金融市場有著嚴重資訊不對稱的問題，信用評等機構就是扮演減輕資訊不對稱的角色， 這種資訊不對稱的情形在銀行與保險業更為明顯。而英國勞依茲市場裡的辛迪卡，即 是以核保巨大複雜而難以精算費率的風險著稱，此市場比銀行與保險業更不透明，由 於以辛迪卡為樣本的研究相當少，更顯出本研究的重要性與特殊性。 我們將探討勞依茲市場辛迪卡的評等議題，包括：影響辛迪卡是否被評等與評等高低 的決定因子。所用的資料庫為Standard & Poor’s 與A.M. Best 的2006 至2010 年的資料 庫，這兩個資料庫本質上有所不同，前者的評等大多係評等公司利用公開的財務資訊 加以評定；後者則是透過評等公司與辛迪卡之間互動的過程，並參考辛迪卡提供內部 資訊，才決定評等的高低，由於資料庫有此本質的不同，讓我們預期研究評等議題所 得到的結果會更為有趣。 我們預期由於勞依茲市場的特性，會讓我們所得到的結果，與文獻中探討評等決定因 子的結果，很不相同。勞依茲市場辛迪卡係個別承保風險，但他們的資本卻存在勞依 茲中央基金，這個基金全額保障所有在1993 年以後任何一家辛迪卡所銷售的保單，亦 即當辛迪卡因為各種原因而沒有辦法支應賠款時，中央基金都會代為全額賠償，保戶 的權益不會因此受損。由於此一特性，我們預期利用Standard & Poor’s 的資料庫，我 們將發現辛迪卡並沒有動機去公開資訊，以得到評等。與過去文獻不同，我們預期大 部分會影響評等高低的決定因子，並不會影響辛迪卡是否被評等的機率。然而，我們 預期：利用A.M. Best 的資料會得到相反的結果。此外，我們也要探討影響辛迪卡評等 意圖的決定因子。 本計畫也將探討是否利用公開資訊所給的評等會比互動所給的評等為低。如果真是如 此，可能的原因又為何？我們預期前者的評等會比後者低，主要的原因可能是評等機 構在給予辛迪卡評等時過於保守。 Rating agencies have played an important role of mitigating informational asymmetries in financial markets by assessing creditworthiness of bond issuers and financial firms (banks and insurers). Lloyd’s syndicates are well known as an insurance/reinsurance provider for risks that are huge, complex, unusual and difficult to actuarially price, suggesting that syndicates are less transparent than banks and insurers. This highlights the importance of the current study, given that there has been limited research in the area of syndicate ratings. This project aims to examine the determinants of Lloyd’s syndicate ratings. To be more specific, we wish to find the factors that affect syndicates’ decision to be rated and their rating level, using Standard & Poor’s and A.M. Best’s syndicate rating data for the period 2006-2010. Standard & Poor’s assigns ratings to a syndicate mainly based on public information, while Best’s assigns ratings through an interactive process. This fundamental difference in these two data sets makes this research interesting. It is worthwhile to note that syndicates underwrite risk on a respective basis but their capital is mutualized at a market level through the Lloyd’s Central Fund. Unlike the guaranty funds in insurance markets across the world, the Lloyd’s Central Fund actually plays a role as a guarantee fund and serves as full security for all policies issued by syndicates from the 1993 year of account onward. Due to Lloyd’s Central Fund, we expect that syndicates are less motivated to obtain a rating. We expect that non-rated and rated syndicates are not statistically different in terms of their financial characteristics in relation to Standard & Poor’s ratings. Unlike prior studies, we expect to find out that most of the factors important in determining the rating level are not important in determining the rating probability. However, we expect to have an opposite outcome for Best’s rating. Moreover, we attempt to examine the factors that affect rating intentions of syndicates. This project also attempts to test whether public information ratings generally are lower interactive ratings. If this is the case, we will further examine why. It is expected that the public-information ratings are biased downward. We expect that strategic conservatism of rating agencies can better explain than strategic self-selection behavior of syndicates why the public information ratings are lower than the interactive ratings.