然而，一旦此一制度出現後，便成為一個可進行利益博弈的「局」，各方力量便進入此局進行博弈，並且形成了一個多次博弈的局面，因而各方力量在此達致某種利益交換的均衡。一旦如此，這個「參與式預算」的制度便具有其自身內在的可持續生命力，因而不再是一個短暫的現象。 There are many new models of public governance emerged in recent years in China. One of the cases with democratic implications that have received most attention is the “participatory budget reform” in Wenling, Zhejiang. This paper intends to respond to a larger theoretical question by examining this case. The larger question is: How is any reform with democratic implications possible under current circumstances in China? What are the conditions that contribute to such reform, and where do the dynamisms that create such reform come from? This paper applies three schools of institutionalism to examine the case（historical, sociological, and rational institutionalism）. This paper finds that all three institutionalisms are applicable in explaining how the institution of “participatory budget reform” evolves once it was established. However, they all appear to be insufficient in explaining how the institution emerged from the very beginning. The paper finds that a group of “political entrepreneurs” played important roles in making possible the emergence of this institution. They mobilize political resources and explore possibility under the constraints of existing political institutions. However, once the institution has taken place, the institution allows various social groups and villages to form a “game” so that they can bargain among themselves to seek a balance of their multiple interests. Once the equilibrium is reached within such a game, the institution can obtain an internal balance, and the institution becomes no longer a temporary reform.