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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/99319

    Title: 利潤稅中立性,廠商逃漏稅決策與租稅天堂
    On the Neutrality of Profit Taxes and Tax Compliance in the Presence of Tax Haven
    Authors: 施淙仁
    Contributors: 翁堃嵐
    Keywords: 中立性
    tax evasion
    tax haven
    endogenous market
    Date: 2016
    Issue Date: 2016-07-20 16:54:40 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 在現有探討逃漏稅的文獻當中,大多將焦點著重在廠商的生產和逃漏稅決策這二項變數的可分性以及利潤稅是否具有中立性的問題,然而通常都以封閉的經濟體為基礎,忽略了國際化浪潮下,廠商的跨國避稅行為。當跨國廠商可以選擇將利潤移轉到租稅天堂規避稅負時,則傳統文獻所獲得的結果就可能無法成立,換言之,廠商的生產與逃漏稅決策就可能不具可分性,利潤稅也可能不再符合中立性。有鑒於此,本論文乃以Wang and Conant (1988) 以及Yaniv (1995) 的結論為基準,利用Dixit (1984) 、Salant (1984) 以及Georke and Runkel (2006) 的設定建立了一個包含租稅天堂 (Tax Haven) 的多家廠商逃漏稅模型,分別在市場結構為外生和內生的狀況下,探討廠商的生產與逃漏稅決策間的可分性以及利潤稅的中立性的問題。研究顯示:當市場結構為外生時且存在租稅天堂時,廠商的生產決策和逃漏決策仍然具有可分性,但利潤稅中立性不存在。再者,當市場結構內生化時,不管租稅天堂存在與否,可分性依舊成立,但利潤稅中性則不成立。
    In most of research of tax evasion, the main concern is focused on the separability between the evasion strategy and the production strategy and the neutrality of profit tax. However, the models are usually based on the closed economy instead of the strategy of tax evasion in multinationals in the open economy. When the firms can choose to evade profit tax in the tax haven, the conventional results of the neutrality of profit tax and separability of production and tax evasion may not hold. Therefore, this paper is based on the results of Wang and Conant (1988) and Yaniv (1995). We use the setting of Dixit (1984), Salant (1984) and Georke and Runkel (2006), modeling a multi-firm tax evasion model with tax haven. With different market structure which is endogenous or exogenous may lead to different result. The conclusion shows that when the market structure is exogenous and with tax haven, the separability exists while the neutrality doesn’t. Moreover, when the market structure is endogenous, whether the tax haven exists, separability still hold but the neutrality doesn’t.
    Reference: 郭虹瑩與翁堃嵐 (2007),「公司稅、租稅逃漏與最適出口貿易政策」,《經濟論文》,35(1),33–54。
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    Description: 碩士
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103255006
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

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