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    Title: CFO與審計委員會的相對影響力與監管主體處罰的關聯性
    The Relative Power of CFO versus Audit Committee and the Enforcement Actions
    Authors: 吳歡逸
    Contributors: 林良楓
    吳歡逸
    Keywords: CFO
    審計委員會
    財務違規
    處罰
    Date: 2016
    Issue Date: 2016-07-01 14:56:35 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究以監管主體（包括證監會、深、滬兩所證券交易所、財政部）於2007年至2014年間發佈的行政處罰公告為素材，對中國深、滬交易所上市公司為研究樣本。本研究旨在探討公司CFO相對於審計委員會的影響力大小，是否會影響到監管主體的處罰。其次，本研究亦進一步研究公司CFO相對審計委員會的影響力大小，與監管主體處罰的嚴重程度之關係。
    本研究之實證結果顯示，公司CFO相對審計委員會的影響力越大，越可能因財務違規行為受到監管主體處罰。此外，本研究也發現，公司CFO相對審計委員會的影響力越大，公司因財務違規行為受到監管主體的處罰就越嚴重。
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    103353044
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1033530441
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Accounting] Theses

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