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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/84173


    Title: 公司治理與利益輸送之防免-集團企業之五鬼搬運
    Other Titles: Corporate Governance and Prevention of Tunneling—Tunneling Problem of Corporate Groups
    Authors: 方嘉麟
    Contributors: 法律學系
    Date: 2012
    Issue Date: 2016-04-12 15:42:11 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: SOGO本屬太設集團,太設財務困窘,SOGO長期扮演提款機角色,供應現金流。後太設控制股東章氏父子與李恆隆等意圖將SOGO自太設集團分割出去,過程中衍生諸多問題,包括(一)集團企業運作規範與負責人責任(1)解決不同法系之矛盾:在我國陸續引進德國法系的關係企業專章,英美法系的忠實義務,以及英國法下之影子董事後,已經到需通盤檢視、解決不同體系間矛盾、對立的時候。以SOGO案為例,章氏父子宣稱切割SOGO是為救太設集團,法律究應如何評價切割SOGO拯救太設集團此一命題。(2)整合公司法最新修訂有關影子董事與控制股東設質的規範:例如SOGO案中幕後獻策者林華德等人有無可能因此概念而需負責?而章氏父子財務發生嚴重危機,事實上SOGO股票亦多已質押給銀行換取現金,新增之公司法197條之1第二項,是否屬集團企業發生危機時的良好防制方法亦值探討。(3)因應我國習見之金字塔與交叉持股之集團控股型態: 太流本為太設百分之百控股的子公司,假設太設為分割SOGO把SOGO股份與大樓售於其百分之百控股的太流,換取太流股份,縱使太設當時山窮水盡,SOGO股份與大樓為太設「主要資產」,依我國企併法第28條,太設亦無庸交由股東會決議,董事會本身就可決定。自本案事實觀察,祇要太流大幅增資(依公司法,祇需由太流董事會決議),就可使SOGO經營權落入他人之手,可以說在法律設計上,太設股東毫無置喙餘地。我國法律對集團企業金字塔控股設計顯無法有效因應,而太流與SOGO的大幅交叉持股,(所謂的完美「切割」至此完成),在形式上似未違反公司法第167條有關交叉持股的禁止規定,但此往往被經營者濫用以鞏固本身的經營權,或作資產(包括控制權)之挪移,則相關規範亦應全面檢討。以及(二)、集團發生財務危機時就控制股東挪移資產之「協力者」的責任設計:集團企業的控制股東在財務危殆時,若擬挪移資產,往往需要第三者協力。在SOGO一案,李恆隆乃至徐旭東都在某種程度參與、協力切割之設計,則此等人士有無可能亦須負責?這對受害的SOGO或太設小股東而言,意義格外重大,蓋章氏父子很可能無足夠資力負起責任。同時,責任的課加在經濟分析層面,或許也能遏止第三者「趁火打劫」、「趁虛而入」,從而增加控制股東五鬼搬運的困難。
    This project focuses on the research of tunneling by affiliated companies, and tries to resolve the battle for corporate control in the Sogo case. Specifically, the following issues will be explored: 1. The conceptual conflict arising from different legal systems, i.e. the facilitation approach of group companies under the German system, the “controlling shareholders as fiduciaries” model of the U.S. system, and the “shadow directors” scheme of the British system, 2. The tunneling problems with respect to pyramid and cross-shareholding structure, and 3. The device to protect minority shareholders of subsidiaries when the parent company faces financial crisis, in particular, the right to bring direct action by such minority shareholders against the parent company or individuals that control the parent company. The Sogo case also highlights an important issue that has received little attention from corporate law scholars—the role played by aiders (whether knowing or innocent ) of tunneling, and their respective duties. This project will conduct an extensive review of internal control mechanism and tries to set up procedural safeguards to deter vulture aiders.
    Relation: 計畫編號 NSC101-2410-H004-041-MY2
    Data Type: report
    Appears in Collections:[法律學系] 國科會研究計畫

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