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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/92158

    Title: 規範型態與公司治理模式的建構累積投票制「變」與「不變」的省思與啟示(上)、(下)
    Other Titles: Regulatory Models and the Construction of Corporate Governance Regimes
    Authors: 邵慶平
    Shao, Ching-Ping
    Keywords: 公司治理;網路外部性;交易成本;契約連鎖理論;直接投票制;累積投票制
    corporate governance;cumulative voting;straight voting;nexus of contracts;transaction cost;network externality
    Date: 2006-02
    Issue Date: 2016-05-05 17:25:51 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 近年來,公司治理法制的改革正積極進行。然而,法制的變革常係單純地將外國法制加以移植,而對於企業實務的現況,未能加以注意。此外,立法、行政機關對於不同規範機制與企業實務間的關聯,也可能缺乏正確的認知。在此情形下,法制改革的成效如何,實非無疑。本文對於累積投票制的研究正是基於公司治理法制與實務互動的觀察。從保護少數股東之利益來看,累積投票制被認為經常扮演著重要的角色,此一制度的建構在比較公司治理上也受到廣泛的重視。就我國法制而言,公司法第一九八條原要求公司必須採行累積投票制,而在九十年公司法修正後,則將之改為任意規定。然而,值得注意的是,法規上「從強制到任意」的修訂,並未帶來企業實務上的轉變,絕大多數的公司目前仍使用累積投票制來選任董監事。在分析了導致此一法制上的「變」與實務上的「不變」的原因後,本文不僅對上述修法結果提出反省,更對未來累積投票制在我國應有之規範模式提出建議。
    In recent years, the legal reform of corporate governance has been aggressively pursued in Taiwan. However, modification of the legal model is often limited to borrowing foreign laws and regulations without paying attention to the norms of the business community. Moreover, lawmakers and administrative authorities might not be able to recognize accurately enough the interrelation between various regulatory means and business practices. Under such circumstances, the effect of legal reform is far from certain. The observation of the interaction between legal rules and norms in corporate governance has lead to this paper on cumulative voting. In view of the protection of minority shareholders, cumulative voting is believed to play a significant role. The institution of this voting mechanism has also attracted much attention in comparative corporate governance. In Taiwan, cumulative voting was previously required in Article 198 of Company Law. Since the law was amended in 2001, permissive cumulative voting has been put into place. It is worth noting, however, that the change from mandatory rule to permissive provision has not brought about a transformation in business practice. Most, if not all, of Taiwan’s companies still employ cumulative voting to elect their directors and supervisors. After analyzing the causes responsible for the variation and constancy of cumulative voting, this paper not only provides reflections on the change of mandatory cumulative voting, but also make suggestions on the future of cumulative voting in Taiwan’s regulatory structure.
    Relation: 法學評論, 89, 109-142
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[法學評論 TSSCI] 期刊論文

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