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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 金融學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/78213
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/78213

    Title: Executive Compensation and Hedging Behavior: Evidence from Taiwan
    Authors: Wu, Ming-Cheng;Liao, Szu-Lang;Huang, Yi-Ting
    Contributors: 金融系
    Keywords: agency problems;executive compensation;hedging behavior;risk-taking incentives
    Date: 2012
    Issue Date: 2015-09-02 17:06:50 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: This study examines the relationship between managerial risk-taking incentives and hedging derivatives usage. We have three results. First, executives' risk-taking incentives are negatively related to the hedging derivatives holdings, a result consistent with equity-based compensation that promotes risk taking. Second, the indexed stock options appear to create stronger risk-taking incentives than the traditional stock options. Third, managerial risk-taking incentives are significantly related to executive stock options but not stock holdings.
    Relation: International Review of Accounting, Banking & Finance, 4(2), 1-27
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[金融學系] 期刊論文

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