NATIONAL SECURITY UNDER THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION

EDITED BY BAHRAM M. RAJAEE AND MARK J. MILLER
This volume is dedicated to the memory of Mahin Sorouri Rajaee, who passed away as this book was going to press. She was a wonderful mother, an amazingly strong and kind person, and a true inspiration. She will be eternally missed.
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CHAPTER 6

PLA Military Modernization and Sino-Russian Military Cooperation

Hong-yi Lien

In 1985 former Chinese naval admiral Liu Huaqing presented the official “offshore defense” strategy of China’s navy. His definition of “offshore” was based on directions from Deng Xiaoping and included the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, the Spratly Islands and Taiwan, the internal and external sea area of the Okinawa island chain, and the northern Pacific waters (Liu 2004, 434–38).1

China set the priorities of its long-term military modernization strategy in 1985 in accordance with the task priorities of its navy, air force, strategic missile forces, and army (Blasko 2005, 10). It is worth noting that many of the reforms of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the last twenty years have contributed to the phenomenal economic growth of China in the 1990s. In addition, the breakup of the former Soviet Union led to the diminishment of threats from the north, along with substantial new imports of advanced weapons from Russia as that country experienced financial difficulties (Ministry of National Defense 2006a, 11).

This chapter describes the development of PLA military thinking, the priority placed on military development, and the importance of Sino-Russian military cooperation in upgrading PLA military power. Specifically, it looks at China’s

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1 The author especially thanks Mr. Jyh-peng Wang, former PLAN captain, for his kindness in providing data and some sources for information contained in this paper.
desire to expand its sea power, mainly through its submarine fleet, and analyzes the impact of these developments for the United States and the Asia-Pacific region, especially Taiwan. The importance of these trends for U.S. interests is reflected in the fact that since 2000, U.S. administrations have released an annual report to Congress reviewing PLA military developments in detail and assessing their impact on the United States and the Asia-Pacific region.

**The Submarine: A Crucial Development for the PLA**

Many indicators concerning the construction and development of Chinese naval forces show that China’s submarine force is at the core of that country’s rapid development of regional access-denial capability (Goldstein 2004, 20). In 2007 Scott Bray, who was then the U.S. Navy officer in charge of intelligence concerning China, pointed out that surface ships face the challenges of limited air defense capability and antisubmarine warfare. These obstacles have forced the Chinese leadership to advance its military modernization efforts by focusing on the development of submarine forces. Bray noted that the growing scientific and technological capabilities of the Chinese submarine force, as well as China’s evolving maritime strategy, provide appropriate incentives to station more submarines in the Okinawa chain of islands in the western Pacific Ocean (Bray 2007, 20).

According to a 2007 report published by the U.S. Department of Defense, the Chinese navy currently has about 58 submarines (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2007, 40), more than half of which were purchased from Russia or were constructed in the previous decade. The submarines are deployed in smaller numbers now than they were under the “people’s war” approach of the 1980s, which called for a large number of low-tech battles to overcome an overwhelming attack from enemy ships. However, China’s submarines are now more advanced.

Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese navy has finished two modified destroyers (551 Luda II, III), five types of new destroyers (051B Luhai, 051C Luzhou, 052 Luhu, 052B Luyang I, 052C Luyang II), one type of improved destroyer escort (053 Jianghu II), and five types of new destroyer escorts (053H2 Jianghu, 053H2G Jiangwei I, 053H3 Jiangwei II, 054 Jiangkai I, and 054A Jiangkai II). It has also acquired four more Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia.

Recent news reports have shown that China is actively building an “ongoing” naval combat capability, beginning with its aircraft carrier fleet. In accordance with the concept of development behind the Chinese navy’s aircraft carrier, China’s first carrier battle groups are predicted to consist of a medium-sized aircraft carrier, two destroyers, two or three escort destroyers, and two nuclear-powered attack submarines. The aircraft carrier battle groups may be classified as first military-grade quality; they are slated to be part of the South China Sea Fleet and the Navy Command, and the carrier base will be located on Hainan Island (Youth Daily 2006, 3).

By virtue of their inherent characteristics, submarines can launch surprise attacks without any cover or support from other forces. They can effectively carry out raids, harassment, blockades, and other tasks, and can often act as a strategic and tactical “effective deterrence” force. In times of peace, submarines can enhance underwater detection density, work with the surface fleet to strengthen naval and air force antisubmarine training, and enhance naval familiarity with expected operational hydrology. In times of war, they can monitor early warning surveillance or implement blockades, mine-laying operations, or special missions with a certain degree of combat and strategic deterrent capability (Youth Daily 2004b, 2).

**Military Collaboration between China and Russia**

Since the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989, Europe and the United States have maintained an embargo on weapons shipments to China. As a result, Russia has been the major weapons procurement source for China (U.S. General Accounting Office 1998, 2), and submarine technology transfers from Russia have been one of the most important elements of this relationship. During almost twenty years of continuous development, Chinese submarine forces have proven their capacity to cross the so-called first island chain, a step that significantly impacts U.S. military power in the western Pacific. This chapter first addresses the military collaboration between China and Russia, with a particular focus on the status of and trends within the development of Chinese submarine forces with the assistance of Russia. It then assesses the possible consequences of this development in the Taiwan Strait and the Asia-Pacific region for the balance of power and U.S. national security.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, economic recession caused reductions in Russia’s defense budget and a significant reduction in Russian military procurements. In 1993 only 15 to 20 percent of manufacturing orders resulted from defense requirements, which seriously affected the financial status of Russia’s defense industry. As a result, almost 20 percent of the defense industry went bankrupt, and another 40 percent faced survivability problems (Information Telegraph Agency of Russia [ITAR-TASS] 1993). Russia tried to find a way out of this predicament by reinvigorating the domestic economy, increasing the employment rate, and maintaining technological advantages, but saw little or mixed success.

In addition to grappling with economic concerns, Russia also had to make political calculations to secure the stability of its external environment. The export of high-level technology and weapons systems to China fulfilled this
strategic goal (Boliatto 1997, 55). In addition, Russia was able to enhance its influence in the Asia-Pacific region and maintain its standing in dialogue with the United States and Japan through military cooperation with China (Menon 1997, 101).

In terms of military concerns, Russia’s leadership calculated that it could influence the development of Chinese military defense technology and maintain the Chinese military’s dependence on Russia through military sales to that country (Rybas 1997, 3). Such sales were thus reflected in Russia’s economic, political, and military policy regarding China. As the Russian government improved bilateral relations through military cooperation with Beijing, the Russian military repeatedly stressed that despite Moscow’s military-industrial and economic predicament, the sale of weapons to China required an evaluation of their impact on Russian strategic and military security (Krasnaya Zvezda 1994).

In the 1992–2006 period Russian military sales to China were estimated at $26 billion, or almost half of Russia’s total weapons exports of $58 billion. (Russia is the second largest weapons-exporting country after the United States.) Weapons deals between Russia and China, however, which were worth more than $2 billion per year at their peak, declined abruptly in 2006. The reasons for this downturn were related not only to export and trade but also to complex security and strategic concerns. Some analysts suggest that Russia was monitoring the extent to which China was becoming a competitor to Russia’s own defense industry. After the imposition of the 1989 arms embargo, through military sales from Russia, China was able to promote its military strength and reduce its technology and firepower deficits with its regional rivals Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. As a result, Russian military experts argued, it was time to reevaluate the purpose of cooperation between the two countries (E-Liberty Daily 2008a).

**Chinese Theater-Based “Antiaccess” Weapons**

On February 28, 2008, the commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific formally registered concern about the scale and intent of China’s military buildup. At a meeting of a U.S. Senate military commission, Admiral Timothy Keating criticized China’s test of an antisatellite missile, saying, “We find that curious behavior for a nation that wants to have this peaceful entry into the league of nations, as they profess to desire. So we would cast a jaundiced (negative) eye, if you will, on China’s anti-satellite test. And through the work that we will continue to do at the Pacific Command to get greater transparency on their military intentions, to operate with them across a spectrum of exercises and services, we hope to gain a better understanding of their intentions” (E-Liberty Daily 2008b).

As Admiral Keating indicated, intelligence showed that China had developed air, surface, and underwater antiaccess weapons and had deployed them in specific regions. The capacity of some of the weapons systems exceeded both U.S. predictions and China’s objectives for its own defense. The United States was troubled by this buildup, Keating stated, and had repeatedly demanded transparency in China’s military modernization and a clear exposition of its intentions. Keating emphasized the importance for both Sino-U.S. relations and the region generally of greater dialogue to reduce the risk of conflict arising from error of judgment. Fundamentally the U.S. Department of Defense was concerned about China’s regional antiaccess weaponry (including missiles) and its capacity to use these weapons to attack U.S. aircraft carriers and ships. U.S. intelligence had also repeatedly proven that China was in the process of developing and deploying weapons systems that had the capacity to limit sea-surface, aerial, and seabed activity in certain regions (Ministry of National Defense 2005).

According to the force buildup plan of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), submarine assets are part of the core of the regional antiaccess capability (Goldstein 2004, 10). Scott Bray has written that “the limited Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities of surface ships . . . makes Chinese decision makers think and focus their military modernization on submarine forces”; he has also observed that the “Chinese PLAN continuously improve their submarine technologies, and continuously evolve their maritime strategy . . . which makes them deploy more submarine forces in the vicinity of the east of Ryukyu Islands and western Pacific Ocean” (Bray 2007, 20).

The continuous development of Chinese PLAN submarine forces prompted the change in strategy. According to Chinese submarine experts, the major strategic missions of Chinese submarine forces in the next ten years are neither to cross the first island chain nor to attack carriers, but rather to achieve the following: (1) absolute control of the seas within five hundred nautical miles of China’s coast; (2) protection of the vital economic regions along the coast; and (3) prevention of U.S. intervention in any Taiwan Strait conflict. To achieve these missions the PLAN is expediting its force enhancement by, for example, procuring air independent propulsion (AIP) systems (Ministry of National Defense 2008).

**The Current Status and Future Development of Chinese Submarines**

In recent years Chinese submarines have frequently crossed the first island chain. A Japanese P-3C found a Ming-class submarine that had sailed due west and was afloat in the Osumi Strait, roughly 40 kilometers east of Satamisaki Kagoshima-ken (World Forum 2004) and only 18 kilometers from Japanese
territorial waters. Notably, the Osumi Strait is located between Kyushu and Tanegashima, where a new Japanese space center and rocket launching site is located (World Forum 2003).

On November 10, 2004, a Japanese P-3C discovered an unidentified submarine that had entered Japanese territorial waters southeast of Ishigaki Island and was traveling north. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi declared a “maritime watch alert status” in accordance with Article 82 of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces Law. Later, the unidentified submarine was proven to be a Chinese Han-class nuclear submarine (Wang 2005, 74–78). On November 13, 2006, the Washington Times reported that on October 26, 2006, a Sun-class attack submarine surfaced and passed the USS Kitty Hawk carrier at a distance of five nautical miles in the waters around Okinawa, an incident that was not explained in detail by either the U.S. Navy or the Department of Defense (Gertz 2006). U.S. and European submarine analysts, however, were shocked on November 11, 2007, when the British Daily Mail newspaper reported that a Song-class attack submarine had again appeared near the USS Kitty Hawk battle group (Hickley 2007). Based on these patterns of behavior, there is a strong likelihood that many other activities of Chinese submarine forces go undiscovered or unpublicized.

According to data from the U.S. Department of Defense, the submarine construction ratio between China and the United States in 2006 was 14:1 (although all the U.S. submarines were nuclear powered). This vast difference underscores the immediacy with which China is seeking to rectify its imbalance with U.S. naval and submarine power. According to the 2008 military force report on China published by the U.S. Department of Defense, China possessed 59 submarines that year, of which about 30 either were procured from Russia or were new models built indigenously in the previous ten years. The number had declined significantly since the 1980s, when the concept of “people’s war” dominated and China deployed 85 submarines (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2008). Now China has developed submarines that are technologically much more sophisticated and show higher quality.

Thus China is actively consolidating its deployments of submarine forces in its East Sea Fleet and South Sea Fleet. The Xiangshan and Zhoshan naval bases of the 42nd Flotilla of the East Sea Fleet have developed complete infrastructures for diesel submarines, and four of the eight Kilo-class submarines procured from Russia have been deployed in Xiangshan—all of them equipped with 3M-54E submarine-launched antiship missiles. With Russia’s assistance, high-pressure air storage stations and Klub-S missile hangars have also been installed in Xiangshan. The maximum capacity of Xiangshan is 12 to 18 submarines, while that of Zhoshan is 8 to 16; both Kilo-class and Type 039A (Song-class) submarines are deployed in Xiangshan (Kaneva Intelligence Review 2006a, 25).

According to Taiwanese reports (Ministry of National Defense 2005), newly built combat ships in the PLAN included the Type 051C (Luzhou) guided-missile destroyer (DDG), Type 051 (Luyang) DDG, Type 054 (Jiangkai) guided-missile frigate (FFG), Type 093 (Shang class), Type 094 ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), and Song- and Kilo-class submarines. These new forces have been deployed in the East Sea Fleet and South Sea Fleet, which form the so-called Crab Strategy and are capable of conducting war in the first island chain.

Moreover, according to current data, at least one (and possibly two) Kilo-class submarines (Type 636), two Type 039 (Song-class) submarines, and six Type 035G (Ming-class) submarines, China’s most modernized submarines of recent years, are deployed in Yulin in the South Sea Fleet (Kaneva Intelligence Review 2006b, 24). In addition, there have been news reports that an upgraded Han-class nuclear-powered SSBN is slated to join the South Sea Fleet, and that some infrastructure, such as maintenance facilities, logistics suppliers, submarine missile launch storage facilities, and fuel gears, have been installed in Yulin. On the basis of the infrastructure expansion rate, Western observers have predicted that Yulin will be able to accommodate three or four SSBNs in the future. This expansion would mean that the South Sea Fleet would have the same important strategic role as the North Sea Fleet and would possess the capacity to execute strategic missions. Han-class SSBN and Type 093A submarines are also slated to be deployed in the South Sea Fleet, thus extending the underwater operational range of that fleet to the Indian Ocean. As a result, the PLAN will be able to observe U.S. naval activity in the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca in the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait, as well as conduct a wide range of underwater surveillance and offensive operations (Kaneva Intelligence Review 2005, 23). Finally, it is worth noting that Type 039A (Song-class) submarines belonging to the East Sea Fleet have also appeared at the North Sea Fleet’s Lushun base. Based on my observations, the presence of these submarines may have been for the purposes of joint exercises or in preparation for the deployment of diesel subs in the North Sea Fleet. The second Type 039A (Yuan-class) diesel submarine is currently being built. It is worthwhile to continue observing whether Yuan-class submarines will be deployed in the North Sea Fleet or in new missions for purposes such as SSBN maintenance or counterbalancing Japanese underwater forces (Kaneva Intelligence Review 2006c, 16–17).

Taiwan’s Key Arms-Purchase Projects: Submarines

These developments have direct implications for the United States but also indirect implications to the extent that they affect key U.S. allies such as Taiwan.
Given China’s increasingly powerful naval force, Taiwan’s navy is also seeking to expand its underwater combat capabilities. The Taiwanese navy has four submarines, only two of which (the Jianlong-class submarines) can undertake combat missions. Thus Taiwan’s overall combat capability is clearly inadequate relative to China. Taiwan should have at least ten submarines to meet its operational needs according to an assessment based on the following criteria: deployment at sea in times of war, operational cycles, task time, whole preparation days, and maintenance. Since 1995 Taiwan has expressed a desire to purchase a new generation of diesel-electric submarines.

According to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and Navy, if the submarines had already been acquired, the country’s scope of early warning detection would have been increased by a factor of five, and mobile combat capability would have been enhanced by a factor of more than one hundred. In addition, in 2005 the assessment department of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported that computer simulations showed that the balance of power would erode significantly by 2006, with military superiority possibly tilting decisively in favor of China by 2012. However, three arms procurements could reverse that situation and maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait for thirty years (Ministry of National Defense 2005, 18).

In summary, the purpose of Taiwan’s submarine fleet is mainly to prevent China from controlling strategic waters with sufficient force to isolate Taiwan. Taiwanese submarines therefore require the ability to destroy the Chinese submarine force and allow Taiwan’s surface ships to conduct antilanding operations in any invasion scenario.

Taiwan’s 2006 national defense report noted that “in 2002, the force buildup policy of the ROC made a strategic turn from passive to active. In accordance with the ‘all-out defense’ policy, the strategic concept was changed from ‘resolute defense, effective deterrence’ to ‘active defense’ equivalent of ‘effective deterrence, resolute defense.’ ‘Effective deterrence’ refers to the building of counter-strike and defensive capabilities with deterring effects, and active research and development of long-range, precision, deep strike capabilities to effectively disintegrate or stagnate enemy forces or firepower advancements, so that enemies will forego all military options after rational estimation of battle damage and casualties” (Ministry of National Defense 2006b, 99).

In Thinking about the Unthinkable, Herman Kahn points out that deterrence is designed to control the acts of other actors by means of threat. For deterrence to succeed, the deterring side must continuously convey the message that attempts to use aggression to obtain interests will incur heavy costs—usually so heavy that they will outweigh any gains (Kahn 1962). Distinguished strategy scholar Thomas Schelling argues that deterrence involves two stages, “deterrence ex ante” (predeterrence) and “revenge ex post” (retaliation afterward), and two key concepts: first, the side that wishes to practice deterrence must have reliable combat ability; and second, the hostile side will lose more than it gains when it actually takes military action (Schelling 1963, 7–8, 11). George H. Quester agrees with Kahn’s two-stage definition of deterrence, but adds that the failure of prevention does not mean that deterrence has failed; that failure depends on whether the retaliation is thorough enough to deter those who will lose more than they gain (Quester 1989, 52–57).

Many might therefore argue that since Taiwan has no nuclear weapons, it does not have the ability to deter China. To successfully execute a strategy of deterrence, Taiwan requires a kind of “defensive deterrence” that combines military and political means. Defensive deterrence might involve an all-out effort on a large scale or might be limited. Its success depends on Taiwan’s own ability and the level of the enemy invasion. To be effective, defensive deterrence focuses on “direct attack on highly valuable targets of invaders” and “a high degree of ability and determination to carry out the revenge” and is therefore in line with Taiwan’s defense policy of “effective deterrence and resolute defense” (Chen 2001, 80–88). The best and the fastest option for effective deterrence is to develop nuclear force or traditional surface-to-surface missiles. Because of many political constraints, however, Taiwan cannot develop or gain either of these two effective and powerful instruments of deterrence. This limitation has forced Taiwan to move toward the alternative of conventional long-range sea and air combat forces to establish the relative deterrence of combat capability.

More than 95 percent of Taiwan’s foreign trade and the importation of its primary source of energy (oil) rely on maritime transportation. If Taiwan’s imports of energy are blocked, its navy and air force will quickly be immobilized. In contrast, China relies on long-distance shipping for 70 percent of its oil needs. Taiwanese capacity to enforce a long-range blockade could serve as an effective deterrent to China. Such a capacity could only be achieved by submarines, and at least 14 submarines would be required to constitute a combat capability sufficient to deter China (Youth Daily 2004a). Former Taiwanese Lieutenant Admiral Ning-li Lan has pointed out that in accordance with his strict calculation, Taiwan would actually need 20 submarines, given that the use of submarines focuses on quality and not quantity. If submarines are used properly and the deployment location is correct, they can present a serious threat to the enemy. Lan points out that Taiwan, because of its relations with such nations as the United States and Japan, is not allowed to carry out offensive actions, because doing so might affect the stability of regional security (Lan 2006).

If war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait or the situation allows Taiwan to take positive action, however, it would be more feasible for Taiwan to undertake “defensive defense.” That is, Taiwan’s submarines could ambush the path of Chinese submarines, which would delay action on the part of the Chinese
because of their perception of Taiwan’s intent (Youth Daily 2007). In response to the threat that Chinese sea power will present to Taiwan in the next 15 years, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and navy planned to build or purchase ten submarines three to four years ago, but this acquisition met only the minimal requirement. According to current estimates, Taiwan’s navy will require between 14 and 18 diesel-electric submarines in the next 15 years in order to achieve “effective deterrence” capability.

The Effects of Russian Assistance to Chinese Submarine Development on the Taiwan Strait Situation

The balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region and cooperation between Russia and China will play a major role in the event of any conflict in the Taiwan Strait. As one of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries, Russia is again moving toward world power status and is the only country supplying full-scale weapons systems to China. With its enhanced confidence and power, Russia is again focusing on its own interests and national security. However, Sino-Russian relations are much closer and smoother than U.S.—Russian relations, although they can still be unpredictable. There is little bilateral conflict over political and border issues, but there has been no significant improvement in military cooperation. One flashpoint in particular has been Russia’s disapproval of China’s procurement of small quantities of weapons systems as samples (i.e., to make copies). Nevertheless, a good relationship between Russia and China is essential to the balance of power and peace in the Asia-Pacific region (Pinkov 2008, 50–53).

Conceptually China and Russia also have different ideas about the Taiwan Strait problem. Russia’s Department of Foreign Affairs frequently takes a clear-cut public stand in support of its “One China” policy, but it also emphasizes the need for the Chinese government to make all possible efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution. In brief, Russia supports a peaceful unification of China. Any conflict in East Asia will only serve to consolidate the U.S.—Japan alliance and bring Australia into a regional bloc, a move that runs counter to Russia’s interests. In addition, a war in this region would force Russia to choose sides.

In an interview with Kanwa Intelligence Review, Evgeniy Bazhanov, vice president of the Academy of Diplomacy of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated, “the fundamental change in the international situation leaves no scope for Russia and China to enter any sort of alliance. It is indeed an illusion, if China expects to free Taiwan under Russia’s assistance” (Pinkov 2008). On the basis of its grand strategy and national interests, Russia therefore pursues an independent line in foreign affairs, leading it to maintain close connections with China and a clear bottom line on military cooperation. For example, on February 7, 2007, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reemphasized its One China policy after the then president of Taiwan, Chen Shui-Bian, publicly implied Taiwan’s status as an independent country on January 29, 2007. Regarding the question of Taiwan joining the United Nations, Russia did not make a statement against this possibility until the United States and Europe did so first (Pinkov 2008, 50–53).

The extent to which China will continue to use Russian technology to develop its advanced submarines is an important question that will affect both this crucial regional relationship and U.S. national security. China has never been fully confident about its reliance on Russia. Indeed, from 1990 onward, China has insisted not only on technology transfers but also on raising the proportion of its weapons systems that are made by China. Russia has acceded to these requests, authorizing its defense contractors to assemble fighters and other weapons systems and assist China in manufacturing jet fighters, space launch systems, submarines, and surface ships. While Russia clearly has its own interests foremost in mind (E-Liberty Daily 2008a), the crucial question of whether Russia will decide to sell even more advanced submarines (such as the Lada class) to China or will help China to further develop its own sophisticated submarines persists.

It is also important to observe the deployments and development of Chinese diesel submarines, and whether the Type 41 (Yuan-class) and Song-class submarines are deployed in the North Sea Fleet; the Kilo-class and Type 039A submarines in the East Sea Fleet; or the Type 636, Type 039A, and Type 035G (Ming-class) submarines in the South Sea Fleet. In line with the concept of “adjust deployment and forward at a proper distance,” Chinese diesel and nuclear submarines may appear in the vicinity of the first island chain, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean (Kanwa Intelligence Review 2006b, 24).

Conclusion

U.S. reports on China’s military power from the past three years show that the number of Chinese submarines and surface warships (destroyers and frigates) has increased year by year, with an average annual increase of one diesel-electric submarine, two destroyers, and two frigates. If this growth is estimated conservatively over the next 15 years and current ratios of allocation remain the same (one-third combat ready, one-third in training, and one-third in maintenance, with a maximum of two-thirds and a minimum of one-half available for combat), by 2023 the Chinese navy will be able to deploy between 38 and 51 submarines and between 64 and 85 surface warships into combat.

As noted earlier, the U.S. Department of Defense has kept up to date on Chinese military developments in the past ten years by publishing an annual
This chapter emphasizes the role of submarine assets in the PLA’s antiaccess/area-denial strategy. As a result of Russian technology and assistance to China, the PLA has been able to rapidly upgrade its weapons capabilities, especially in its maritime forces. To be able to cope with China’s military development, the United States should monitor PLA military development closely while providing appropriate weapons to surrounding countries—such as Taiwan—to reduce the risk of a crisis resulting from a growing military imbalance in the Taiwan Strait.

Notes

1. Admiral Liu stated that the Chinese navy must have four capabilities that have guided its long-term development: (1) the capacity to gain command of the sea within a certain period of time and maintain it with a view to conducting main battle operations in offshore waters, (2) effective control within a limited time of the main sea lanes connected to Chinese waters, (3) the ability to operate with other PLA forces in the nautical areas adjacent to Chinese waters, and (4) a strong nuclear counterattack ability.

2. The first island chain includes Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, the Philippines, and Borneo Island.

Bibliography


