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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/81777
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/81777

    Title: Stock-Based Compensation in a Concentrated Ownership Setting: An Empirical Investigation
    Authors: 梁嘉紋
    Contributors: 會計系
    Keywords: Stock-based compensation;concentrated ownership;controlling owners and minority shareholders;cash flow rights and voting rights
    Date: 2016
    Issue Date: 2016-03-02 14:23:41 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: Stock-based compensation has been viewed as an important mechanism for tying managers’ wealth to firm performance, and thus alleviating the agency conflict between the shareholders and the managers when ownership is diffused. However, in a concentrated ownership structure, controlling owners are usually the management of the firm; they can engage in self-dealing activities to the detriment of minority shareholders’ interests. Yet, outside investors may anticipate the problem and discount the share price for the entrenchment behaviors they observe. In this study, we investigate how controlling owners trade off the benefits and the costs of using stock-based compensation. Based on a sample of Taiwanese firms, our evidence shows that stock-based compensation is negatively related to the agency problem embedded in a concentrated ownership structure. This relation is evident among firms with more frequent equity offerings. Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that controlling owners consider the negative price effects of stock-based compensation and trade off these costs with the benefits of expropriating minority shareholders’ interests, particularly when firms seek more external equity capital. Our results hold after controlling for selection bias and share collateral by controlling owners.
    Relation: Journal of Business, Finance, and Accounting,
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12167
    DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12167
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 期刊論文

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