德渥肯（Ronald Dworkin）提出了下列「合法性論證」（the legitimacyargument）來主張政府不能限制仇恨言論：在民主社會中，假定A想要訴諸仇恨言論來表達意見，而政府卻限制他使用仇恨言論；此時A就等於被剝奪了同等表達意見的機會，對A並不公平；因此，政府不能限制仇恨言論。然而瓦爾準（Jeremy Waldron）反對德渥肯的「合法性論證」，理由如下：A既可以訴諸會傷害他人的仇恨言論來表達意見，又可以訴諸不會傷害他人的非仇恨言論來表達立場；若是如此，則政府當然有合理理由要求A使用不會傷害他人的非仇恨言論來表達意見。藍騰（Rae Langton）則援引英國語言哲學家奧斯丁（John Langshaw Austin）的言語行為理論（speech acts theory）來支持瓦爾準的主張，並認為政府應限制仇恨言論。筆者將利用語言哲學來分析瓦爾準及藍騰的主張，並證明瓦爾準及藍騰的主張並不能成立。 According to Ronald Dworkin's legitimacy argument, anti-discrimination laws could not be legitimately enforced unless their opponents, some of whom are racists, are given appropriate opportunity to state their opposition to them. Dworkin concludes that the legitimacy of anti-discrimination laws may be imperiled if we do not include hate speech among the forms of speech that are protected by the freedom of political speech. Jeremy Waldron argues that Dworkin's legitimacy argument fails by pointing out that racists can object to anti-discrimination laws through non-racist speech. Rae Langton explores the nature of hate speech and argues against Dworkin that laws protecting free speech should not allow hate speech. I will argue that Waldron and Langton fail to show why we should not tolerate hate speech. If I am right, then it follows that limitations on hate speech cannot be justified even if hate speech causes harm to others.