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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/81457
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/81457


    Title: 企業超額現金持有與租稅規避
    Corporate Excess Cash Holdings and Tax Avoidance
    Authors: 蔡麗雯
    Tsai, Lih Wen
    Contributors: 陳明進
    Chen, Ming Chin
    蔡麗雯
    Tsai, Lih Wen
    Keywords: 超額現金持有
    租稅規避
    有效稅率
    財稅所得差異
    Excess Cash Holdings
    Tax Avoidance
    Effective Tax Rates
    Book Tax Differences
    Date: 2015
    Issue Date: 2016-03-01 10:26:05 (UTC+8)
    Abstract:   本文以民國87年到103年我國上市櫃公司個別報表為樣本,實證研究發現租稅負擔愈重的公司,在「預防動機」下會傾向持有比較多的現金或超額現金,以作為日後稅款繳納的資金來源;此外,也發現愈有意圖以租稅規避節省稅款繳納的現金流出之企業,其留存的現金或超額現金持有部位也愈高。
      再者,股票市場投資者認為企業租稅規避活動而節省的超額現金,受到債務契約中嵌入的限制性條款或加速條之約束,而無法用於發放股利或是股利發放金額低於股東預期值,因此會回應予負向的超額權益報酬。另外,本文也發現企業會傾向將租稅規避活動而節省的超額現金用於償還短期借款,或保留作為日後長期借款的還款資金來源,藉以減輕企業負債的資金成本。
      最後,合併報表樣本同樣也發現集團企業租稅負擔愈重時,愈傾向持有更多的超額現金(或現金持有)作為日後稅款繳納的資金來源;而若以聯屬企業租稅負擔低於母公司租稅負擔作為租稅規避的代理變數時,則發現企業會將租稅規避所節省的現金流量用於投資或擴廠等用途,因此發現租稅規避與現金或超額現金持有具有負向關聯性;再者,企業為了避免補繳海外資金匯回的所得稅款,乃傾向將避稅節省的超額現金留滯於境外,故股票市場投資者仍然負面看待企業租稅規避之超額現金的邊際價值。
    This study first examines the effects of tax avoidance on corporate excess cash holdings. The empirical result shows that, ceteris paribus, firms with higher effective tax rates tend to have greater excess cash holdings, which is consistent with the precautionary savings motive that financially-constrained firms proactively save more cash to pay future cash needs. In addition, firms which actively engaged in tax avoidance exhibit greater excess cash holdings.
    This study then examines the relation between tax avoidance and the value of excess cash holdings. Following the Faulkender and Wang (2006) approach, this study uses excess equity returns to estimate the value of excess cash to equityholders. The result shows a negative relation between tax avoidance and the marginal value of excess cash holdings to equityholders, supporting the costly contracting hypothesis. Additional analysis reveals that firms engage in tax avoidance activities to minimize taxes and are likely to use excess cash holdings to retire debt, leading to a lower cost of debt.
    Finally, based on the financial data of consolidated financial statements, the results also show that a positive relation between effective tax rates and the excess cash holdings, which is consistent with the transaction costs hypothesis that multinational corporations, to aviod repatriation taxes, retain cash holdings abroad and use that cash for overseas investments. Thus, tax avoidance is negatively related to excess cash holdings. In addition, based on the financial data of consolidated financial statements, the result also shows a negative relation between tax avoidance and the marginal value of excess cash holdings to equityholders. This result suggests that additional dollars of excess cash holdings arising from tax avoidance activities of multinational corporations are likely to be kept aborad to avoid the repatriation tax, rather than to be distributed to shareholders as an increase of cash dividend. Therefore, the stock market responds negatively to the excess cash holdings arising from tax avoidance.
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    Description: 博士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    95353502
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095353502
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

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