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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/99332
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/99332

    Title: 企業現金持有與經理人風險誘因
    Corporate Cash Holdings and Managerial Risk-taking Incentives
    Authors: 謝佩穎
    Hsieh, Pei Yin
    Contributors: 陳嬿如
    Chen, Yenn Ru
    Hsieh, Pei Yin
    Keywords: 現金持有
    Cash holdings
    Risk taking
    Systematic risk
    Idiosyncratic risk
    Date: 2016
    Issue Date: 2016-07-20 17:13:30 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究以企業現金持有之理論進一步分析擁有選擇權風險誘因的經理人是否有不同的風險投資決策,並提出在超額現金情境之下,具有選擇權風險誘因之經理人將會偏向投資與特有風險相關的研究與發展計劃或商品上,進而貢獻經濟利潤於公司的長遠發展上。本研究蒐集於1992年至2014年的S&P1500企業,將不同類型的風險與選擇權誘因及超額現金進行回歸分析。實證結果顯示具有超額現金的公司會誘發具有風險誘因的經理人投入特有風險,且相較於無超額現金的公司提高特有風險之水準。此外本研究基於現金持有理論中的預防動機理論加以解釋當公司有較多的現金時,經理人將會傾向可以為公司貢獻更多經濟利潤的特有風險投資決策,如;研究與發展、創新計劃等。
    The literature suggests that executive stock options (ESOs) can only encourage managerial risk taking by conducting risky projects that increase only systematic risk. This study investigates whether the excessive cash holdings can further enhance the risk incentive of ESOs, especially increasing the idiosyncratic risk. By examining the Standard and Poor indexed 1500 firms from 1992 to 2014, we find a positive impact on idiosyncratic risk for firms with excessive cash holdings, consistent with the precautionary motive of corporate cash holdings. The precautionary cash holdings enhance the ESOs mechanism in encouraging managerial risk taking, especially for firms’ long-term growth. In addition, we verify the managerial risk taking by identifying that excessive cash would enhance the risk incentive of ESOs in undertaking unexpected new investments.
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    Description: 碩士
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1033570181
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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