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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/99480


    Title: 殘缺的產權、土地財政與基層政府－解釋中國大陸的「小產權房」現象
    Other Titles: Truncated Property Rights, Land Finance and Grass-Root Governments －A Case Study of China’s “Minor Property Rights” Housing
    Authors: 曹海濤
    Keywords: 小產權房;集體所有制;殘缺產權;土地財政;鄉村集體組織
    Date: 2013-03
    Issue Date: 2016-07-25 11:40:46 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究從土地制度和「中央－地方」關係，探討中國大陸的近年出現的「小產權房」現象。藉由關注基層鄉鎮政府與村集體組織在「小產權房」產生過程中的角色，本文指出，殘缺的土地產權和財權事權不對等的財政體制是「小產權房」興起的制度基礎。一方面，現行土地制度限制了農村集體土地的轉讓，阻礙農民和農村集體組織分享經濟成長過程中土地增值收益；另一方面，財政分權改革衍生的土地財政，只是為地方政府帶來巨額利益，面對龐大支出責任的基層鄉鎮政府和農村集體組織，卻得不到相關收入。準此，「小產權房」反映了農民和農村集體組織試圖擺脫現存制度束縛的理性選擇。作為一種制度安排、以及制度安排往往具有多重功能的特性，「小產權房」既有增加住房供給、降低租值耗散的效率意涵，也有因鄉村幹部利用權勢操控集體土地產生的尋租問題。
    The main purpose of this paper is to discuss institutional foundations of “minor property right” houses emerging in rural China. The land property right system and the central-local fiscal relations exert substantial influences on “minor property right” houses’ supplier, namely the grass-root governments. On the one hand, collective ownership and management of rural land are strictly regulated by the state. The coercive policies expropriate rights and opportunities of Chinese farmers to participate in land market. On the other hand, the current fiscal system has prevented grass-root governments from obtaining land revenue. However, the state has no control over all attributes of collective land due to transaction costs. The grass-root governments and peasants are able to manipulate some attributes of land to minimize the loss of property rights. Accordingly, “minor property right” houses are the rational choice for grass-root governments to mitigate institutional constraints. However, as an institutional arrangement with multiple functions, “minor property rights” houses also have effects on income redistribution. In other words, village cadres take advantage of their power to manipulate the collective land for rent-seeking. Keywords: minor property right houses, collective ownership, truncated property rights, land finance, grass-root governments
    Relation: 中國大陸研究, 56(1), 91-125
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[中國大陸研究 TSSCI] 期刊論文

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