English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 91280/121421 (75%)
Visitors : 25392457      Online Users : 86
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/84154


    Title: 金融資產證券化道德風險之探討與防範金融危機之配套研究
    Other Titles: Moral Hazard Behavior of the Asset Securitization Process and the Firewall Mechanism against Financial Crises
    Authors: 林左裕
    Contributors: 地政學系
    Keywords: 道德風險;金融資產證券化;住宅抵押貸款違約;政府保證
    moral hazard;asset securitization;residential mortgage default;government guarantee
    Date: 2012
    Issue Date: 2016-04-12 14:33:56 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 2007 年美國爆發的次貸危機(Subprime Crisis),重創了美國的金融與房地產 市場,由於證券化的機制使得這一原本只是美國境內的次貸違約事件,演變成為 影響全球金融的金融海嘯(Financial Tsunami)。 許多探討次貸危機的文獻指出證券化機制是造成美國此一房貸違約問題蔓 延至全球的元兇,然美國自1970年代便開始實施金融資產證券化,至發生次貸危 機已將近四十年,為何之前沒有發生類似的問題?因此部分文獻指出次貸危機的 主因並非是證券化,而是不當的鼓勵高舉債購屋之住宅政策及政府間接要求 Government-Sponsored Agencies(GSAs, 如FNMA 及FHLMC)所提供之保證,而 使放款機構降低其放款審核標準,終究在後續油價上漲引發通貨膨脹後,政府採 緊縮貨幣政策而導致違約潮。這些一連串不當的政策引發銀行放款及證券化之過 程中之「道德風險」(Moral Hazard),即銀行在放款時因GSA保證及資產證券化 移轉風險等機制而放寬審核標準,故造成房貸違約機率上升。有鑑於此,本研究 擬藉Logit Model分析銀行貸放及資產證券化過程中之「道德風險」如何影響違約 行為、以及藉此結果探討我國金融資產證券化條例中規範疏漏之處,期能在防範 未然,避免類似金融風暴在臺灣重演。
    The 2007 subprime mortgage crisis has severely struck the stability of the worldwide financial markets. Some literature attributed this crisis to the asset securitization mechanism due to its nature of transferring risks to investors in secondary markets. The asset securitization was incepted in 1970s, however, why the systematic crisis did not occur until 2007? Were there other factors besides the securitization mechanism arisen to facilitate the crisis? Some researches indicate that moral hazard problems originated from inappropriate policies, such as “Affordable Housing Plan”, requiring the GSAs’ guarantee toward subprime mortgages, and encouraging banks to relax lending requirements, are the main factors causing the crisis. This study firstly intends to categorize some moral hazard factors, such as the existence of mortgage guarantee, the ratio of asset securitization, the Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio, and the existence of second lien, …, to conduct the empirical analysis for these factors’ impact on default. According to the empirical results, secondly, this study will review the current regulations in the Banking Acts and Asset Securitization Acts, and propose suggestions to reduce moral hazard problems and enhance the regulation environment and market’s stability. It is expected that the results of this study will be applied to avoid the occurrence of similar crisis in Taiwan.
    Relation: 計畫編號 NSC101-2410-H004-203
    Data Type: report
    Appears in Collections:[地政學系] 國科會研究計畫

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    101-2410-H004-203.pdf1844KbAdobe PDF208View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback