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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 金融學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/94765
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/94765


    Title: 公司拍賣機制之探討
    Authors: 范芳瑜
    Contributors: 李桐豪
    范芳瑜
    Keywords: 購併
    拍賣理論
    公司拍賣機制
    中央存款保險公司
    Date: 2008
    Issue Date: 2016-05-09 11:50:08 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 在有關購併的一系列探討議題中,有關非單一主併公司進行購併,要如何決定不同機制的應用,因為實證上的資料不易取得,於文獻中探討的篇幅相對較少。
    Hansen(2001)大致整理美國80-90年代期間公司購併的相關資料,簡單歸納出二階段式的公司拍賣機制,最常為實務上所應用。本研究以此為出發點,延續公司拍賣機制的探討。透過拍賣理論中有關於競標的機制,重新以公司作為競標物,與傳統拍賣機制之標的物作出區隔,整理出三種可運用於公司拍賣的機制。此外,探討公司拍賣與傳統拍賣最大的差異性,在於公司拍賣中由於本身所擁有的資訊有其價值性,將直接影響競價者(主併者)對標的物的預期價值,因此本研究也以熵(Entropy)建構資訊價值函數,對競價者的預期價值作調整。本研究最後一部分,藉由電腦模擬的方式,將整理的三種公司拍賣機制與傳統拍賣機制應用於中央存款保險公司出售Good Bank流程之上,得出不同機制下的效益,作為不同潛在競價者(主併者)人數下選擇機制的判別因素。
    結果得出在不納入資訊價值於競價得標收益前提下,拍賣機制的選擇對賣方收益影響有限。不論何種分配或潛在人數多寡,即使運用不同的拍賣機制,賣方邊際預期收益隨著競價人數增加皆有收斂之情形,唯有中央存款保險公司現存處理Good Bank機制因抽樣來自不同分配呈現不同程度的效益落後。但當潛在競價人數偏低時,仍以二階段拍賣機制效益最佳。納入資訊考量後,通過門檻的比例,會影響資訊價值的獲益及損害函數,尤其損害函數受通過門檻比例影響特別明顯,連帶對賣方最終預期收益帶來影響。因此,在納入資訊價值後,分辨競價買方來自何種分配?同時考慮潛在競價者人數,成為賣方追求最大獲益,所必須同時考量的兩個因素。在進行敏感度分析時,本研究假設資訊價值損益因子可以獨立作區隔,結果得出部分情境可藉此帶來更高的邊際收益增量,但要如何明確的區分不同的資訊影響因子,更進一步控制其資訊揭露程度,就實務而言則有執行上的困難。
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    2. 徐村和、楊宗欣(2000),應用模糊層級分析法評選廣告媒體,管理與系統,第七卷,第一期,115-138
    3. 徐村和(1998),模糊德菲層級分析法,模糊系統學刊,第四卷,第1期,59-72
    4. S. H. Chen and C. H. Hsieh(1999), “Graded mean integration representation of generalized fuzzy number”, 模糊系統學刊, 第五卷, 第二期,1-7
    5. Boone, Audra L. and J. Harold Mulherin (2007), “How Are Firms Sold? ” Journal of Finance
    6. Bulow, J. I. and Klemperer, P.D. (1999b), “ Price and Winner’s Curse,” Nuffeld College, Oxfield University Discussion Paper.
    7. Bulow, J. I. and Roberts, D. J. (1989), “The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions,” Journal of Political Economy, 97, 1060-90.
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    10. Hansen, Robert G. (2001) “Auctions of companies,” Economic Inquiry, 39, 30–43.
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    12. John G. Riley and William F. Samuelson, (1981), “Optimal Auctions,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Jun., 1981), 381-392
    13. Levis, D. and Smith, J. L. (1994), “Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry,” American Economic Review, 84, 585-99
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    19. Milgrom, P. R. (1981), “Auction Theory,” In Truman F. Bewley (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    金融研究所
    95352025
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095352025
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[金融學系] 學位論文

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