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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/77417

Title:	Social norms, costly punishment and the evolution of cooperation
Authors:	Yu, Tongkui;Chen, Shu-Heng;Li, Honggang 于同奎;陳樹衡
Contributors:	經濟系人工智慧經濟學研究中心
Keywords:	Social norm;Costly punishment;Cooperative evolutionary stable state;Attraction basin;Convergence speed
Date:	2015-01
Issue Date:	2015-08-05 14:25:42 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	Within a co-evolutionary framework of reputations, strategies and social norms, we study the role of punishment in the promotion of cooperation. Norms differ according to whether they allow or do not allow the punishment action to be a part of the strategies, and, in the case of the former, they further differ in terms of whether they encourage or do not encourage the punishment action. In such a framework, depending on the applied social norm, players are first given different reputations based on their employed strategies. Players then update their strategies accordingly after they observe the payoff differences among different strategies. Finally, over a longer horizon, the evolution of the social norms may be driven by the average payoffs of all members of the society. The strategy dynamics are articulated under different social norms. It is found that costly punishment does contribute to the evolution toward cooperation. Not only does the attraction basin of the cooperative evolutionary stable state become larger, but the speed of convergence to the CESS also becomes faster. These two properties are further enhanced if the punishment action is encouraged by the social norm.
Relation:	Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 11, 313–343
Data Type:	article
DOI link:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11403-015-0146-8
DOI:	10.1007/s11403-015-0146-8
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Economics] Periodical Articles

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