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    Title: 「黨管一切」或是「部門利益」:以三峽大壩與青藏鐵路的決策為例
    Other Titles: “Party-State Interests” or “Bureaucratic Interests”? Example of Decision-Making Processes for “Three Gorges Dam” and “Qinghai-Tibet Railway”
    Authors: 趙建民;蔡文軒
    Chao, Chien-min;Tsai, Wen-shuen
    Keywords: 三峽大壩;分裂權威主義;部門利益;青藏鐵路;「委託╱代理」關係;黨國利益
    bureaucratic interests;fragmented authoritarianism;party-state interests;principal-agent theory;Qinghai-Tibet railway;Three Gorges Dam
    Date: 2010-06
    Issue Date: 2016-07-19 16:34:17 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 作者藉由「委託╱代理」關係,去解釋黨中央與國務院的決策運作,並以「三峽大壩」與「青藏鐵路」為例案。本文認為中共黨國體系決策過程,存在「黨國利益」與「部門利益」的雙元利益考量。「三峽大壩」僅涉及「部門利益」的決策,黨中央無明顯立場,具體決策權移至國務院,使得下屬部門可參與議價,決策結果呈現出「部門獲利」的形態;而「青藏鐵路」則因涉及「黨國利益」,黨中央立場明確,部門無法議價,故導致「黨管一切」的決策形態。本文認為,中共黨國力量的強大,因此李侃如所謂的「分裂權威主義」,只出現在無涉「黨國利益」的決策上,但涉及「黨國利益」的決策,仍為「黨管一切」的形態。易言之,「黨管一切」與「部門獲利」的形態,同時呈現在中共決策體系內部。中共的決策體系之根底,仍無法擺脫黨國體制的遺續,短期內不會出現全面多元化。
    We intend to use the principal-agent theory to explain the process in which the Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the State Council make decisions. Two cases, “Three Gorges Dam” and “Qinghai-Tibet Railway”, are used as examples to show the main difference. This paper concludes that the dual-interests principle, consisting of “party-state interests” and “bureaucratic interests,” dominates the decision making process. For instance, the “Three Gorges Dam” case related only to “bureaucratic interests” in which the CPC Central Committee had no strong position and thus the decision power moved to the State Council. As a result, subordinate departments were allowed to participate in price negotiations and the results demonstrated a decision-making pattern prone to “bureaucratic interests”. On the other hand, the CPC Central Committee clearly stated that the case of “Qinghai-Tibet Railway” was involved with “party-state interests”, in which the Party should control everything and none of the subordinate departments was allowed to have any bargaining power. As a result, “party dictatorship” appeared to be the decision-making pattern. This paper thus argues that the theory of “fragmented authoritarianism” proposed by Kenneth Lieberthal will apply only to those decisions in which “party-state interests” are not involved, because the CCP deems “party-state interests” as its sole decision territory. In other words, there exists a dual-interests principle in the decision-making system of Chinese Communist Party. As long as the party-state legacy still prevails in the CCP, it is most unlikely for a fully pluralistic decision-making pattern to appear in China, especially in the near future.
    Relation: 中國大陸研究, 53(2), 39-72
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[中國大陸研究 TSSCI] 期刊論文

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