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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/85707

    Title: 經理人是否應對公司承擔過高風險負責--由公司治理看高階管理人員薪資
    Other Titles: Did Executives Take Extra Risks for Their Own Gain? Examining Executive Compensation from Corporate Governance Perspective
    Authors: 盧敬植
    Contributors: 財務管理學系
    Keywords: 高階經理人報酬;部分鑑定法;公司治理;違約風險
    Executive Compensation;Partial Identification;Corporate Governance;Default Risk
    Date: 2013
    Issue Date: 2016-04-20 16:31:52 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本計劃目標在於探索高階經理人的高額報酬是否因他們讓公司承擔過高風險而 來,我們同時也將討論經理人的報酬所無法被公司所承擔的風險以及其他財務變數所 解釋的部份是否來自不良的公司治理。 在金融風暴的後續檢討中,公司高階經理人的報酬被所有人拿到放大鏡下檢視,他 們的薪資結構也成為財務制度改革的重點項目之一。在這樣的情況下,我們更需要了 解這些豐厚的薪資到底是來自於承擔過度的風險還是來自於失敗的公司治理。 這篇文章中我們首先以混合迴歸與固定效果模型建立薪資決定的規則。在解釋變數 的選取上,我們採取文獻中常見的財務變數以及代表風險的兩個指標之一-淨負債比 例與違約距離-來解釋公司高階經理人的報酬。當我們確定風險對於薪資的影響是否 存在後,我們會以部分鑑定法 (partial identification) 來解釋公司治理指標對經理人報 酬所無法被前述模型所掌握的部分。這一步驟可以幫助我們了解到底我們是否需要對 被稱作「肥貓」的高階經理人施加更多的薪資管制,抑或是董事會及股東必需要為經 理人的冒險作為負責。
    This project aims to explore the relation between risk-taking and executive compensation, and whether poor corporate governance can induce unexplained compensation. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, executive compensation has been under scrutiny and it has become the financial overhaul target of regulators. It is essential to know whether the lucrative compensation came from excess risk-taking, or it is simply from failed governance. We will first establish the compensation rule with traditional structural model approach. Pooled regression and fixed-effects model are two natural choices. On top of the usual candidates of financial variables, we will also include one of two different risk measures – net debt ratio and distance to default- to explain executive compensation. Once we confirm the link between risk-taking and compensation, or lack thereof, we will examine the impact of corporate governance on the un-explained part of compensation with partial identification approach. This last step will help us determine whether the “fat cats” need to be explicitly regulated or it is the board/shareholders who should be held responsible for their misdeed.
    Relation: 計畫編號 NSC 102-2410-H004-068
    Data Type: report
    Appears in Collections:[財務管理學系] 國科會研究計畫

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