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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/99309
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/99309


    Title: 以股權結構觀點探討代理理論與創新投資之關聯性
    The Effects of Ownership Structure on Innovation Investments: an Agency Perspective
    Authors: 洪晏東
    Hung, Yen Dong
    Contributors: 張清福
    洪晏東
    Yen Dong Hung
    Keywords: 傳統代理問題
    核心代理問題
    股權集中
    股權分散
    研發支出
    Type I agency problems
    Type II agency problems
    Concentration of ownership
    Dispersed ownership
    Research and development expenses
    Date: 2016
    Issue Date: 2016-07-20 16:41:26 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究透過不同股權結構來探討傳統代理問題與核心代理問題對於研發支出投入程度之影響。
    本研究將具有金字塔結構或交叉持股結構之企業分類為股權集中之企業,而將不具有金字塔結構或交叉持股結構之企業分類為股權分散之企業。實證分析顯示,在股權分散情況下,傳統代理問題的降低有助於研發支出之提升。其中,董事長兼任總經理、經理人持股比率、董監事持股比率、大股東持股比率、法人持股比率及獨立董事席次比率皆對研發支出之投入有正相關影響。在股權集中情況下,核心代理問題的降低也有助於研發支出之投入。
    此外,相較於股權分散之企業,股權集中之企業有著較高的研發支出投入,代表股權集中之企業較有辦法投入較多資源於研發支出上。而透過交乘項之實證分析後,發現相對於股權集中之企業,若股權分散之企業的傳統代理問題能降低,那麼會更有效地提高研發支出以提升企業經營績效。同理也得知,在相對於股權分散之企業,股權集中之企業之核心代理問題若能降低,那麼會更有效地提高研發支出以提升公司價值。
    Based on ownership structures, this study investigates the effects of type I and type II agency problem on R&D expenses for innovation investments. This study classifies both pyramid ownership structure and cross-holding ownership structure as ownership-concentrated structure while others ownership-dispersed structure.
    The empirical results indicate that under ownership-dispersed structure, the reduction in type I agency problems increases research and development (R&D) expenses in innovation investments. The ways that reduce type I agency problem and boost innovation investments include CEO duality, executive ownership, corporate ownership, block ownership, institutional ownership, and the percentage of board seats held by independent directors. Under the case of ownership-concentrated structure, reduction in type II agency problems lead to increase in R&D expenses for innovation investments.
    Moreover, comparing with ownership dispersed firms, the ownership concentrated firms spend more in R&D expenses. However, if the dispersed ownership firms can decrease type I agency problems then they spend more in R&D relative to the ownership concentrated firms. By the same token, comparing with ownership-dispersed firms, the reduction in type II agency problems of ownership-concentrated firms will more effectively increase R&D expenses to raise the company value.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    103353102
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1033531022
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

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