級註冊會計師協會的年度檢查，且該資訊 自2007 年起，已經可以公開取得。在揭露之資訊包括合夥會計師屬於哪一家分所之資 訊。初步的觀察顯示，有一定程度的審計報告係由「總所會計師」以及「分所會計師」 共同簽字；但是也同時發現皆由「分所會計師」簽證的查核報告。在假設有總所會計師 通時簽字之審計報告有較佳品質控制的前提下，本研究得以分析(1)會計師事務所的品質 控制如何影響審計品質，(2) 審計報告係由會計師事務所經協理簽字對審計品質的影響。 會計師事務所總部的品質控制對於分所審計品質的影響 該子計畫擬分析利用中國的數據分析會計師事務所的品質控制如何影響其分所的 審計品質。有別於美國的實務運作(事務所的總部為單純的管理職能)，在中國，會計師 事務所的總部同時肩負管理職能以及提供審計服務。具體而言，藉由異常應計、審計意 見以及審計公費等三個審計品質的代理變數，本研究將調查品質控制對個別審計合約、 分所整體以及事務所整體審計品質的影響。除此之外，也將進一步調查事務所規模如何 影響品質控制的成效。 審計報告係由會計師事務所經協理簽字對審計品質的影響 這部分分析經協理簽字查核報告與一般由合夥會計師簽字查核報告，二者間審計品 質的異同。雖然合夥會計師有較佳的經驗，但是合夥會計師來自未來收入考量以及期 望升遷之經協理的更力求表現等因素，可能使得經協理簽證的審計品質反而較佳。具 體而言，本研究擬比較二組樣本監審計品質與審計公費的異同，若能得到經協理簽字 有較佳的審計品質但合夥會計師簽字有較高的審計收費，那麼將發現一個在中國有趣 的觀察:高審計品質不必然伴隨較高的審計收費。|
This proposal includes two sub-projects, both using China data: (1) Quality Control on Audit-Offices of Audit Firms and Audit Quality of Audit-Offices, and (2) Audit Engagement Oversight by Managers. Quality Control on Audit-Offices of Audit Firms and Audit Quality of Audit-Offices Using unique data from China, this study examines how, in an audit firm, the degree of quality control at specific audit-offices affects audit quality. Audit firms in most countries, including the U.S., do not reveal their quality control information, and thus, researchers cannot examine its effects on the audit quality of audit-offices. However, the audit practice in China allows us to partially observe the degree of quality control audit-firms practice on particular audit-offices. In the U.S., as in China, the head office of an audit firm is a national administrative office. However, a head office in China additionally serves as a practice office; in other words, audit-offices performing audit engagements consist of the head office and its local offices. Head offices in China manage local offices by setting up quality control policy and, as a direct means of monitorship, involving engagements. Head offices with strong controlling power over a specific local office will, all other things being equal, are more likely to sign the audit report of a company. Put differently, head office controlling power decreases the probability that the local office most proximal to the firm signs an audit report. This study hypothesizes that the involvement of head offices can increase audit quality; thus, we have chosen a working designation – the headquarter effect. In this study the measures of audit quality includes abnormal accruals, auditor opinions, and audit pricing. I first analyze individual engagement, which predicts that an audit report is better when signed (or cosigned) by the head office than purely signed by a local office. The second angle is office level, which compares audit quality among audit-offices, and expects that audit-offices with higher portions of engagements cosigned by the head office have better audit quality than those with lower portions. The final investigation compares audit quality between audit-firms and expects that audit-firms with higher portions of engagements cosigned by the head office have better audit quality than those with lower portions. In addition, we divide the full sample into large audit-firms and small audit-firms. I will further examine the headquarter effect, if any, and whether audit-firm size influences the headquarter effect. If a large audit-firm contains efficient quality control mechanisms beyond the direct involvement of the head office, then the headquarter effect is more prominent in small audit-firms. Audit Engagement Oversight by Managers – Evidence from China This study investigates whether Chinese audits overseen by managers are of lower audit quality and monetary cost than Chinese audits overseen by partners. While one might expect partners with greater experience to provide higher quality and more expensive audits than managers, the pressure on partners to increase and maintain audit firm revenue could result in an opposite result. Examining audit reports issued by local auditors in China in 2010, this study investigate whether an audit report signed by the engagement manager is more likely to contain a modified audit opinion and cost greater fees than an audit report signed by the engagement partner. Using the findings of this study can answerer whether higher auditors rank require greater cost, at least within the Chinese audit environment.