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    政大機構典藏 > 學術期刊 > 會計評論 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/97074
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/97074


    Title: 強制揭露員工紅利對盈餘影響資訊之政策效果評估
    Other Titles: Evaluating the Mandatory Disclosure Effect of Pro Forma EPS Deducted by Employee Bonus in Taiwan
    Authors: 范宏書;陳慶隆
    Fan, Hung-Shu;Chen, Ching-Lung
    Keywords: 員工紅利;稀釋效果;誘因效果;考慮擬議配發員工紅利及董監酬勞後之設算每股盈餘
    Employee bonus;Dilution effect;Incentive effect;Pro forma EPS deducted by employee bonus
    Date: 2006-01
    Issue Date: 2016-05-31 16:25:46 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 證期會發佈台財政六字第0920000457號令,要求自2002會計年度起,公開發行公司須揭露董事會通過之考慮擬議配發員工紅利及董監酬勞後設算每股盈餘資訊,企求藉此規範權宜地解決有關員工紅利會計處理的爭議。此種以「揭露」取代正式「認列」的權宜政策可否達到政策目的?投資者是否會認知到員工紅利的本質是費用,而在規範實施後自動調整其對股票的評價?此為本研究欲探討的主題。本研究以1999至2004年間有發放員工紅利之上市(櫃)公司為樣本,發現在證期會強制要求揭露考慮擬議配發員工紅利及董監酬勞後之設算每股盈餘及相關資訊之後,員工紅利資訊(特別是股票紅利)對股價之稀釋效果顯著增強,顯示投資者意識到員工紅利是盈餘的減項,會自動調整其對發放員工紅利之公司的股票評價。另外,觀察員工紅利宣告日前後5日之異常報酬發現,在強制揭露員工紅利資訊的規範實施後,宣布發放員工紅利的公司其股價呈現負異常報酬反應,此亦顯示投資人似乎對於員工紅利係費用性質以及公司價值稀釋效果作出反應,且此效果甚至大過員工紅利之誘因效果。因此,不論就年度之長觀察期或5日之短觀察期,均發現證期會強制揭露政策之實施使得員工紅利稀釋效果顯著增強,故就強制揭露之目的而言,證期會的權宜性規範似乎可以促成投資者對公司價值重作評估,達到政策目的。
    Based on Taiwan’s regulation, the employee bonus is treated as an item of after-tax-earnings distribution rather than an expense of a firm. The Taiwan Securities and Futures Commission promulgated a new order on January 30, 2003 which required public companies to “disclose pro forma EPS deducted by employee bonus and director/supervisor compensation” rather than to “recognize employee bonus and director/supervisor compensation as a firm expense” in 2002 (and later) annual reports. Could such an expedient regulation make investors realize that the employee bonus is an expense that should be formally recognized in firm’s financial statements? This study is motivated to examine the mandatory disclosure effect of employee bonus as a firm expense after this new order is enforced. The empirical results indicate that the interactive variable of employee stock bonus and the dummy for the years of carrying out the new order is significantly negatively related to stock price. It evidences that the dilution effect of employee bonus (particularly stock bonus) becomes stronger than before. The results of the event study on 5-days around the employee bonus announcement date also indicate that investors reverse their stock valuation after the new order, and suggest that the dilution effect of employee stock bonus becomes stronger and even dominates its incentive effect. That is, the mandatory disclosure policy of pro forma EPS deducted by employee bonus and director/supervisor compensation achieves its objective.
    Relation: 會計評論, 42,109-140頁
    International Journal of Accounting Studies
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[會計評論] 期刊論文

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