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碩士論文

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A Comparative Study on Korea and Taiwan Democratic Development and Media's Role

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論文題目

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This is hereby certified that this Master's Thesis has successfully passed the final defense

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國立政治大學 National Chengchi University

A Comparative Study on Korea and Taiwan Democratic Development and Media's Role

Chang-geun Choi

Professor, Ming Lee, Thesis Advisor

Abstract

In this thesis, comparative experienced similar historical events the countries in East Asia, Korea and Taiwan. Research focus is democratic development and media's role in Korea and Taiwan. This research theme is composition of communication studies and political science. Firstly, I reviewed basic concept of media and democracy's correlation, and media's role in democratic countries, Secondly, purchased Korea and Taiwan's democratization process on view of comparative political science. And I followed media's role on democratization process. Research's basic point of view is comparative study, and also used literature analysis method. The purpose of this study is review Korea and Taiwan's journey of democratization, and through the past experience what was the role of the media.

Key Words : Democratization, Media, Taiwan(ROC), Korea

Table of Contents

國立政治大學 National Chengchi University

1.Introduction

Korea and Taiwan, these two countries are neighborhood in East-Asian religion. A view point of geographical point, Korea and Taiwan's physical distance is close. In Addition, Korea and Taiwan have a lot of similar points at various sectors. Two countries were delivered by similar process of development in the past surprisingly, and general feature of society nowadays is similar. Now the meaning is discolored somewhat, but an expression called 'brother countries' is well described really as relations of two countries.

Korea and Taiwan experience similar historical event. Japanese colonial era (in Korea 1910-1945, in Taiwan 1895-1945), a long authoritarian regime, successive economic development and lift democratization. These two countries created miracle of the 20th century for the past times. Among economic great powers global major countries, Korea and Taiwan are countries which jumped up after overcoming colony state. Specially, regardless of much smaller land and population than that of Korea, along with limit of short resources, Korea and Taiwan achieved abrupt development of the day. So firstly, review two countries' same but different developing process.

Focus on media studies, according to the reports of Freedom House, USA, published every year, press freedom and democracy levels of Korea and Taiwan are similar. And Taiwan is evaluated as the most democratized country among the Greater China countries. So, in my view, meaningful to do a comparative study on correlations between media and democracy required necessary for democracy development as social supervisors. However from 2008 to 2011 index of Korea's press freedom is consistently declined.

In Korea, direct election for President was revived as a result of large scale resistances of citizens requiring democratization at June, 1987. Afterwards, democratization is progressed in full scale. As a part of this democratization, establishment regulation of newspaper company establishment was relieved, and newspapers which could represent citizen's voice alienated in the meantime were into being, facing with three huge newspapers like *The Daily Chosun Ilbo(朝鮮日報*, *The Daily JoongAng Ilbo(中央日報)* and *The Daily Dong-A Ilbo(東亞日報).*

In Taiwan, the new media was made after dissolution of newspaper establishment prohibition, and then the newspapers were able to reflect various voices of society at late 1980s. As like this, Korea and Taiwan democratization were progressed in the similar times, and got express freedom really. So this point of view to study on what is same and different between two countries with correlation democracy with media role.

But after democratization, symptoms of the two media are different. Extreme example is the broadcast market. In case of Korea, public and terrestrial broadcasting represented by KBS(韓國放送公社), MBC(文化放送 株式會社) and EBS(韓國教育放送公社) are forming keynotes. These broadcasting companies were still exercising huge influences. However, these companies are losing their influences gradually by rough challenges of Cable TV started from 1995 and Internet media along with satellite broadcastings begun from 2001. Specially, the inclination argument of the last political neutrality and reports of the broadcasting companies persisted for many years became a major cause of turning away the audiences from public and terrestrial broadcasting.

Taiwan has very competitive broadcasting environment centered on private management of cable TV. In this circumstance, Taiwanese broadcasting companies are spreading drastic competition so as to raise audience rating, and thus blatancy of broadcasting is becoming issue.

Korea has a problem in political neutrality because it has possession structure which cannot but be vulnerable to a political authority as public broadcast with

majority shareholder of government, and Taiwan has blatancy issue, even though they are free from politically as private broadcastings.

Since 2008 political power has returned to the conservative party, the Korean grassroots democracy and press freedom that developed during the liberal rule have been threatened by the dictatorial style of leading groups such as the president, the Grand National Party(GNP) and major conservative newspapers. For example, the Lee Myung-bak government has forced existing directors to resign and replaced directors in the public sector. This is in breach of the law, which guarantees their positions for certain periods. Public gatherings in places such as Seoul City Hall Plaza have been banned and demonstrators harshly treated and detained. Police also tore down the memorial alter to the late former President Roh Moo-hyun installed in central Seoul, a move which drew immense public criticism. Under the Roh Moo-hyun government Korea was assessed by the Reporters With-out Borders as one of the Asian continent's best performers in press freedom in 2006.

International human right NGO, Amnesty International reported, "Korea has been backpedaling on human rights regarding expression of opinion, assembly and association under the Lee Myung-bak administration" *(Korea Times, February 2, 2009).* Furthermore, one Korean media watch NGO, the Citizen's Coalition for Democratic Media (CCDM, 2009), a media social movement in Korea, has expressed grave concern over the increasing use of force by police in cracking down on demonstrators. In recent rallies, police recklessly assaulted and detained non-violent demonstrators and even innocent civilians, injuring some.

However, *The daily Chosun ilbo*, *The daily JoongAng ilbo* and *The daily Dong-A ilbo* so called "big 3 news papers in Korea" have supported the Lee Myung-bak government's assault on human rights with one voice. Additionally, ruling Grand National Party, GNP (GNP's new party name is Saenuri-Party, 2012) are trying to pass seven media-related bills that include restricting freedom of assembly and association, which are guaranteed by the Constitution. Big 3 newspapers have criticized public assembly as witness in the Candle light demonstration and have supported the seven media-related bills. These issues are ongoing.

Furthermore, these days, nationally there are increasing numbers of university professors, religious leaders and opinion leaders who are vocal in demanding no rollback on democracy, a cessation of the dictatorial style of the Lee administration, an official apology from Lee and his party for former President Roh's suicide, and other issues. So in this time, I consider about freedom of press in Korea and democracy.

Freedom of the press has been a danger under the Lee Myung-bak administration. The government oppresses the electronic media especially, the broadcast and internet media. The directors of media related organizations and broadcasting companies such as YTN(Korea's 1st largest cable news network) and KBS have been replaced forcefully with Lee Myung-bak sympathizers. As a result, the labor unions of YTN and KBS have fought against president's followers. However, the appointed directors have abused their personnel rights. On 6th October 2008, the new president of YTN punished thirty three journalists including sacking six journalists, one of whom was the chairman of labor union. The labor union of YTN has been desperately fighting for fair reporting since 18th July 2008, YTN's new director who the Special Media

Assistance for democratization Lee democratization during the 2007 presidential campaign, was appointed director of the company *(Hankyoreh Newspaper, August 18, 2008)*. On April 2, 2009, their fight was stopped with the agreement of the labor union and the managerial group.

Electronic media practitioners face harsh treatment including the want on arrest of television journalists and producers, Korea's famous investigative reporting program 'PD's Notepad' producers at MBC. They were arrested and released. Arrest of journalist's main reason is related with import of U.S. beef. By August 2008, about twenty-four netizens (internet activists) were punished by the law because they campaigned to dissuade companies from advertising in three major dailies so called, Big 3 newspapers(*The Daily Chosun Ilbo, The Daily JoongAng Ilbo and The Daily Dong-A Ilb*, which are publishing distorting reports.

The President Lee's government has tried to reorganize the Korean media industry by allowing cross media ownership and creating Big 3 conservative newspapers benefit in order to prolong the power of conservative groups. The president, the government and the Grand National Party are trying to privatize the existing public broadcasting companies. Korea's ruling party, the Grand National Party is trying to pass seven media related bills that include allowing newspapers and big business to buy major stakes in terrestrial broadcasting stations. These issues are ongoing.

The Big 3 newspapers are the major conservative newspapers in Korea and are aligned with the conservative political power group to try to restructure the media industry. These attempts have however provoked the National labor unions of the media, which staged protests and strikes against the attempts to enact these new laws,

resulting in an ongoing media war between the electronic media and the current Lee government. And through these situation Korea's press freedom level is recorded 'partly free level' in 2011 by Freedom House's annual report. So viewing this situation in Korea, I had essential question about importance of freedom of the press.

In contrast, Taiwan's media, ranked as the 2nd freest in Asia after Japan by the Freedom House's 2010 report, have faced mounting criticism that they exhibit a low level of professionalism. As *the Christian Science Monitor* reported, "many observers say that the glitter of the island republic's free press has been overrated, especially in a highly commercialized news culture that is both deeply partisan and prey to political favors."

Focus on as nations undergo democratization from an authoritarian state to a democracy, journalists have taken on various roles such as watchdog to monitor authority and information disseminators who at times work to provoke or even incite the public to push democratic efforts. This research will examine the role of the media during different role in political transitions in Korea and Taiwan.

The basic idea of democratization emerged in the 1980s, when the ruler at the time directed a massacre of protesters. A wave of democratic ideas and the call for new administrations followed until the authoritarian regime was overthrown in 1987. During these events of Korea and Taiwan active political movements, a number of news media organizations began to include strong voices and opinions in the form of editorials and commentary articles. More than two decades after democratization, media roles during this event, within a democracy, would have been different from its roles in two previous events.

What has happened in Korea and Taiwan are perhaps a highly compressed version of media role developments throughout the history of journalism and democracy. For journalists around the world, theories describing what their roles are in society could be applicable to their respective situations, depending on what stage of democracy or democratization they are experiencing.

As for scholars, the linkage among various theories of different disciplines (political science and mass communication) would make this research appealing. Korea and Taiwan, located in East Asia, is a very important study subject for the political scientist, as its turn of political events in the past fifty years show salient cases of civil society establishment, building of effective states and governance systems, and political figures with distinct characteristics. This trait of two countries and its history will also be beneficial to journalism studies because a majority of journalistic material from the period of transition are still available and in good shape, these events being relatively recent. As mentioned above, the study would also hopefully serve as a preceding reference study for anticipating media roles in parts of the world that are currently undergoing social transitions.

This research will be presented as follows: In the literature review chapter, a general discussion of democracy and democratization will be followed by a review of pertinent theories on press systems, which look at the relationship between political systems and how the press functions in those systems. Then, the researcher will look at existing discussion of media role concepts and link those concepts to the theory regarding political transition and press systems.

The methodology of this study is comparative studies of Korea and Taiwan. After a brief discussion of sampling methods and explication of key concepts in the methodology, analysis and findings will be presented, separately for each time.

國立政治大學 National Chengchi University

2. Basic Approach ; Democracy and Media

2.1. Definition of the Democracy

The basic concept of Democratization is an authoritarian regime is transformed into a democracy. It is defined as a multifaceted phenomenon : Institutionally, it refers to a “transition from authoritarian rule to a political system that allows ordinary citizens to participate on a regular basis.” (Shin, 2008) Culturally, the democratization process is deemed complete when democracy as a political ideology is believed to be the “only game in town” by the people.

The definition of democratization deals with a low-level qualification of democratization, theories of democratic consolidation and effective democracy are used to define the ultimate desired goal for democratization. Democratic consolidation, as defined by Schedler (1998), describes the extension of the life expectancy of a democracy beyond the short term, of making the system immune against the threat of authoritarian regression, of preventing a reversal. It is an ideal state for a democracy, and it has become a challenge even, for newer democracies to maintain and develop democracy in a number of aspects.

The academic term “effective democracy” is best explicated by Inglehart and Welzel (2008) as a state of democracy that goes beyond meeting basic and systematic requirements. Alan T. Wood (2004) lists five essential characteristics of a democracy: 1) elections to office are open to participation by all citizens; 2) each vote is of equal value; 3) voters have real and free choices; 4) citizens have open access to

information; and 5) there is a rule of law guaranteeing freedom (pp. 2-4). However, effective democracy, in addition to these institutional and systematic conditions, requires the empowerment of citizens and the degree to which officeholders and leaders actually respect civil and political rights of the people. Here, empowerment of the people refers to the transfer of power from the elites to the people, and as a result of being empowered, citizens' willingness to participate in society and politics increases. The standard for effective democracy is very high, and it, along with democratic consolidation, has been argued to be the goal for new democracies such as Korea. For instance, Korean politics researcher Im (2004), in discussing the performance of the "three Kims era". a period in which three politicians named Kim Dae-jung, Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil showed significant influence in the Korean politics scene . Evaluates that democratic consolidation during this timeframe was on the verge of faltering; he even labels Korea as a "defective democracy." Assumptions of such conclusions seem to imply that democratic consolidation was Korea's desired objective whose fulfillment had failed due to political incapability.

2.2.Media Systems: Models and Theories

In this thesis, focuses on how media roles may have changed in different stages of democratization and in democracy. In other words, this research aims at examining different press systems, meaning forms of mass media within political regimes. With regard to the status of a regime in political developments, Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm (1963) provide an overview of press systems that associate media and political types, systems that are important in understanding relationships between them. The four press systems, referred to as the "four theories

concept" are 1) authoritarian, where the organizational state supersedes the individual or any free will of one; 2) libertarian, in advocacy of free press; 3) communist, with media's focus on perpetuation and expansion of the socialist system; and 4) social responsibility, which goes beyond the libertarian theory in that it places a great many moral and ethical restrictions on the press. This conceptualization of systems has been called the "four theories of the press" or the "normative theories of the press," and has been one of the most influential academic approaches to discussing press freedom.

Different Media Models

Authoritarian model	**Libertarian model**
Communist model	**social responsibility model**

Schramm (1963)

To this, Nerone et al. (1996) concede to the point that the four theories hold high curricular and intellectual virtues and have strengths in brevity and simplicity, but argue against it in that it may not be able to suffice in explaining press systems and roles in new settings outside of the United States or of a new time period. The authors, taking into account theory as something that "is able to explain a relationship between concepts," claim that the four theories are not really four theories, but only offer one theory with four examples. According to the authors, the "theory" of the four theories as stated by Schramm and colleagues is that a society's structure, policy and political orientation result in one of the four press systems. In other words, although the four theories would be adequate for stating that there is a relationship between social circumstances and press systems, the actual four theories or just models or examples of press system cases. May not be able to explain what could

happen in societies other than the United States or at a different time.

Similarly, Hallin and Mancini (2004) argue that a potential problem of the four theories of the press is that "The press always takes on the form and coloration of social and political structures within which it operate," (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1963, p.1) and that the authors claim to believe that an understanding of these aspects of society is basic to any systematic understanding of the press. Hallin and Mancini question this perspective of the four theories, which state that they can be applied to any and every type social regime. Arguing that it makes sense to lead a further discussion from the four theories, or normative theories, the authors engage in their own comparison of media systems.

Hallin and Mancini's comparison is based on 1) the development of media markets; 2) political parallelism, or the degrees and nature of the links between media and political parties; 3) development of journalistic professionalism; and 4) the degree and nature of state intervention in the media system. The authors also argue that there are important connections between the patterns of development of media systems and key characteristics of the political system such as the role of the state, consensus character of a political system, pluralism, and corporatism. According to these factors, the authors created the three models theory consisting of the 1) polarized pluralist, 2) democratic corporatist, and 3) liberal models.

The polarized pluralist model is characterized by the state (or regime) and political parties intervening strongly in many areas of social life, and with much of the population holding adherence to a wide variety of political ideologies. This system is relatively absent of commonly agreed rules and norms. The news media in this system

are similarly characterized with a high degree of external pluralism, and the media seem to have posed more importance on commitment to ideologies than on common professional culture. Links between journalists and political actors are close, state intervention is active, and newspapers provide commentary directed at political activists. The democratic corporatist model puts a strong emphasis on the role of organized social groups in society, but at the same time holding a strong sense of commitment to the "common good." The media culture here is characterized by being a vehicle for expression of social groups and diverse ideologies, but at the same time adhering to a high level of loyalty to common norms and procedures. State intervention in the media is extensive, but it places high values on media autonomy.

In the liberal model, representation is more individualistic. In this model, the role of organized social groups is emphasized less than in the other two system and is often looked down upon. "Special interests" are emphasized more than the "common good." Role of the media here tends to be seen less in terms of representation of social groups and ideological diversity and more in terms of the press as a "watchdog" of government. A common professional culture is relatively strong. State intervention is low in this model.

The authors state that although the liberal model has dominated media studies and has served as the principal normative model, it is probably the polarized pluralist model that is most widely applicable to political systems around the world in terms of the relationship between media and politics. They mention that Asian states will also fit into this model due to the role of clientelism, or the dependency of society on superiors and subordinates, strong roles of the state, and the role of the media in political struggles.

Unlike the authors of the four theories, Hallin and Mancini state that “substantial modifications” would need to be made to their models and that their theories of the three models would be used as inspiration for creating new models.

These press system theories are significant for this research because they can be applied to the case of Korea, which has transitioned from an authoritarian or polarized pluralist model to a more libertarian or liberal model. It is also interesting that, although further discussion will follow later, Korean press systems always adhered to some kind of a socially responsible model owing to its cultural values. Moreover, as Korea and Taiwan is relatively young in its history of democratic transition and consolidation, its press system seem to be a combination of all of the three different models introduced and discussed by Hallin and Mancini.

Then, it would be worthwhile to elaborate the discussion of press systems in terms of conceptions that would fit into the specific settings of Korea and Taiwan, graft them with a theory that would be able to explain why such press role conceptions occurred in the way they did.

2.3. Role of the Media in Democratic Countries

Prior to advancing to an application of a theory or theories that provides explanation corresponding to the Korean and Taiwan’s case, an overview of roles concepts in pertinent literature seems necessary. These role conceptions, as per the discussions of Hallin and Mancini, are mainly rooted in a Western approach, which is why a comprehensive understanding and grafting of these concepts to a possible theoretical explanation of the Korean and Taiwan’s case must follow.

Due to the freedom-oriented nature of democracy, roles of the press are diversified to a great extent in accordance to various media elements. Some of these elements as debated by John C. Merrill and Everette Dennis (1991) include media-government relationship, media and the public trust, people's right to know and right of access to the media, etc.

James Curran (2005) also mentions that democracy requires of the media the following: 1) representation by enabling groups to be heard, 2) deliberation by providing a forum for discussion and presenting a wide range of voices, 3) conflict resolution by working to promote norms and procedures of democracy, 4) accountability by monitoring diverse sources of power, and 5) information dissemination, enabling citizens to enter into informed debate and decision-making. Although these are concepts and functions of what ought to be done, they can be perceived as roles that media plays in a democracy, or put further, in a transition to democracy.

Valenzuela and McCombs' (2008) theory is media as agenda setter, and he gives a description of agenda-setting and agenda attribute setting roles of the media, where media providers determine what should be considered as "news." It is the role of the journalist to tell the audience not what to think, but what to think about. This is an important role of the media in a democracy in that issues within a democratic regime that may be overlooked are presented with emphasis, bringing together topics and ideas crucial to a democratic society. As audiences are directed to such issues, their support for and accessibility to democratic values are increased, enabling different phases of democratization or democratic consolidation.

國立政治大學 National Chengchi University

Weaver and Wilhoit's (1986) definition of the interpretive role of the media can also be universally applied to various political situations, because through this role all that the media does is explicated complicated concepts to the audience. Some may argue that this role is a facilitative role, but this role can be played even in authoritarian regimes, because strictly the media does not have to care about social benefit in performing this role. Its main focus is to explain and make a concept better understood, regardless of the ideology behind those concepts.

Bennett and Serrin (2005) discuss a role of the press as watchdog. As an agenda setter, it is the role of the news media to bring forth issues specifically dealing with how government is performing. It could be understood that this role of the media is a specified kind of an agenda setter. The media is a vigilant watchdog that monitors actions of the government, timely pointing out problems that people should know about. This role is important within a democracy because foundation of such a regime lies under an assumption that the government is for and by the people. Any actions of the government that is non-democratic, or in other words authoritarian, will be discussed in the news media. With this role is another significant idea that the news media address accountability.

Weaver and Wilhoit (1986), in their discussion of roles, introduce the verification role of the press, which refers to its ability and willingness to verify alleged truths in society. This requires a high level of media autonomy, as what the media does here basically is to question it sources. Here, the media also has as its goal to pursue a definite good, which is truth. Those subject to verification can be anyone, but in most cases the target is the government and policies, which makes this role monitorial in many senses.

Schmuhl and Picard (2005) address representation, deliberation, and conflict resolution functions of the media by examining the marketplace of ideas role. For this role, the media provides a forum for the discussion and resolution of ideas and interests in a society. By performing the media representation function, media plays a role to become the "voice of the people." The traditional view of the media as a unitary institution representing an indivisible public is rejected, and its customary role becomes one to enable the principal organizations and groups in society to be heard. In other words, the media acts as a vehicle for conveying opinions of different groups in society, large or small, so they can be given an opportunity to speak. Through an exchange and sharing of these voices, conflicts can be resolved in the forum, and in the marketplace of ideas, it is said that truth always prevails. However, the authors say that accelerating commercialization of the news may be hindering the performance of this role.

Patterson and Seib (2005) discuss the media role of providing information for the public, which is perhaps the most familiar role. On the basis of information provided by the media, citizens can productively participate in politics and policies. As a contemporary problem, the authors indicate how news coverage often fails to educate the public and lead them to more informed and discerning judgments. For this, the authors suggest that a clear understanding of just how informed a citizen must be is a required discussion for the media to adequately perform this role.

Thorson (2005) provides a definition of the media role as mobilizer, presenting it with an assessment of how well the press works to mobilize citizens in a democracy. This is linked closely to the two abovementioned roles, as the news media as agenda

setter and watchdog finds and presents issues in a democracy, it eventually acts as a vehicle for enabling public actions. Again, democracy is regime that puts emphasis on the people above all. Thus, these three roles in a synthesized form act as the means for people. The people are able to obtain information regarding how their democracy is performing, and possibly on problematic issues of the government. It becomes journalism then, which enables the people to have their opinions heard through mobilization.

Merrill (2002) also writes on a concept called as the "people's press." According to Merrill, the people's press is less dominated by "journalist-centered journalism and owner-controlled journalism" but focuses itself more on a "symbiosis between journalism and people." (p. 27) This seems to be a complementary concept for the existential journalist in that although the existential journalist is a liberalist and an advocate of freedom and subjectivity, it is also bound with a responsibility to put a priority on people. In other words, the free journalist seeks autonomy and press freedom while also considering how the practice of journalism influences people.

Merrill, in one of his earlier works, introduces a term called the existential journalist. In contrast to the existing objective journalism, or the rationalist stance, the existentialist stance is built upon keywords such as intuitive, subjective, directive, persuasive, judgmental and liberal. In summary, his definition of an existential journalist is a free and authentic person and not a "cog in the impersonal wheel of journalism." The existential journalists would also relieve the uniqueness of every journalist's individual existence and personality and praise freedom and responsibility for decisions in such a time when journalists are disappearing into institutionalized corporate journalism (Merrill, 1979).

In discussing media ethics and professionalism in post-colonial societies, Musa and Domatob discuss a concept called the development journalist. Development journalism is a notion of journalism where its act of reporting events of national and international importance should be constructive so that it contributes positively to the development of the country concerned. McQuail (2000) writes that development media theory emerged out of the idea that "societies undergoing transition from underdevelopment and colonialism to independence often lack the money, infrastructure, skills, and audiences to sustain and extensive free-market media system." (p.155)

One important thing to consider of the role conceptions above is that although they seem to be associated with certain political systems or degrees of press freedom, they can be interlaced in different stages of political transition such as democratization.

For example, the media's watch dog role, according to its intended concept, would occur only under circumstances where much press freedom is granted. However, it could be possible that such a role of the media can be embossed in a society that is undergoing democratization, depending on the objectives of the journalist or organization. That is, the press may be able to play this role in an authoritarian regime (not much press freedom) as a way of communicating with the public so as to increase press freedom and stimulate the transition process by "enlightening" the people. Another example could be the development journalism concept. This role conception in theory would apply only to third world countries that are on the verge of economic development. However, many traits of this role

conception could still be dominant in a society like Korea due to its background of rapid advancement. Korea and Taiwan was occupied by Japan until the end of WWII, and from then to 1980s it had undergone economic development and political transitions.

Although it was not at a post-colonial status in 1980, the concept of the development journalist may be able to explain certain roles or role philosophies Korea and Taiwan had at that time. Thus, maintaining such a perspective on role conceptions and taking into consideration that the discussion of role conceptions and press system theory above are of Western descent, it would be important to be able to incorporate them into a theory that would provide a more comprehensive explanation of social-circumstance-press system press role associations in a democratization such as that of Korea and Taiwan. Social Transitions and Key Roles in Journalism: A Theory Christians et al (2009), in a discussion of press systems and media roles, links different dimensions of how political transition affect press systems with the types of roles played by the media. In this theory, the two factors that determine how media roles change are media autonomy and transition of institutional power of the media within a democracy. The four key roles for journalism for each dimension of transitions are monitorial, facilitative, radical, and collaborative roles. The monitorial role refers to all aspects of the collection, processing, and dissemination of information of all kinds about current and recent events, plus warnings about future developments. The facilitative role helps to develop a shared moral framework for community and society, rather than just looking after individual rights and interests. The radical role focuses on exposing abuses of power and aims to raise popular consciousness of wrongdoing, inequality, and the potential for change, typically in new nations with their intense pressure toward economic and social development. The

collaborative role specifies and values the task for media that arise in situations of unavoidable engagement with social events and processes.

As can be seen in the figure, what Christians et al. argue is that as dynamics of institutional power and media autonomy change due to political changes within and toward democracies, the roles tend to be played by journalism also changes.
For example, given that institutional power of the media grows (as in the case of Korea), mass media should shift from playing a radical role to a monitorial or collaborative role depending on how much autonomy it has. This theory will be incorporated into the process of analysis so that a transition in media roles could be linked to the status to which Korea and Taiwan belonged at different time periods.

This theory seems to be adequate enough to attempt an explanation, media of Korea and Taiwan roles in relation to its transition because the two axis accurately represents a plausible shift, or dynamics, of two significant elements of press system-press role relationships: media autonomy and the strength of media institutions. The axes can be extended in all four directions to illustrate press status and features at a certain stage in democratization. By integrating this theory with the discussion of media role concepts, it would be possible to see how these required functions of the media are conceptualized into actual roles. In order to examine roles with regard to the argument of Christians et al. on media role-political transition relationships, existing discussion of media roles in the literature can be categorized into their four key role classifications.

To elaborate on the theory's effectiveness in explaining these relationships, the facilitative category of roles seem to have most to do with media ethics and what

members of the mass media see as their goals in society. In a democracy, the institutional powers of the media are strong and the news media is able to exercise fully its autonomy.

However, the media, as a constituent of society, seeks the common good, sacrificing its libertarian desires. As for radical roles, when media prioritizes their autonomy above norms and common good, it could very well assume such roles. Also, since role conceptions in literature mostly deal with the Western world of journalism and democracy, a question arises as to what roles are assumed by the media when the political system is a non-democracy, where media lacks autonomy while still having quite an influence on the public. This is where the collaborative sphere of this theory would enable classification and synthesis of roles to explain effects under such circumstances.

It is also true that some role conceptions discussed above do not really fit into the classifications of the theory of Christians et al. It could be that these roles are inherent in the intrinsic traits of journalism itself, and they may perhaps be in practice at least to a certain extent in all cases of political regime and transition.

Systematic classifications and role definitions alike, the focus is on how journalists have acted or ought to act in a democracy, with the exception of the development journalist. Although it seems that these concepts seem to describe at least certain aspects of roles played by the media while Korea and Taiwan was in a non-democratic or democratization period, a need to define how journalism is practiced with what values in these two countries.

2.4. Concepts of press freedom

The concept of press freedom is too complex to sum up simply. However, freedom of the press should be characterized by independence from internal or external factors and all other elements, which might make journalists hesitant in carrying out their media work. According to classical liberal approaches, "A truly free press would be free not just of state intervention but also of market forces and ownership ties and a host of other material bonds" (Berry et al., 1995, p. 22). Press freedom is freedom from all compulsions throughout the processes of press activities. The overall meaning of freedom in the media is that all processes of press activities should be conducted freely. This includes establishing a press company, gathering news, writing articles, editing news, publishing and distributing. However, in practice the media cannot be free from governmental, political or economic control (LaMay, 2007, p. 26). LaMay argues, "The press must be dependent on something for its viability; the press cannot be free, but is locked into a cycle of interdependence."

It is easy to see media control in authoritarian societies because "governments employ strict censorship to control the flow of information to the general public, and journalists exist as mouthpieces for the government" (LaMay, 2007, p. 26). Authoritarian regimes regularly censor or control the media before or after media production.

However, there are many complex elements in this interrelationship in democratic societies because "in part theory is less important to democracy than how freedom is lived and perpetuated" (LaMay, 2007, p. 26). Freedom of the press helps

maintain the health of democracies (Baker, 2007, p. 5). These two different systems, authoritarian and democratic can be seen in Korea and Taiwan.

Ostensibly, Korea and Taiwan are a democratic country, however, in practice the society has been strongly controlled by clientelism, which refers to a form of social organization characterized by personal relationships such as blood ties, academic background ties, and institutes. An authoritarian style still exists in practice to different degrees because of the long history of authoritarian rule. It ranges from authoritarian rule to civilian governments, depending on the ruling style of political leaders such as the president. Therefore, Korea and Taiwan have a mixture of authoritarian and democratic features. In the media, if freedom of the press is to be maintained it is important to be independent not just from government interference but also from other factors like capital and ownership ties.

國立政治大學 National Chengchi University

3.Democratization in Korea and Taiwan

3.1. The 3rd wave of Democracy and East Asia

In early period of 1990s, with the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the down all of all communism regimes in an Eastern European area, many people became enthusiastic about a “3rd wave" of democratization” in the late 20th century (Huntington 1991 pp. 13-26). Over about 15 years later, this wave of democratization has proven disappointing. At present, Asia has only four stable democracies: Japan, India, Korea and Taiwan.

This leaves just two "3rd wave" democracies in Asia: Korea and Taiwan. Some researchers have stressed economic factors behind the democratization of Korea and Taiwan, the two principal Asian "little 4 tigers" or "little 4 dragons." The political economy approach of Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman (S. Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman 1995), for example, suggests key links between the economy and democratization that this writer finds unconvincing. Rather, as Laurence Whitehead notes, any argument that the "Democratic 'Developmental States'" of Taiwan and Korea required a strong authoritarian regime for economic development remains undemonstrated (L. Whitehead 2002).

Before progressing further, it is necessary to define "democracy." In the simple definition, a democracy is a political system in which the people regularly and freely choose their own leaders. In choosing their leaders, the people have the right and the ability to make the opposition the new government. In a democracy, people

also have such civil liberties as freedom of the speech and press and all citizens have relative equality before the law. Democracies appear in various shapes and forms. Some are presidential such as the United States, while others are parliamentary such as the United Kingdom and Commonwealth of United Kingdom countries. Some are unitary such as the United Kingdom and France while others are federal such as the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, and India. However, in all of these cases the people have and do use their ability to change their rulers freely and peacefully.

It is important to distinguish between democracy and "liberalization." Sometimes authoritarian regimes engage in "liberalization" allowing some increase in freedom of speech and the press. They may allow opposition politicians to win office in elections, though they do not relinquish ultimate control (J. Bruce Jacobs 1981).

Focus on Taiwan, non-allowed to establishment of opposition party of any kind, until September 1986, and those who attempted to do so were imprisoned. when president Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) was being prepared as successor to his father, until after his appointment as premier(President of Executive Yuan) in May 1972, Taiwan had one such period of liberalization. A 2nd important liberalization period took place after the KMT(Kuomintang中國國民黨)'s "defeat" in the November 19, 1977, election until the Kaohsiung (高雄) Incident of December 10, 1979.(Chang 1992) A 3rd period of liberalization occurred after the conservative General Wang Sheng (王昇) was in effect exiled and as ambassador to Paraguay on September, 1983. The ruling KMT, under the direction of its party chairman Chiang Ching-kuo, nominated Lee Teng-hui (李登煇), a Taiwanese, to be vice-president on February 15, 1984. However, in taking this action Chiang Ching-kuo did not appoint Lee Teng-hui his successor,6 and it seems that Lee, for example, could not see Chiang Ching-kuo

when the latter was hospitalized near the end of his life and only fellow mainlanders had access (Jay Taylor 2000 p 398). At other periods, hard-line authoritarianism prevailed.

3.2.What is Specific about Democracy or Democratization? In Korea **and Taiwan**

Based on the historical context of recent transitions toward democracy in these 2 countries, certain aspects of their respective regimes cannot fit into the rather narrow standard of a "full democracy" as described by Wood (2004).

Huntington (1991), calling a "wave" a specific period of time in which a transition to democracy significantly outnumbered transitions in the opposite political groups, included Korea and Taiwan in what he labels the 3rd wave (1974-1990) of democratization. This democratic wave comprises mostly third-world countries that experienced social and economic conditions favorable to democracy. He also labels political leadership as a significant factor for this wave of democratization: leaders have to want democracy to happen or be willing to take steps such as partial liberalization that may lead it to happening. In added 1987 years is momentum of democratization in Korea and Taiwan, in this year, Korea recovered direct-presidential election and Taiwan reshuffled martial law in same year.

Korea and Taiwan seems like a representative example of this specific wave of democratization, as it underwent a rapid economic development and saw democratic values increasingly gaining support from its people.

This is closely related to how Inglehart and Welzel (2008) define the relationship between economic development and human empowerment in a democracy. The authors mention three components to empowering the people: 1) action resources such as material resources and educational levels; 2) self-expression values; and 3) democratic institutions.

They are closely linked to each other, as the increase in the accessibility to resources results in greater confidence of people in a society, which also raises the willingness of individuals to express them-selves. Democratic institutions, as venues for such a purpose, become strengthened and begin to function better in a society. In this linkage, economic development is the starting point; economic development, by increasing the amount and quality of action resources, provides the causal relationship that can lead to human empowerment and effective democracies. As mentioned above, Korea's case can be an exemplary one for this theory as it saw great economic achievements in a short span. Action resources for the people such as education opportunities and the amount of accessible knowledge became more available, and it seems to have played a significant role in democratic values fostering in the Korean public.

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3.3. Historical Review of Korea and Taiwan's past

3.3.1.Same memories ; The Japanese Colonial era

Korea and Taiwan have some important historical parallels. While these broad similarities facilitate comparison, the following analysis also shows that the two countries had important differences.

Based on geographical perspective, Korean and Taiwan is located at same area, East-Asia. But before modern previously, these two countries' space time is separated. However a result of the important historical event in 1894-1895. Korea and Taiwan was historically encountered.

Taiwan and Korea both became important Japanese colonies. The Qing Dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895, following defeat of the Qing-Japanese War, 1894-1995, while Korea became a Japanese colony informally in 1905 and formally in 1910. Both countries gained independence from Japanese colonization after Japan's defeat in 1945.

Although both nations gained economically under the Japanese colonial rule, both also resisted Japan and both suffered grievously. Davidson estimates that close to 8,000 Taiwanese died resisting the Japanese in 1895 (James W. Davidson). Also Japanese killed 12,000 Taiwanese "bandit-rebels" during 1898-1902 (Harry J. Lamley), while a Japanese source states that the Japanese colonial regime executed over 32,000"bandits,"morethan one percent to Taiwan's population, in the same period (Kiyoshi & Walter Chen 2004 138-39)

The Japanese also slaughtered many Koreans during their colonial rule. From 1905 to 1914, the Japanese killed some 150,000 Korean militiamen (Kim 1998 p 36). Especially, in the three months of the March First 1919 Movement (March to May), the Japanese killed 7,509 Koreans, wounded 15,961, and arrested a further 47,948(Kim 2000 p39). After the March First Movement, many Koreans went north to Manchuria and in the Kando (Chinese: Jiandao)

Japanese colonial rule in the two countries had some differences. In Korea, the Japanese maintained military men as governors while Taiwan had civilian governors from 1919 to 1936. Korea "gained some semblance of self-rule while in Formosa it was strongly bureaucratic." (Edward & Chen 1970 p157). Koreans held many senior positions in the Japanese colonial government, while Taiwanese held very few. This was in part because Japanese formed only 2.8 percent of the population in Korea compared to 6.0 percent in Taiwan (Kim 2000). In Taiwan, force was used to "eliminate active resistance," a goal achieved by 1919. In Korea, which revolted in the very substantial March 1st Movement, 1919. Japan "decided to relax control somewhat in the hope that the Koreans might be reconciled to 'autonomy' and abandon their demand for independence (Kim 2000)."

In terms of future democratization, the Japanese colonial experience made three contributions to both countries. Firstly, the strong Japanese bureaucratic rule established patterns of administration that the postwar governments were able to use, thus enhancing their efficacy. Secondly, the Japanese colonial experience increased national consciousness among all sectors of both societies. Finally, the Japanese colonial experience advanced both countries economically, socially, and

educationally.

3.3.2.The Post-war Authoritarian Period : Miracle of Han-River and Miracle of Taiwan

In the postwar period, the authoritarian governments in both Korea and Taiwan implemented some similar strategies of economic development and achieved some similar goals. Both, for example, started with import substitution industrialization and then shifted to export oriented industrialization in the 1960s. Thus, from 1976 until at least 1991, Taiwan's exports always exceeded 40 percent of gross national product (GNP) and in 1984, 1986, and 1987 exports exceeded 50 percent of GNP. Korean exports from 1976 to 1981 ranged from 24 to 31 percent of GNP (Bank of Korea).

Both countries also achieved considerable social mobility. Many people migrated from the farm to the city and moved from agriculture to industry. In Taiwan, many farm girls went to work in factories to earn their dowries and to put their brothers through university, a pattern also familiar in Korea. Both countries moved in the direction of greater equality in income, though Taiwan moved faster. Both also emphasized the importance of education and greatly facilitated the education of the two populations.

These regimes promoted high levels of education in part owing to the official Confucianism that authoritarian leaders in both Korea and Taiwan promulgated in order to maintain discipline in their societies. However, Confucianism has mixed implications for authoritarian rule. While encouraging education, Confucian ideas are also proto-democratic.

In addition, study in democratic countries can result in more liberal perspectives. Of the twenty persons in Premier Chiang Ching-kuo's 1st cabinet announced on May 29, 1972, fourteen had studied or trained abroad. eight in the United States, four in the United Kingdom, and six in Japan including four who had studied in two of these countries(Roy 2003). Most two had primarily military educations. Certainly, it has become clear Calculated from Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1992 (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Republic of China, 1992), 43 (GNP), 190 (Exports). Calculated from Major Statistics of Korean Economy (Seoul: Korean Statistical Association), that several of these persons did hold more liberal views that may have ameliorated the actions of Taiwan's government and which seem to have contributed to Taiwan's democratization after Chiang Ching-kuo's death(Roy 2003).

In Korea, nine of the seventeen members of the president Park Cheng-hee's 1st Yushin Regime, which was announced on January 15, 1973, had studied overseas; five had studied in Japan and six in the United States with two of these studying in both countries. However, at least six persons, including three of those who had studied overseas, had studied primarily in military institutions.

The nature of the economic development in Taiwan and Korea also had important differences. Taiwan's large-scale industries remained government hands, while most industrialization in Taiwan took place in small and medium-sized firms. In South Korea the great private Chaebols (財閥, Tycoon's Korean term) dominated the economy, though these had important government connections.

Both regimes repressed labor, but in Taiwan labor activists could more easily gain employment in a small firm, while in Korea blacklisting. These different economic developments reflected key differences in the political regimes. The various

Korean postwar authoritarian regimes were Korean. The Taiwan postwar authoritarian regime can best be described as "Chinese" and "colonial" rather than Taiwanese. Just as the Japanese colonial regime discriminated against Taiwanese, so did the Chinese colonial regimes of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Chingkuo. During the leadership of the two Chiangs in Taiwan (1950-1988), Chinese mainlanders, who accounted for less than 14 percent of the population, always held large majorities in the government's cabinet and the KMT's core decision organization Central Standing Committee(國民黨 中央常務委員會). Taiwanese never held the positions of president, premier, or minister of foreign affairs, national defense, economics, education, finance, or justice. Taiwanese also never held senior positions in the KMT or in the military and the security agencies. Chinese mainlanders controlled the large state industries, leaving Taiwanese to organize their small and medium-sized industries.

From Park Chung-hee's take over in 1961, Korean authoritarian governments were military in nature and came to power through coups d'etat. Although Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo both had considerable military experience, Taiwan's government remained essentially civilian and the military and security agencies never seriously threatened the rule of the tow Chiangs.

In addition, from the retaking of Taiwan from the Japanese in 1945 until the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in early 1988, Taiwan had only one regime. Korea, in contrast, had five different republics, each with its own constitution: the 1st Republic under Rhee Syngman (1948-1960), the short-lived Dr. Chang Myun's 2nd Republic (1960-1961), the 3rd and 4th republics under Park Chung-hee (1961-72 and 1972-79,), and the 5th Republic under Chun Doo-hwan (1980-87).

The voting systems of the two regimes also varied. In Korea, the Park Chung-hee government abolished local elections in 1961, but the central government continued to have elections, even if they were controlled. Local elections were only reinstated in 1994 after democratization.

In Taiwan, local elections were implemented in the 1950s, but the island had virtually no central elections. Other than partial "supplementary" elections after 1969. until after democratization in the 1990s.

Finally, even though the figures may not be complete, the authoritarian governments in both Taiwan and Korea were violent. In Taiwan, the government killed as many as 28,000 Taiwanese after the so-called "February 28, 1947 Incident." Then, in the White Terror of the 1950s, the regime executed 1,017 persons of whom two-thirds were Taiwanese and one-third were Chinese. Over the whole of the martial law period under both Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, some 140,000 people suffered imprisonment in some 29,000 political cases. The number executed in political cases totaled three to four thousand.

According to official statistics, Korea arrested and executed fewer persons for political crimes than did the Taiwan government. From 1948 until 1993, 336 persons were executed for political crimes and in 1954 alone the government executed 38 people for political crimes.

1962 to 1989, 116 persons were executed for political crimes. After the

National Security Law(國家保安法) was passed in 1948, some 100,000 to 110,000 persons were arrested. During the Korean War(1950~1953), 550,000 were arrested as traitors, but no records remain to reveal their sentences. Under the rules of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, a total of some twenty-five years, about nine thousand persons, an average of three to four hundred per year, were arrested under the National Security Law.

On the streets, however, the Korean authoritarian governments proved much more deadly. In the Kaohsiung Incident in December 10, 1979, the Taiwan government claimed that 183 police (and no demonstrators) were injured. These figures clearly had problems, but the key point in this context is that no one was killed and relatively few injured in the most important political demonstration during the postwar authoritarian period in Taiwan. By contrast, the suppression in South Korea of the Kwangju Uprising of May 18, 1980, officially left 191 people killed and a further several thousand injured, though other estimates go considerably higher.

During the December 1987 presidential campaign, Kim Dae-jung, basing himself on statements by Ambassador William H. Gleysteen of the United States, said that one thousand had been killed in the suppression of Kwangju, Korea's 1st largest city of southwest(Gleysteen 1999). In June 1987, during the seventeen days of intensive demonstrations that led to the first major steps toward democratization in Korea, the authorities fired over 300,000 tear-gas canisters at the demonstrators. This tear-gas alone cost about six billion won34 or US$7.3 million. By comparison, Taiwan's demonstrations during the authoritarian period (and afterwards) remained quite peaceful.

3.4.Political Rifts and Political Contents of Democratization

In the just after post-the 2nd world war period following liberation from Japanese imperialism ruling, the Korean and Taiwanese societies became politically activated. But under the anticommunist autocratic regimes that came into being in the course of the division of the countries, both societies were forcibly depoliticized. The conflicts that occurred under the autocratic regimes shaped the particular political cleavages that characterized the two states throughout most of the postwar period. The political rifts thus generated in the two states reflected the processes that formed the respective autocratic regimes as well as the characteristics of these regimes.

Whenever political conflicts arose in the two countries, they opened these rifts which shook the authoritarian regime. The specific patterns of the political rifts in the two authoritarian regimes defined the political contents of their democratization processes.

In the Taiwan, under the presidential system, The president and vice president, the Legislative Yuan (adopting laws, deciding the national budget, approving appointment of the head of the Executive Yuan), and the Control Yuan (impeaching public functionaries) are regarded as the elected central representatives of the public will.

The three bodies taken together are considered to be Taiwan's equivalent to the parliament in European countries. The elections of these representatives of public will were conducted from 1947 through 1948 in the midst of the civil war in all regions of China except those under Communist control. On the basis of the election

results at that time, the central government structure was organized, including the election of the president and vice president. The KMT government thus formed adhered to this form of government as provided by the Constitution of the Republic of China even after it moved to Taiwan. It was decided then that the parliamentarians and other officers elected in 1947~48 were to continue to exercise their powers until another national election covering the whole of China was held. Thus, the permanent parliament composed of irreplaceable representatives, only a few of them having effective constituencies, came into being. When Chiang Ching-kuo became the president of the Executive Yuan (premier) in 1972, which virtually established his control, he increased the seats for Taiwan to be filled by regular elections(Roy 2004). This measure was intended to resolve the problem of aging representatives and consolidating the base of the government of Taiwan to meet the external crises following Taiwan's withdrawal from the United Nations. This is the background of the election of additional members.

Choi (1993, pp. 145.97) describes three political rifts in Korean politics: 1) autocracy versus democracy, 2) economic fairness versus economic development, and 3) people-oriented national unification versus conservative national unification. He stated that in the early post-colonial period political conflicts flared up along the lines of all three rifts. After the First Republic was established and the left wiped out, rifts 2) and 3) expanded as the regime used the military to force itself on the people and strengthened its ideological control. In this paper I borrowed Choi's coordinates of analysis with partial modification.

In Korea, namely, 1) the coordinate of political regimes (authoritarianism versus democracy), 2) the coordinate of social cleavages, and 3) the coordinate of national

unification doctrine. Different types of antagonisms existed over each of the three issues in the two states, and the political contents of democratization were accordingly determined.(Im, 2004)

3.4.1.Political regimes

In an early period of state foundation, the most salient organizational feature of the Taiwanese authoritarian regime is its party-state system character. The contradiction between authoritarianism and democracy in Taiwan therefore assumed the form of antagonism between the KMT and the anti-KMT forces. The political forces that sought their political resources outside of the party-state system first voiced criticism of the KMT in local election campaigns, and then in the narrow political arena connected with the election of additional members to the parliament. They did so carefully, constantly testing the outer limits of the KMT's tolerance. Democratization under the party-state system first and foremost implied the formation of a new opposition party in order to break the KMT's proclaimed monopoly on national politics (a ban on the formation of political parties other than the KMT). In the 1960s local anti-KMT personalities who called themselves nonpartisan succeeded in securing representation in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly. In the 1970s a small group of democracy promoters who dubbed themselves "party outsiders" (Dangwai or ousters of KMT) advanced not only into local assemblies but also into the national parliament.

These forces, supported by new political journalism (Dangwai journalism), coalesced through cooperation in election campaigns. Finally, the Dangwai forces

succeeded in forming the first opposition party under KMT rule, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), during the latter half of the 1980s.

The most remarkable organizational characteristic of the Korean quasi-military authoritarian regime was the political rule of Park Chung-hee's revolutionary force and their successors (the "new military group," Chun Doo-hwan). The democratic movement sought to rectify the distorted political system by compelling the military men who had become the political elite through coups to withdraw from politics.

The major task of the democratic forces was not to form a new opposition party, but to continue to apply effective pressure on the government for democratization, sticking to an unambiguous position of opposition and resisting the carrot and-stick tactics used by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (later, the Agency for National Security Planning) and other agencies of the military government. In this struggle the "two Kims" (Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung) functioned as the symbols of the Korean democratization movement.

3.4.2.Modalities of Democratization Processes

Korea and Taiwan share the following similarities in the modality of democratization: 1) opposition elite groups grew (in Taiwan) or survived (in Korea) taking advantage of the limited political areas opened up by elections which the authoritarian governments were compelled to hold for various reasons; 2) the opposition elite, in critical periods of regime shifts, succeeded in mobilizing the urban

population including the middle class into street politics, thus applying effective pressure on the power holders, and 3) in the crises thus generated, the incumbent power holders became split over how to cope with the crises.

But there are notable differences between the two states as to how initiatives of the ruling and opposition elite were displayed. Huntington (1991, chap. 3) identified three types of democratic transition concerning power relationships between the governing coalition and opposition. These are: 1) the governing coalition remains preponderant even when it is shaken by a crisis, 2) the opposition becomes preponderant, and 3) neither side can dominate the other. There are correspondingly three democratization models. The first is the "transformation model" where the governing coalition is preponderant over the opposition. In this model the reformers within the governing coalition start a change by taking the initiative for liberalization, defeating the diehards (who oppose any reform or transition to a new system); then democratic reformers (favoring transition to democracy) take the lead over the liberal reformers (who advocate a certain measure of liberalization and a partial opening of the authoritarian regime in order to maintain the basics of that regime) to complete the transition to a new regime. The second is the "replacement model" where the opposition gains strength vis-a-vis the governing coalition which refuses to accept any reform, and overthrows the regime to bring about a democratic regime. This is a model close to a revolutionary model. The third is the "trans-placement model" where neither side is strong enough to dominate the other so that the democratic reformers and democratic moderates (who aim to achieve only a transition to democracy, unlike revolutionary extremists pursuing goals more radical than transition to democracy) jointly take the lead in arranging negotiations and compromise to facilitate the transition to a new regime.7 Taiwan's democratization process so far has followed the

transformation model while Korea's the trans-placement model. Wakabayashi (1994a) ordered and described the political process of Taiwanese democratization using Huntington's argument (1991).

In Korea major decisions concerning transition to a democratic regime were made through consultations between the opposition elite and the newly emerging democratic reformer elite in the governing coalition, under pressure from the opposition elite and its mobilized mass action in the streets. In the midst of the popular upsurge in June 1987, the government accepted the direct election of the president as demanded by the opposition. Following the ensuing consultation between the ruling and opposition parties, the constitution was swiftly revised. As early as December of the same year, the direct presidential election took place, normalizing the country's political system. 4 years later, in 1992, Kim Young-sam, an opposition leader having a long record of confrontation with the authoritarian regime, stood as a presidential candidate from the Democratic Liberal Party, a party established by the merger of the former ruling and opposition parties, and was successfully elected to presidency. Popular demand for a civilian government was thus satisfied.

In Taiwan all the major decisions in favor of transition to a democratic regime were made by the top leader of the government without the direct participation of the opposition elite, though it is true that the decisions were made under pressure from the opposition elite and street action it had organized. Chiang Ching-kuo decided on his own to permit the formation of opposition parties, lift the state of emergency, and let permanent parliament members retire. Likewise, it was Lee Teng-hui who decided to convene the National Affairs Conference in which opposition leaders were invited to participate, to implement a constitutional reform, and to introduce the direct election

of the president. Because of this formula, reforms in Taiwan's political systems have made slow progress. In fact, it took about five years before Chiang's decision on liberalization and permanent parliament reform materialized with the dissolution of the permanent parliament. This period of transition was studded with Chiang's death, Lee's succession to power, and the aggravation of KMT factional infighting. After the death of the strongman Chiang whose high prestige had affected all sectors of the state, no important decisions could be made without causing intra-party struggles. Only as late as the summer of 1994 was the direct presidential election agreed upon. This was carried out in the spring of 1996. This author once referred to the Taiwanese democratization process as "democratization in installments" (Wakabayashi 1992, p. 17).

Though it had to abandon the political monopoly it held during the party-state period, the KMT could not be forced to give up its struggle to stay in power in competition with other groups. The KMT is trying to successfully meet challenges of elections by relying on its heritage of economic success and social control. Taiwan thus will keep the imprint of its ancient regime for quite a time to come.

國立政治大學 National Chengchi University

3.5.The process of democratization in Korea and Taiwan

The processes of democratization occurred at similar times in both Korea and Taiwan and they share some similarities. Both places received substantial shocks from the fall of Ferdinand Marcos to "people power" in early 1986 and both authoritarian regimes felt less secure as a result (Seo 2001). Key people in the authoritarian regimes of both countries helped initiate the process of democratization. However, there were also differences.

3.5.1.Taiwan's Case

On July 15, 1987, former President Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law and new political parties were allowed to form (Roy 2004). And before, On September, 1986, leaders of Dangwei already declared form of new opposition party the Democratic Progressive Party(DPP). on September 28, 1986, the opposition organized as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP 民進黨). While members of the new party had expected to be arrested, Chiang Ching-kuo left them alone and the DPP actually contested the December 6, 1986, elections under its new name. And to the new opposition party, KMT government had been ignored. Chiang Ching-kuo had never had difficulty talking to the opposition. However, a more systematic process, the so-called "dialogues" (goutong溝通), began in May 1986. (Chi, 2009)

In January of the following year, the ban on new media establishment(報禁) was also lifted. Since then, Taiwan and its media have entered a media liberty era. Lift of martial law and ban of form new media regulation are historical event of Taiwan

democratization.

In Taiwan, from the late 1940s to the late 1980s, the political power of the ruling KMT in Taiwan was based on Leninist organizational principles without the Leninism (Chen, 1998). In general, this expectation holds up. The organizational dependence on and control of the media by the KMT during martial law (1949-1987) follows patterns very similar to those seen in the Leninist regimes of the same period. The party owned half the 31 newspapers (the number was held constant throughout the period of martial law), and the rest were licensed to loyal party supporters. The state owned all three of the television stations.

Party-state system control was also exercised in ways similar to those of the Leninist regimes. The state had a Government Information Office (GIO), which was responsible for registering the print media, and the party had a Department of Cultural Affairs, which orchestrated the political orientation of the press. The physical acts of suppression (including periodical and plant seizures and pre-censor-ship) were the responsibility of the Taiwan Garrison Command within the Ministry of Defense.

Personnel management in the media also looked similar to the Leninist regimes. In the mid-1970s, when civil society pressure for democratization began increasing, the KMT Department of Cultural Affairs began to directly call or meet with newspaper editors and remove those who did not follow instructions. In the broadcast media, the party maintained control over the appointment of personnel (not to mention programming).

Until the early 1970s, the Republic of China on Taiwan was recognized as the sole legitimate government of China by the United Nations and most Western nations, refusing to recognize the People's Republic of China on account of the Cold War (Roy 2004). The KMT ruled Taiwan under martial law until the late 1980s, with the stated goal of being vigilant against Communist infiltration and preparing to retake mainland China. Therefore, political dissent was not tolerated.

The late 1970s and early 1980s were a turbulent time for Taiwanese as many of the people who had originally been oppressed and left behind by economic changes became members of the Taiwan's new middle class. Free enterprise had allowed native Taiwanese to gain a powerful bargaining chip in their demands for respect for their basic human rights. The Kaohsiung Incident would be a major turning point for democracy in Taiwan.

Taiwan also faced setbacks in the international sphere. In 1971, the ROC government walked out of the United Nations shortly before it recognized the PRC government in Beijing as the legitimate holder of China's seat in the United Nations. The ROC had been offered dual representation, but Chiang Kai-shek demanded to retain a seat on the UN Security Council, which was not acceptable to the PRC. Chiang expressed his decision in his famous "the sky is not big enough for two suns(漢賊不兩立)" speech. In October 1971, Resolution 2758 was passed by the UN General Assembly and "the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek" (and thus the Republic of China Government) were expelled from the UN and replaced as "China" by the PRC. In 1979, the United States switched recognition from Taipei to Beijing.

After the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, Vice President Yen Chia-kan (嚴家淦) briefly took over from 1975 to 1978, according to the Constitution, but the actual power was in the hands of the Premier of the Executive Yuan, Chiang Ching-kuo, who was KMT chairman and a son of Chang Kai-shek. (Chang, 1991)

Former President Chiang Kai-shek was succeeded by his son Chiang Ching-kuo. When the younger Chiang came to power he began to liberalize the system. During the presidency of Chiang Ching-kuo from 1978 to 1988, Taiwan's political system began to undergo gradual liberalization.

Yen Chia-kan served as president until 1978, when he was succeeded by Chiang's son, Chiang Ching-kuo. Earlier, the year 1950 saw initial steps toward democracy with the institution of direct elections for some local government heads and council seats. The late 1970s and early 1980s saw the formation and development of an informal coalition of opposition politicians and political activists known as the Dangwai (KMT party outsiders), alluding to the fact that they were not affiliated with the KMT.

In December 1979, a rally in Kaohsiung City organized by leading Dangwai figures to observe International Human Rights Day turned violent when thousands of participants were hemmed in by military police. In connection with this event, known as the Kaohsiung Incident (美麗島事件), prominent dissidents were detained, convicted of sedition by a military tribunal and imprisoned.

Ultimately, however, the incident and the repression that followed added steam to the democracy movement. In September 1986, Dangwai leaders established the

Democratic Progressive Party, in defiance of the ban on formation of new political parties.

President Chiang Ching-kuo rescinded martial law in 1987 shortly before his death. His successor, Lee Teng-hui, took vigorous action to reform the political system and dismantle the party-state machinery that had been in place in Taiwan for the preceding four decades. Under his administration, bans on the establishment of new political parties and news publications were lifted; private visits to the Chinese mainland increased dramatically; and the ROC Constitution was amended to require direct election of the president and all legislators by citizens residing in its effective jurisdiction.

In 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party was formed. This organization was formed illegally, and inaugurated as the first party in opposition to Taiwan. This was formed to counter the KMT. Martial law was lifted one year later by Chiang Ching-kuo. Chiang selected Lee Teng-hui, a Taiwanese born technocrat to be his Vice President. The move followed other reforms giving more power to Taiwanese born citizens and calmed anti-KMT sentiments during a period in which many other Asian autocracies were being shaken by People Power movements.

Chiang Ching-kuo died in 1988. Chiang's successor, Vice President Lee Teng-hui, continued to hand more government authority over to Taiwanese born citizens. He also began to democratize the government. Taiwan underwent a process of localization, under Lee. In this localization process, local culture and history was promoted over a pan-China viewpoint. Lee's reforms included printing banknotes from the Central Bank instead of the usual Provincial Bank of Taiwan. He also

broadly suspended the operation of the Taiwan Provincial Government. In 1991 the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly elected in 1947 were forced to resign. These groups was originally created to represent mainland China constituencies. Also lifted were the restrictions on the use of Taiwanese languages in the broadcast media and in schools.

In 1988, martial law was lifted, elections were scheduled for 1989, and the media were considerably freed. One feature of KMT structure made the organizational basis of this persistent dependence more viable than in the East Central European cases. By the late 1980s, the KMT began clarifying its ownership of what were to that point state (or party-state) assets. The party, as a result, owns its media outlets as part of an enormous business empire. In the Taiwanese transition, then, there would be no question of ownership of media assets, because the KMT remained dominant in politics and retained its newspapers and broadcasting facilities as businesses. The continuity of media organizations, in other words, would be total. That is not to say, however, that the KMT held on to its media firms for their financial value. The party has retained its media companies in spite of increasing losses, which, as Fields (1998, p. 3) points out, “demonstrates that functions beyond profit are at work.”

In 1996, incumbent President Lee was voted in as Taiwan’s 1st popularly elected president. Previously, the ROC president and vice president had been elected by the National Assembly. In 2000, DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian was elected president, marking the first-ever transfer of governing power between parties.

He was re-elected in March 2004. Under the Chen administration, the Referendum Act was enacted in 2003, the first national referendums were conducted

in 2004, the National Assembly was abolished, and its power to ratify constitutional amendments was transferred to the people through the mechanism of referendum in 2005.

With respect to the latter, the United Daily News and China Times (the circulation leaders during and after martial law) became the organs of competing factions within the KMT. The Independence Evening Post is associated with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which was first legally established in 1986.

A variety of journalists, editors, and media observers contend that these party affiliations have influenced and constrained journalistic performance, particularly as they encourage the mixing of news with editorial opinion,6 something also widely practiced and lamented in the East Central European press.

The KMT's efforts to control broadcasting were even more comprehensive. For at least 5 years after the lifting of martial law, the party-state7 controlled the only three national television channels and held a similar monopoly of radio. Pirate radio and TV broadcasters, typically started by or at least sympathetic to the DPP, did emerge as soon as 1990. Until they were legalized, however, starting in 1994, they were suppressed by the Government Information Office(GIO).

When cable was finally introduced into Taiwan, the KMT tried unsuccessfully to limit to one the number of channels available in a given region. By the The Publication Law, which barred the distribution of "seditious" material, was not formally repealed until 1999.

3.5.2.Korea's case

The situation in Korea was different. Following the Revolution on April 19, 1960, the multiparty system yielded its fruit and Democratic Party formed the government. However, it was unfortunate for the Democratic Party that it failed and overthrown. Park Chung Hee overthrew the government by means of putting the Coup on May 16th into practice. Democratic Party failed, because they were not able enough to rule the state efficiently and to come up with satisfactory solutions for the social problems. As a result, Park Chung Hee took over the rule with military coup and another authoritarian regime started, which did not make the Korean society happy(Cho 2003).

Under this authoritarian regime, protests against the system began and they were widely supported by the public, including the students, scholars and judges. While the society was protesting the rule and demanding democratization, on the one hand, Park Chung Hee aimed at introducing Yushin system.

The Yushin system strengthened the presidential authority to a generalissimo level. In order to prevent pro-democracy activities, several decrees were adopted. This system turned out to be a hindrance to democratization movements, because it was repressive and strict. Moreover, giving all powers in a state to the President only has nothing to do with democracy, but dictatorship; therefore, it was dictatorial system. However, the grassroots movements continued in this period and resistance to Yushin system became widespread. The assassination of Park Chung Hee was the turning point in this period, as it ended with the death of the authoritarian leader.

After Kim Chae-gyu, the director of the KCIA, assassinated Park Chung-hee on October 26, 1979, Generals Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo seized power in a coup of December 12th, ,1979. At year and established the 5th Republic. Within a few months they had suppressed the protests in Kwangju with deadly violence (Oberdorfer 1997).

After the assassination of Park Chung-hee, there was a convenient environment for democratization movements. However, within the scope of the new constitution, Chun Hoo-hwan came to power and the military forces organized the political party system according to their understanding. Likewise, Chun Doo-hwan resorted to oppression and forces to control the movements and social uprisings. Intolerant to authoritarian regimes, the Koreans continued their democratization activities. In this period, more radical groups protested against the government and pushed for democracy. In return, the government took strict measures to suppress the movements, such that the suppression was so fierce that the ruling government violated fundamental human rights.

The June Democratic Uprising of 1987 was a turning point in the South Korean history, as the whole society cooperated against the authoritarianism. It became a massive uprising, supported widely by the public.

In plain words, the June Democratic Uprising was a nation-wide uprising and the main goal was to make the authorities to give green light to democratization. For this very reason, it is right to call this national-wide cooperation as the key to success. In return, the ruling authorities came up with the June 29th Declaration. This declaration was introduced in order to finds a solution to the social problems. This declaration

helped to take firm steps towards democratization. During this period, the Chun regime could not use the military power to take the uprisings under control. On the grounds that the protests were so strong and widely-supported that the ruling regime did not think that they could quell the continuance of the riots. The grassroots movements for democratization yielded fruitful results in paving the way for a change; however, not a democratic government was formed in the end.

The violation of human rights posed an obstacle on the way to democratization, because the government intimidated the activitists and protestors so as to not to give rise to a big social unrest. Under these circumstances, in order to overthrow the authoritarianism and bring democratization, people had no choice except for protesting, which finally led to June Democratic Uprising in 1987.

Availing the opportunity thanks to June Democratic Uprising, the democratization movements led to transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The endeavors of people gave positive result and they played an important role in this critical process. The most important factor that contributed to this process is the coalition of various groups in the society. In other words, the movements did not remain as the movement of students only, or the scholars, rather, it was supported by huge crowds. Each class and group gave their support for the activities. Basically, the movements started by the activities at the beginning, but it became a massive uprising in the cores of time. As these efforts paved the way for democratization, it is a kind of transition by movement.

Following to this uprising, the Constitution was amended in the same year and the constitutional system began to operate properly. The civil society also began to regain its previous status, as it was repressed by the previous authoritarian regimes by

force. Thanks to this democratization period, the civil society began to develop more and more. In the year 1988, popular elections became the only way of electing the governmental representatives at national, provincial and local levels.

The contemporary history of Korea covers alternating periods of democratic and autocratic rules: from the first to the sixth republics. The 1st republic was established by Syngman Rhee and de jure sovereignty passed to the new government. The 1st constitution of the country was promulgated by the first National Assembly. The 2nd republic was established after the new parliamentary elections were held in 1960. With the second republic, the parliamentary cabinet system was adopted. However, with a military coup d'état by Park Chug-hee, the 2nd republic came to an end and the 3rd republic was established by Park. Under his authoritarian rule, martial law was declared. Further, he also announced plans to eliminate the popular election of the president. With the adoption of Yushin Constitution, the fourth republic began in 1972. Thanks to this constitution, Park gained effective control over the parliament. Following the assassination of Park, social protests arose and the fifth republic was established by Chun Doo-hwan. Eventually, did to the June Democracy Movement, the republic came to an end the last republic came into existence with Roh Tae-woo.

In the National Assembly election of March 1981, the military's Democratic Justice Party (DJP) won 151 of the 276 seats (Im, 2004). In the February 12, 1985, National Assembly election, the DJP did much worse, winning only 35.3 percent of the vote and 87 of the 276 seats, while the opposition won 30 percent of the vote and the five largest cities in South Korea as well as 67 seats. At this time the two major opposition leaders, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, remained barred from political activity. On March 6, 1985, the government removed the ban on several

opposition politicians, though Kim Dae-jung was still prohibited from political activity. Roh Tae-woo became party chairman.

From 1984, the number of student protests and their participants rose substantially over the previous years. In 1987 the number of student protesters increased to more than 930,000 (Oberdorfer, 1997) . The protests were not limited to students and they occurred nationwide. In June 1987, 3,362 protests were held in South Korea, with one million participants in 37 cities.

While president Chun Doo-hwan refused to compromise with the opposition, his designated successor, party chairman Roh Tae-woo, gave his famous eight-point speech of June 29, 1987, which made many concessions to the demonstrators including constitutional amendments approved by government and opposition, direct presidential elections, revision of the Presidential Election Law, an amnesty for and restoration of the civil rights of Kim Dae-jung, the free in go fall political prisoners except those charged with treason or violence, a free press, freedom for political parties, local autonomy, self-governance by universities, and a campaign against crime and corruption. Roh Tae-woo implemented these promises and by late October, the Korean people approved the new constitution of the Sixth Republic. Although Roh Tae-woo was one of the generals who had carried out the coup of December 12, 1979, and was involved in the suppression of the Kwangju Uprising in May 1980, he seemed to have become much more democratic by mid-1987. In the presidential election of December 17, 1987, Roh Tae-woo won with only 37 percent of the vote against Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, who split 55 percent of the vote between them. In the National Assembly election of April 26, 1988, held four months after the presidential election, Roh's party obtained only 125 of the 299 seats, though in the

March 24, 1992, National Assembly election, near the end of Roh's term as president, his party obtained 149 of the 299 seats.

In some ways Roh Tae-woo in Korea combines elements of both Chiang Ching-kuo and the early presidency of Lee Teng-hui. Chiang Ching-kuo, though he began the process of democratization with very significant liberalization, remained the clear and unchallengeable leader.

Roh Tae-woo, as a colleague of Chun Doo-hwan, was able to overrule the president, especially as the demonstrations in Korea became huge and the opening of the Seoul Olympics approached. Like Lee Teng-hui in Taiwan, Roh Tae-woo worked closely with the opposition. In fact, Roh's ruling Democratic Justice Party merged with Kim Young-sam's Reunification and Democracy Party in 1990 to form the Democratic Liberal Party.

After overcoming many obstacles, Kim Young-sam came to lead this new party and win the presidency on December 18, 1992.42 This ability to compromise partly accounts for the smooth and relatively peaceful transitions in both countries.

國立政治大學 National Chengchi University

4.Media and Democracy

4.1.Taiwan's Democratization and Media

4.1.1.Role of Taiwanese Media for Democratization

These contradictory images reflect the complexity of the role of the media in Taiwan's democratization. In this chapter will examine the media's roles during the period of martial law as well as its impact on current democratization efforts, on provincial ethnic problems, and on political divisions (such as the pan-Blue coalition that opposes Taiwan independence, and the pan-Green bloc which favors Taiwan independence) (Chi, 2009). The analysis will distinguish between big media (which can be characterized as "mainstream" and "establishment") and small media (which may be called "marginal" or "alternative"). It will also discuss the deterioration of quality that has accompanied the media's adaptation to the process of commercialization. This chapter should provide a better understanding of the relationship between the media and Taiwan's democratization, and may ultimately become part of the discussion on creating a healthier relationship.

Within the media world, the size of a media company can be well defined. However in the context of the development of Taiwan's democracy, the distinction of large and small media has complex significance. "Large" refers not only to size and scale, but also refers to the fact that such outlets have legal status, operate in the public openly, are friendly with the ruling authorities, or that they basically are part of the ruling party. This includes television stations, newspapers, radio broadcasting, and

news agencies. A small media company not only is smaller in size and scale, but also is often unlicensed or illegal, opposed to the ruling authority, and competes with the mainstream media in the realm of public opinion.

Big and small media have had deep but different impacts on Taiwan's political change. During the long period of martial law (1949-1987), Taiwan's big media served almost only to supplement to the established political system and social values. Media leaders accepted this situation, and their main priority was to make a profit. They did occasionally use some ideological ambiguity to deviate from the establishment in order to enhance their credibility and create an image of professionalism. Some also strived for true journalistic independence, but it was not easy for them to overcome the constraints of ideological and political pressures. In the end, they were not able to empower the oppressed. Since the voices of the marginalized simply could not be heard through big media, the political opposition turned to smaller, underground media (alternative magazines, cable television, and radio) to push for change. Once small media began to gain traction with the wider public, the world that big media had constructed began to crumble. Big media's self-imposed limits were gradually torn down.

4.1.2. Party State System and media : The KMT, media conglomerate

Taiwan's party-state system's original model is Marx-Leninism Party in U.S.S.R., in this system, party's role and status are superior than state, plus representative character of this system is party is own their organization, during the period of martial law, the KMT held the power of life and death over public and private media. It controlled a media empire which owned *The Central Daily News*, *The China Daily*

News, *the Central News Agency*, the Broadcasting Corporation of China, China Television, and the Central Motion Picture Corporation; these groups, in turn, were major shareholders of Taiwan Television (TTV) and Chinese Television System (CTS). In addition, publishers of the two major private newspapers, *the United Daily News* and *the China Times*, were members of the KMT's Central Standing Committee. The KMT, was the only media conglomerate in Taiwan up to the early 1990s; it dominated voices all across the media. But after the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988, factional power struggles erupted within the KMT, and its control of the media began to deteriorate.

4.1.3.Big medias and KMT

During the martial-law era (1949~1987), the KMT government maintained a 'patron-client relationship' with the media. Under these circumstances, the government restricted the total number of newspapers that could be published. To publish newspapers was a privilege which was only given to certain people, and in return these people were loyal to the regime. Except a KMT's party running newspaper *The Central Daily News*, so-called "2 big newspapers (*The United Daily News* and *The China Times*) and 3 television stations (TTV, CTV, and CTS) together held more than a almost 90% share of the media market. Their relationship with the government was very close; both of the big newspaper chairpersons were members of the KMT's Central Standing Committee, and the 3 TV stations belonged to the government, the KMT, and the military sectors (Choi, 2011). The roles of the 2 newspapers are particularly worthy of mention. In early years, *the United Daily News* was considered to have a certain degree of independence: in 1958, it published an editorial criticizing a new publishing law for being more rigid than the old one (Chang

1991).

But after the Lei Chen's *the Free China Magazine* event in 1960, the *United Daily News* adopted a more conservative stance, often represented the KMT's right-wing forces, and tended to be close to the military and the security system. *The China Times*, on the other hand, adopted a more liberal stance, especially when dealing with issues of domestic politics and cross-strait relations (Rampal, 2011). It represented the left-wing reforming forces in the KMT (but now day's 2 newspaper's stance is different, *the United Daily News* is more liberal than *the China Times*) .

Under the party-state system, Taiwan's media were politically restrained; subjects like the lifting of martial law and the formation of new parties were taboo and could not be openly discussed. But in non-political areas, the newspapers had sufficient rights to act on their own. Thus the two newspapers frequently invited scholars and intellectuals residing in the U.S. to write articles and commentary, providing foreign experiences and promoting progressive thought while avoiding sensitive topics. Despite their close relations with the KMT, both newspapers competed fiercely with each other for market share, so they occasionally pushed political boundaries to gain popularity.

However, establishing a foundation for political reform was far from a primary goal for the two publications. Taiwanese scholar Tien Hung-mao wrote in 1989 that "while under martial law, Taiwan's newspapers had independent characters which were not seen in other totalitarian systems. That was because they were competing for market share".

Sometimes commercial objectives would go against political interests." But Taiwan's mainstream media seldom spoke out for the anti-KMT political opposition before the lifting of martial law. The Chungli Incident in 1977 and the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979, demonstrations for democratic development which turned violent and were dealt with violently by the government, were critical moments for Taiwan's democratization. During these and other periods of upheaval in the 1970s the big media either kept silent or showed no sympathy to the opposition (Roy 2004).

The media effectively became accomplices of the persecuting party. The opposition group collectively called the Dangwai, which literally means political forces "outside the party" (that is, outside the KMT) could only voice their discontent and challenge the authority through alternative and marginal media. These media included the Dangwai magazines in the 1970s and the 1980s, cable television (known as the "the fourth channel" in a reference to the big three broadcasters mentioned above) in the 1990s, and underground radio stations thereafter.

國立政治大學 National Chengchi University

4.1.4.Dangwai magazines' role

Taiwan's influential small media can be traced back to the 1950s. *the Free China Magazine*, a bi-weekly journal initially sponsored by the KMT government, became a political forum that actively criticized Chiang Kai-shek's authoritarian rule. It promoted ideas like democratization, civil rights, freedom of the press, reform of government organization, release of political prisoners and legalization of opposition parties. Free China incurred the wrath of the authority and was forced to close in 1960. But the journal had a great influence on subsequent small media outlets.

In 1971, the Republic of China on Taiwan Government lost its United Nations seat (including Standing Seat of Security Council) to mainland China, and the legitimacy of the KMT's rule in Taiwan became increasingly questionable. The KMT government used the carrot and stick approach to meet this domestic challenge. On the one hand, it introduced the "10 Major Construction Projects" and other programs that actively improved people's lives. As the purchasing power of the people expanded, so did their demands on the media. *The United Daily News* and *the China Times* replaced older KMT- and government-run newspapers, such as *the Central Daily News*, *the Chinese Daily News*, and the *Taiwan Shin Sheng Daily News*, as the main forces of public opinion. On the other hand, the KMT's heavy-handed authoritarian rule did not soften at all; the people of Taiwan still kept quiet out of fear and did not dare to speak publicly about change. Toward the end of the 1970s, however, the opposition increased in force and the authority's oppression became less and less effective. In August of 1979, almost 20 years after the closing of *the Free China Magazine*, *Formosa Magazine* was established by opposition leaders, and the decade-long golden age of Dangwai magazines began.

Taiwan's experience is an example of print magazines acting as the mechanism for political organization in lieu of a formal party. In its heyday, *Formosa Magazine* had 11 branches throughout the island. It organized 13 mass assemblies and demonstrations in the 1970s before the eruption of the Kaohsiung Incident in December 1979 (Yoo, 2006).

After that incident, *Formosa*'s publisher, Huang Hsin-chieh, was sentenced to jail by a court martial. During the trial, Huang said the aim of establishing the magazine was not merely to publish news from the Dangwai movement, but to

develop an organization to actively attract supporters for the opposition. Another famous opposition leader and political prisoner, Shih Ming-teh, said during the trial that the goal of *Formosa Magazine* was to form "a party without a name (Shih, 1988)." In addition to this organizing function, *Formosa Magazine* was also an effective Dangwai propaganda tool which broke down the KMT's political mythology and publicly challenged the restrictions established by the state.

There was a common saying at the time that the KMT had the organization but not the masses, while the Dangwai had the masses but not the organization. Before Formosa Magazine, that was true. but after the magazine's emergence that was no longer the case.

However, the Kaohsiung Incident resulted in expanded authority for the Taiwan Garrison Command, a military body with the mission of domestic state security (and the government's main tool against the political opposition), which began to make increasingly arbitrary arrests and judgments against individuals and publications. It clamped down on Dangwai magazines more frequently. Antonio Chiang(江春男), editor in chief of a Dangwai magazine called *The Eighties*, recalled that every time the members of the Taiwan Garrison Command came, they had blank documents already signed with the authorizing seal. The reason for closing down a publication could be filled in on the spot, with general terms like "undermining public morality" listed as reasons for banning the publication.

At that time, the authorities offered rewards for confiscating Dangwai magazines and informing against them. Thus the publishers would deliberately print a certain number of early copies of the magazine intended for seizure, and would tell

the printing house to inform the authorities. After the Garrison Command took away these copies, the printing house would continue to print the rest. Because of the curiosity of the public, any banned issue of a magazine would sell well. In a 1985 article titled "Taiwan Magazines Play Mice to the Censor's Cat," *the New York Times* reported on the Dangwai publications and their special ways of surviving during the period of martial law.

As more and more Dangwai magazines began to appear in a limited market, intense competition for circulation and market share naturally began. In order to attract readers, some magazines deliberately defied taboos, and many the writing in many were ethically questionable and represented substandard journalism. Later, when newspapers were finally deregulated (January 1, 1988) and restrictions on speech were gradually removed, Dangwai magazines lost their importance and thus disappeared.

The Dangwai magazines had at least two major influences on the development of Taiwan politics and the media. Firstly, different Dangwai magazines gave their names and followers to political factions in the new Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which was 6 On July 23, 2006, the DPP general assembly passed a resolution requiring the disbanding of all factions.

The factions have since publicly stated that they will comply with the resolution. But in reality the original factions of the DPP still exist under the surface. founded in 1986 and legalized in 1991. The DPP's *New Tide* faction, *Formosa* faction, Justice Alliance faction, and Welfare State Alliance faction are all named after Dangwai magazines (Chi, 2009).

Secondly, Dangwai magazines influenced the journalistic style and attitude of Taiwan's mainstream media. They set the pattern for cutthroat competition and extreme partisanship. This trend has only increased since the Dangwai era; after the KMT lost the presidency for the first time in 2000, Taiwan's media fully embraced commercialism and plunged into aggressive political commentary. In many cases, the media have degenerated into mouthpieces of political parties and are more interested in advertising than in journalism.

4.1.5. Formosa Magazine and Kaohsiung Incident

Kaohsiung Incident occurred when *Formosa Magazine*, headed by veteran opposition Legislative Yuan Legislator Huang Shin-chieh(黃信介), and other opposition politicians held a demonstration commemorating Human Rights Day in an effort to promote and demand democracy in Taiwan. At that time, the Republic of China was a one-party state and the government used this protest as an excuse to arrest the main leaders of the political opposition. Kaohsiung Incident is well-recognized as a critical and important event in the post-war history of Taiwan and regarded as the watershed of the Taiwan democratization movements. The event had the effect of galvanizing the Taiwanese community into political actions and regarded as one of the events that eventually led to democracy in Taiwan.

KMT was the only legal political party in Taiwan in 1970s since it took power in 1949. Many opponents of KMT asking for democracy were organized as an opposition camp gradually after the establishment of the magazine *Taiwan Political Review(*台灣政論) in 1975 founded by one of active members, Kang Ning-Siang. In its 5th edition it published an article on December 27, 1976 titled "Two States of

Mind—An Evening Discussion with Fou Cong and Professor Liou" which resulted in the revocation of the publisher's license. In the 1977 election, Dangwai expanded support significantly and won more seats than it did in previous elections. The outcome of the election manifested the potentiality of Dangwai as a quasi-opposition party of ruling KMT and laid the ground for the ensuing mass movement.

On December 16, 1978, the U.S. President, Jimmy Carter, announced that it will severe its official relationship with Republic of China as of January 1, 1979. It was the most serious challenge to Taiwan government since it lost its seat at the United Nations taken place by the People's Republic of China in 1971. The President Chiang Ching-kuo immediately postponed all elections without a definite deadline for its restoration(Yoo, 2006). Dangwai which had won steadily expanding support was strongly frustrated and disappointing about Chiang's decision since it suspended the only legitimate method they could use to express their opinions.

The leader of Dangwai, legislator Huang Shin-chieh, and his comrades soon petitioned KMT government for the restoration of elections, but it declined the petition(Huang, 2000). On January 21, 1979, KMT arrested Yu Deng-fa(余登發), one of the most prestigious Dangwai leader in south Taiwan, and his son with the intentional false accusation of doing propaganda for the Chinese Communist Party. Dangwai regarded the arrest of Yu as a signal of complete suppression and decided to make the last-ditch effort by holding radical demonstrations on the street [4], resulting in the escalating conflict between the conservative KMT and Dangwai .

In May, 1979, *Formosa Magazine* was established by Huang Shin-chieh aiming at consolidating Dangwai members. On August 16, 1979, the 1st edition was published under the title "Joint Promotion of the New Generation's Political Movements". The initial issue sold out all of its 25,000 copies, the 2nd and 3rd issues sold almost 100,000 copies, and the 4th issue sold more than 110,000 (Yoo, 2006). On October 17, 1979, a meeting of 22 KMT security agencies adopted a proposal to ban the magazine after a protest from the Korean Embassy protested over an article in the 2nd issue titled "Unveil the Myth of the Korean Economic Miracle". Dangwai held many public gatherings and protests without official permission since its 1st publication. The KMT only showed its symbolic power such as anti-riot police and riot gears without suppressing the gatherings for these meetings, and such endurance and inaction led to Dangwai's belief in its own power and stuck to the radical approach.

The event on December 10, 1979 started out as the first major Human Rights Day celebration on the island. Until that time the authorities had never allowed any public expression of discontent. Between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon of December 10, 1979 (four hours before the demonstration commemorating Human Rights Day started, and before any irregularities had taken place), the military police, the army and the police had already taken up positions when the demonstrators arrived(Chang, 1991). When the event took place during the evening, the military police marched forward and closed in on the demonstrators, then they retreated again to their original position. This was repeated two or more times. The battalion commander explained that the purpose of this exercise was to cause panic and fear in the crowd and also to provoke anger and confusion. Political demonstrators clashed with troops sent by the KMT.

4.1.6.Cable television

The 4th television channels were the predecessors of today's thriving cable television systems in Taiwan. In the mid-1980s, Taiwan was still under authoritarian rule. While the ban on independent newspapers was lifted in 1987, the only three large television stations .

TTV, CTV, and CTS remained under the control of the authorities (the state, the KMT, and the military sector). Television news reports and commentary therefore tended to advocate the conservative ideology of the ruling party and provided few programs in local dialects (Taiwanese, Hakka language). The opposition and various business representatives repeatedly requested that the government open additional television channels, but their efforts were futile. So they created underground "fourth television channels."

In the early 1980s, these stations were made possible through a new microwave technique and mushroomed all over the island. The authorities initially turned a blind eye to these emerging stations. until the opposition began to use them as a political platform to challenge the official stations (beginning especially in 1986 following a demonstration at Chiang Kai-shek International Airport).

1990 was a watershed year. The DPP, which still did not exist legally, decided it would not conform to the unfair rules of the KMT any longer; using the underground microwave technique, it established the first "democratic television" network. This process began to accelerate, and in September 1991, 21 individual stations throughout the island organized "democratic TV networks" and proclaimed that they wanted to

terminate the KMT government's monopoly on television broadcasting.

At the same time, the U.S. government demanded that Taiwan halt its alternative cable systems, which were broadcasting programs in violation of intellectual property laws. The U.S. threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs against Taiwan's goods if it refused to comply. The KMT was therefore forced to quickly legalize the 250 illegal, mixed-quality cable systems on the island in order to better monitor their content and enforce intellectual property laws. The "Cable Radio and Television Act" of 1993 recognized many of Taiwan's cable television systems. some of which had existed for more than 10 years as "guerrilla media". (Choi, 2011) as normal and legal. However, Taiwan's economy is of limited size; the island did not have sufficient capacity for so many cable systems. While this new move by the KMT government represented a turn toward economic liberalism, planners did not consider the market size requirements of the media business. Ultimately, as with the Dangwai magazines, market forces dominated: in the fight for greater market share the "fourth channels" lost their function of pioneering democratic ideas. Media run by the party establishment even imitated the "guerrilla media" by adopting their inflammatory style to compete for viewers. (To this day, there are 10 to 12 talk shows and call-in programs every night, running one after another. They initiate senseless arguments and stir political scandals and gossip. They have become a source of social turmoil.)

4.1.7.Underground radio stations

As with television, the KMT's monopoly on radio broadcasting continued after the lifting of martial law in 1987. The DPP applied for a radio license several times, but was denied repeatedly. So in 1992, the DPP set up the first underground radio

station in Taiwan to publicly challenge the monopoly. In the following year, a more radical pirate radio station called “The Voice of Taiwan” hit the airwaves, triggering a copy-cat effect that led to many new stations. Bowing to intense pressure at the end of 1993, the government began to grant licenses to new radio stations, but this action had only a limited impact in controlling the rampant underground stations. In 1994, during the Taipei mayoral election campaign, pirate radios aired call-in shows and talk shows 24 hours a day, calling for supporters to call in and vent their anger over the radio. These programs catered to listeners with strong prejudices, stirring up inflammatory emotions among rival camps and inciting ethnic tensions.

After the election, the KMT government issued even more radio licenses. Since a new telecommunications act went into effect in 1997, more than 100 licensed radio stations have sprung up, but many pirate stations still exist. On a small island of 36,000 square kilometers with a population of 23 million, there are up to 171 legal and illegal radio stations on the air. The density is probably one of the highest in the world, especially for the news and talk format.

Nan Fang-shuo, a renowned political commentator in Taiwan, once described the underground radio stations as a new type of “radio-wave terrorism”; they spread “political ravings” and viciously incite hatred. The legitimate radio and television stations have followed this style as well. As the saying goes, “Bad money drives out good money.” Some famous talk show hosts have programs on both legal and illegal radio stations, further blurring the lines between the two media sectors and lowering standards across the board.

國立政治大學 National Chengchi University

4.2.Korea's Democratization and Media

4.2.1.The military regimes (1961~1987) and Meida

Generally, there were severe restrictions to freedom of the press in practice under the military regimes those of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan. However, at that time, the Korean media enjoyed freedom of the press regarding non-political and non-sensitive social issues leading to "a trend of sensationalism and an emphasis on soft-news items" (Youm, 1996, p. 13). In the beginning, it ordered "prior censorship of all newspapers, magazine feature articles, comics, cartoons, editorials, photographs, and foreign news" (Decree No.1, 1961, as cited in Youm, 1996, p. 50); subsequently prior censorship resulted in media self-censorship. During these two regimes the media were severely restricted and functioned largely as tamed media. There were approximately twenty different laws covering the media. Joo Dong-whang argues that in the 1960s press industry was driven into the enterprising process, in the 1970s it passed through a phase of large press enterprise, and formed a monopoly structure in the 1980s (Joo 1993).

In 1963, the Constitution of the 3rd Republic set out the range of new limits and responsibilities on freedom of expression. In 1963, the law of newspaper communication and registration and the broadcast law were established after the law for the registration of newspapers and communication (Kim, 2005, p10). "It cancelled the license of the media, which were found to fall short of its production machinery and facility" (Park et al., 2000, p 113). Basically, this system still exists to different degrees in practice, from the authoritarian rule to the civilian governments, depending on the ruling style of political leaders. As LaMay (2007, p. 26) pointed out, "theory is

less important to democracy than how freedom is lived and perpetuated."

According to Kim (1994), during the 3rd republic the economic crisis was a serious situation because of global economic downturn. During this time capitalist groups were encouraged by the state (Kim, 1994). Kim argues, because of the government's economic stimulus conditions in newspaper production improved in the 1960s. For example, the sales subscription market was quite developed because of urbanization and the effect of economic development despite the fact that subscription market of provincial newspapers was decreasing (Kim, 1994).

Joo (1993) said, because of the state's crisis in the 1970s the state's policy tended to control the media. From the end of the 1960s, the government was faced with the external economic crisis and internally, there were problems of political crisis such as the Revitalizing Reforms Constitution in 1969; the Declaration of the State of National Emergency in 1971; and the initiation of the Yushin in 1972 (Joo, 1993). During the same time the state merged and closed down news agencies and provincial newspapers (Joo, 1993).

After 1970, the authoritarian Park regime imposed harsh media restrictions through the Declaration of the State of National Emergency, and the Martial Law Decree, which banned "all indoor and outdoor assemblies and demonstrations for the purpose of political activities and speeches, publications, press and broadcasts" (Youm, 1996, p. 55). The Yushin Constitution was proclaimed in 1972. According to Choi, The Yushin Constitution omitted the natural-law languages of the chapter on basic rights and duties of the citizen, and simply stated that legal restrictions on the rights and freedoms of citizens should be imposed 'only when necessary.' Other parts

of this Constitution gave the president broad and unlimited power to rule (Choi, 2005, p. 380).

Freedom of expression became a core control issue for the state. Furthermore, in 1974, the Park Chung-hee's junta outlawed the National Federation of Democratic Youths and Students, which was characterized by the authorities as an "unlawful underground organization manipulated by the North Korean communists" (Youm, 1996, p. 56). Park restricted press freedom relating to the Federation and its members through the Emergency Measure, which banned "any act to publish, produce, process, distribute, exhibit, and sell papers, books, disks, and other presentations" (Youm, 1996, p. 56).

Under the 4th republic, the economic crisis lessened and the capitalist groups consolidated (Kim, 1994). The control of the media industry was shown in the case of *the daily Dong-A Ilbo* in 1975. The Park regime tried to pressure business firms into cancelling advertising so as to weaken the financial bases of *the Dong-A Iibo* reporters, who were fighting for freedom of the press and other issues. Park et al. (2000, p. 113) argue, "In 1974, one hundred thirty four journalists had to leave *the Dong-A Ilbo* and thirty three journalists had to leave *the Chosun Ilbo*, both of which were leading newspapers at the time."

Although there was severe media control, the media industry in the 1970s continues to grow as big businesses. The situation in newspaper production and the sales market was gradually improving not only in subscription but also in advertising revenue (Kim, 1994). Newspaper companies were competitive with other media such as broadcasting but their management was quite stable due to cross-ownership of the

newspaper and the broadcasting industry (Joo, 1993).

The authorities tried to use the case as an opportunity to quell the anti-Yushin movement. Police questioned a total of 1,024 persons, arrested 203, and indicted 32. The lower court of martial handed down death sentences to seven students. The higher court reduced the sentences of six defendants to life imprisonment, but upheld capital punishment for one. Meanwhile, of 22 activists indicted on fabricated charges of trying to rebuild the People's Revolutionary Party, seven were sentenced to death.

These harsh persecutions, however, failed to subdue the pro-democracy movement. Protests calling for the release of arrested students spread widely, especially in universities and religious groups. The crackdown also became a diplomatic issue. International condemnations poured in and some U.S. Members of Congress demanded sharp cuts in U.S. military and economic aid to Korea.

The government's oppression seriously backfired. Instead of eradicating the burgeoning anti-Yushin movement, it caused all democrats to unite. After they were released, the over 200 activists who had been arrested across the country in the National League case networked together and led antigovernment struggles in various regions and sectors.

They greatly contributed to development of the democratization movement and the building of national organizations. In addition, the government's accusations that Catholic, Protestant and civic groups were manipulating the democratization movement in the 1970s student groups prompted them to join forces. A crucial development was the launch on September 26, 1974, of the Catholic Priests

Association for Justice, which would grow into one of the most powerful critics of the Yushin system.

Meanwhile, other pro-democracy groups kept springing up. On October 24, reporters at *the Dong-A Ilbo* declared a press freedom movement, and were joined by many other journalists. On November 18, a group of 101 literary figures issued a statement for democracy. On November 27, 1971, civic leaders inaugurated the National Council for Democratic Restoration, which would serve as the center of the anti-Yushin movement. Consisting of representatives of political, Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, media, academic, literary, law and women's circles, the joint front enabled more effective organization by previously dispersed pro-democracy groups.

The government clamped down on the council's leaders. And on December 23, it inflicted a new form of press suppression on *the Dong-A Ilbo* by restricting advertisements. Government pressure caused a massive cancellation of advertising placements by advertisers, driving the company into a financial crisis. But sympathy advertisements immediately flooded in from citizens and various social groups. These supporters expressed their desire for democracy through the campaign, which continued for three months until the newspaper's management fired many of its reporters and gave up on press freedom. In February 1975, the government succumbed to domestic and international pressure and released the student group members and other activists jailed under Emergency Decree No. 4. But those charged in the People's Revolutionary Party trials were excluded from the pardon. Meanwhile, following *the Donga Ilbo*'s massive dismissal of reporters in March, *the Chosun Ilbo* newspaper followed suit. On March 18, 163 former *The Dong-A Ilbo* reporters formed an association to fight for press reform, and on March 21, 33 fired *the Chosun Ilbo*

reporters launched a similar organization.

Student protests continued in the spring semester of 1975, with students demanding that schools readmit the student activists who had been released from jail. On April 7 and 8, students at Korea University staged a fierce demonstration, calling for abrogation of the Yushin Constitution and resignation of the dictatorial government. Park responded with Emergency Decree No. 7, which targeted that school alone.

Assemblies and demonstrations inside the campus were banned, the university was temporarily closed, and troops were stationed on the campus. Under the Yushin Constitution, the special presidential decrees were supposed to be imposed only when national security or public order was threatened. But this time Park used the decree simply to control protests at a single university.

Meanwhile, on April 8, the Supreme Court upheld military court rulings on those accused in the National League of Democratic Youth and Students and the People's Revolutionary Party cases. In what was condemned as murder by law, the eight defendants were executed the next morning and their bodies.

4.2.2. Symbolic Event for Freedom of Press ;

The *Dong-A* Free Press Practical Movement

Under the president Park Cheong-hee's authorial regime, Korean journalist's significant resistance is the "*Dong-A* Free Press Practical Movement". The "*Dong-A* Free Press Practical Movement," is an under which reporters at *The daily Dong-A Ilbo*

protested the dictatorship of the Park Chung-Hee administration in the 1970s and sought to protect the people's right to know, has been officially recognized.

The Honor Restoration and Compensation Screening Committee under the premier decided at its plenary meeting that "The *Dong-A* Free Press Practical Movement contributed to the establishment of the democratic constitutional order by restoring and enhancing the people's freedoms and rights."

The committee went on to say, "Under the premise that freedom of the press was a basic condition for the construction of a liberal and democratic society, Dong-a reporters clearly expressed their intention to oppose the authoritarian government in a declaration on the practices of a free press that was issued on October 24, 1974. The declaration called for the prohibition of external interference, a ban on visits by secret service members and a refusal to tolerate the illegal detention of journalists.

The compensation screening committee also said, " The *Dong-A* Free Press Practical Movement spread to 29 newspapers, news agencies, and broadcast companies throughout the country, including the *Chosun Ilbo, Hankook Ilbo(Korea Ilbo), Kyunghyang Shinmun, Seoul Shinmun, Sinah Ilbo, Joongang Ilbo*, KBS and MBC by the end of October of that year, greatly boosting the press freedom movement in the dictatorship era.

The compensation screening committee said, "As the quality of The *Dong-A Ilbo* improved and articles concerning human rights began to appear in keeping with the free press declaration, President Park put pressure on advertisers through the then Central Intelligence Agency. Accordingly, the committee will conduct individual screenings of 97 persons, including reporters who applied for the restoration of honor

and compensation, to determine whether they were involved in the democratization movement.

The Dong-A Free Press Practical Movement began when 180 *Dong-A Ilbo* reporters, *Dong-A* Broadcasting producers (PD) and announcers adopted the free press practical declaration. The document paved the way for reports on cases in which people's basic rights were violated by the then Park Chung-hee administration. In response to the movement, the Park administration put pressure on advertisers to cancel their ads for several months from the middle of December.(Kang 2001)

With the declaration of martial law in 1972, the Korean press, hardly free in the first place, began slipping further into submissive helplessness, by degrees becoming dictator Park Chung Hee's main propaganda instrument. Step by step the regime encroached on "free press prerogatives" until the occasional cartoon barb or subtly ironic headline remained the only weapons left. By the end of 1973 KCIA agents sat in a's "assistant editors," checking the galleys for the slightest deviation from state-ordained orthodoxy, the slightest lapse from "responsible journalism." Haggling between editor and "assistant" over a story's appearance or its precise wording would often hold up an edition for hours. As the repressive machinery went into high gear in late 1973 to become full-fledged fascist repression by March 1974, as Park picked off segments of the student, church and parliamentary opposition, and as the prisons filled up with political cases to where ordinary institutions of "justice" could no longer handle them all, the press was too preoccupied with the "threat from the north" to give these events its attention. Or, at most, it simply printed the government hand-outs nearly verbatim. To the hundreds of people in Park's prisons could now be added each of the major dailies, not least among them *the Dong-A Ilbo*.

So long as the press stood between the opposition and the people, no movement had any hope of breaking out into the open. Such movements, if reported at all, were treated as something akin to a communist fifth column. And this in a climate where the fear - of invasion or subversion by North Korean leader Kim II Sung's stalinist minions to the north is the paramount political factor. By playing on these fears, Park held the upper hand, but only so long as the press went along, so long as many of the "facts" handed out by the government went unchallenged. But an important fissure in the iron edifice of state-press collusion appeared on October 24, 1974, when some 180 *the Dong-A* reporters and deputy editors issued their "Manifesto for the Realization of Freedom of Speech." As much a quarrel with management as it was a struggle with the regime (for the reporters viewed the two as very nearly inseparable), it called for the reinstatement of several fired fellow reporters, better working conditions, greater job security, removal of the KCIA from the editorial rooms, the right of reporters and editors to freely report political news unhampered by government restraints, and for management to print the Manifesto in that day's *Dong-A.* As management continued to negotiate, especially on the last demand, the reporters shut down the presses. Finally, that night, management capitulated entirely, the presses rolled again, and the last two of the four regular editions appeared a half-day late (an evening paper, *the Dong-A* usually hits the street shortly after noon.) From that day on it was a different paper. No longer did it belong to Park and his management proxies, but to the people. The workers were in command.

But to view *the Dong-A* struggle as simply one of workers' control is to not only gloss over some of their original demands, but is also to miss its wider political implications.

The Dong-A ilbo's role in the larger movement, and its free-speech origins can best be understood if we retrace the development of the human rights struggle from October 1973. Another outburst of student organizing, campus petition campaigns and street demos led to a rash of clubbings, gassings, arrests and tortures at the underground interrogation cells at the KCIA's notorious - Namsan headquarters. Among student demands was the end to Park's pet Yushin Constitution, which banned most forms of dissent right down to informal gatherings of three or more people. By the last week of November, hardly a day passed that didn't see a demo2 To stem the tide, Park closed the schools in December, two months early, pleading a heating fuel shortage (the oil shock was then two months old).

With the students out of the way until the beginning of the next term in April, the scene of action then shifted to the elders. With public opinion un pacified by Park's December 3rd replacement of 10 of his 20 ministers and the ouster of the hated KCIA director, Lee Hu-rak, a group of prominent opposition party, church, academic and intellectual leaders joined in calling for an end to the Yushin Constitution. On December 24, they began a petition drive to that end, and succeeded by the end of the year in getting half their stated goal of 1 million signatures (Kang 2002).

Park did not wait to find out whether they would succeed in getting the other half-million. On January 8, 1974, he decreed the first of four Emergency Measures. EM-1 made criticism of the Yushin Constitution or calls for its abrogation a crime punishable by 15 years' imprisonment. Civil disobedience cases would be disposed of without warrant and tried in a special. "High Military Tribunal" closed to all but the defendant, his or her lawyer, one family member and press members accredited by the Defense Ministry. Even criticism of the EM itself could get one 15 years. The EM

was met with defiance and the petition movement continued into the new year. Jailing of several dozen of the petition's initiators swiftly followed, along with outspoken church and intellectual leaders, until, within a few short weeks, several dozen of the country's most prominent civil libertarians were behind bars. The trials were swift, "justice" peremptory and sentences severe. With most of its leaders in prison, the petition movement quickly fizzled out.

The next crisis came in March with the students' return to the campuses. As early as January, one observer had written: "The start of the long winter recess and a cold spell saved Korea from mass student demonstrations Given the lack of genuine reforms, the crucial test facing the government win be what to do when the students return to the campuses next spring and threaten to take to the streets again. Without a new wave of KCIA counterattacks, it seems unlikely that sporadic rallies by student and other groups for more freedom and reforms will subside." By March rumors were rampant that the students had been putting their long vacation to good use and that flash-in-the-pan rampages were a thing of the past. This time they were organizing -and nationwide.

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4.2.3. Chun Doo Hwan's New Military Regime and Media

The 5th Republic of Korea was the government of Korea from 1979 to 1987, replacing the 4th Republic of Korea. Throughout this period, the government was controlled by Chun Doo-hwan, a military colleague of the assassinated president Park Chung-hee. This period saw extensive efforts at reform. It laid the foundations for the relatively stable democratic system of the subsequent Sixth Republic in 1987.

After the assassination of Park by Director of KCIA Kim Jae-kyu in 1979, a vocal civil society emerged that led to strong protests against authoritarian rule. Composed primarily of university students and labor unions, protests reached a climax after Major General Chun Doo-hwan's 1979 Coup d'état of December Twelfth and declaration of martial law on May 17. The expanded martial law closed universities, banned political activities and further curtailed the press. The event of May 17 means the beginning of another military authoritarianism.

On May 18, 1980, a confrontation broke out in the city of Kwangju between civilians and armed forces, with the military forces winning out nine days later on May 27. Immediate estimates of the civilian death toll ranged from a few dozen to 2000, with a later full investigation by the civilian government finding 606 deaths.

During the Chun Doo-hwan's junta, the Korean media were again controlled by harsh media policies and laws similar to those of the Park Chung-hee's regime. In 1980, the of the Republic(the 5th Republic Constitution) prescribed in No.1 of Article 20 that every person shall enjoy freedom of the press, freedom of publication, freedom of assembly and freedom of association(Joo et al., 1997: 187.8).

However, in practice this did not occur. There were conditions in No.1 of Article 20 as follows: the press and a publication could not violate others' reputation or rights : Also, they could not violate public morals or social ethics; If the press or a publication damaged someone's reputation or rights, the person could sue for damages (Kim, O-J. 2005, p 10).

These conditions were used and abused generally as a means to restrict the media's ability to criticize the government or powerful people and to maintain the dictatorial regime, which used daily 'press guidelines' regulated the media coverage of news events.

Furthermore, the Chun junta proclaimed the notorious Basic Press Act in 1980. Youm (1996, p. 59) explains this law as follows: "One of the most restrictive and comprehensive laws in capitalistic societies, providing specifically for the rights and restrictions of the press." In relating to its registration the Minister of Culture and Information (MOCI, almost likes Government Information Office, GIO in Taiwan) had the power to cancel publications and to suspend them for various reasons, one of which was "When they repeatedly and flagrantly violate the law in encouraging or praising violence or other illegal acts disrupting public order" (Youm, 1996, p. 60).

During the 5th republic, the social crisis steadily decreased because of the economic recovery, and the capitalist groups became even more powerful in society (Kim, 1994). N-S. Kim argues, in the 1980s, the newspaper industry grew in excess of the newspaper market. Also, during this period, newspaper industry management was restricted in regard to its business profit (Kim, 1994). Kim stresses, policy had less influence on the newspaper industry, then the economy and the political activity of citizens. A major power group within the newspaper industry was established (Kim, 1994).

The Basic Press Act of December 1980 was the legal capstone of Chun's system of media control and provided for censorship and control of newspapers, periodicals, and broadcast media. It also set the professional qualifications for journalists. Media

censorship was coordinated with intelligence officials, representatives of various government agencies, and the presidential staff by the Office of Public Information Policy within the Ministry of Culture and Information using daily "reporting guidelines" sent to newspaper editors. The guidelines dealt exhaustively with questions of emphasis, topics to be covered or avoided, the use of government press releases, and even the size of headlines. Enforcement methods ranged from telephone calls to editors to more serious forms of intimidation, including interrogations and beatings by police. One former Ministry of Culture and Information official told a National Assembly hearing in 1988 that compliance during his tenure from 1980 to 1982 reached about 70 per cent.

By the mid-1980s, censorship of print and broadcast media had become one of the most widely and publicly criticised practices of the Chun government. Even the government-controlled *Yonhap(United) News Agency* noted in 1989 that "TV companies, scarcely worse than other media, were the main target of bitter public criticism for their distorted reporting for the government in the early 1980s." Editorials called for abolition of the Basic Press Act and related practices, a bill was unsuccessfully introduced in the National Assembly to the same end, and a public campaign to withhold compulsory viewers' fees in protest against censorship by the KBS network received widespread press attention. By the summer of 1986, even the ruling party was responding to public opinion.

The political liberalization of the late 1980s brought a loosening of press restraints and a new generation of journalists more willing to investigate sensitive subjects, such as the May 1980 Kwangju massacre. Roh's declaration of June 29, 1987, provided for "a free press, including allowing newspapers to base

correspondents in provincial cities and withdrawing security officials from newspaper offices(Kang 2002)." The Korean media began a rapid expansion. Seoul papers expanded their coverage and resumed the practice of stationing correspondents in provincial cities. Although temporarily still under the management of a former Blue House press spokesman, the MBC television network, a commercial network that had been under control of the state-managed KBS since 1980, resumed independent broadcasting. The number of radio broadcast stations grew from 74 in 1985 to 111 (including both AM and FM stations) by late 1988 and 125 by late 1989. The number of periodicals rose as the government removed restrictions on the publishing industry(Kang 2002).

Chun Doo-hwan rose to power in 1980, after a series of political upheavals and a military coup, the Korean news media quickly reverted to their position of so-called “social responsibility” and, unabashedly curried favor with the new government.

During the notorious overhaul of the media industry in 1980, more than 800 journalists were dismissed from their jobs on charges of incompetence or unethical conduct (Lee, 1997; Yang, 1999).

In the broadcasting industry alone, KBS and MBC fired 135 and 111 employees respectively (Kim, 2001c). The authoritarian governments used “carrot and stick” strategies with the Korean news media; the ruling elite promised various favors ranging from massive tax-breaks and business opportunities to cooperative news media owners. Similar privileges in the forms of long-term low-interest bank loans and rights of apartment ownership were given to acquiescent journalists as well.

An ambiguous slogan of social responsibility replaced the idea of the press as a watch

dog. Adjusting itself to the changed political situation, rather than insisting on its free dom, the Korean press accepted its role as a “voluntary servant” of the ruling govern ment.

4.2.4. The 5th Republic and Broadcasting Control

Korean broadcasting in the early 1980s, A brief explanation of the Korean media in the early 1980s is needed to better understand the political context of audience movements in Korea. In particular, it provides some background for the emergence of the television reception fee boycott movement in the 1980s, an unprecedented collective campaign. As is commonly seen in developing countries, political upheaval exerts a great impact on the media. Eighteen years of dictatorship by President Park Chung-hee finally came to an end when he was assassinated on 26 October 1979. This incident marked a turning point in the media circle in that media policy drastically changed thereafter. The vacuum of power was filled by an army general, Chun Doo-hwan, who staged a coup d’etat. Even before he was officially inaugurated as President, General Chun placed the media under centralized state control. As the new government lacked popular support, it never tried to conceal its explicit intention of placing the media under its control.

As a result, the Korean media experienced major changes in 1980 to their structure, ownership, regulatory regimes and journalistic practices. The radical overhaul of the structures of the Korean media can be summarized as follow

Firstly, considering that the best way to control the media is through the revision

of media-related laws and regulations, the government enacted the Basic Press Law which comprised all existing media laws. The government argued that the law was introduced to place 'greater emphasis on defining the responsibility rather than on the freedom of the press' (Kim et al., 1994 p 186). However, the law had been heavily criticized for facilitating the government's control over the media and journalists until it was abolished in 1987.

Secondly, the government established the Korean Broadcasting Advertising Corp oration (KOBACO) to control the television advertising market. As broadcasting stati ons were prohibited from airing any commercials on their own, they had to entrust the ir advertising to the Corporation, which charged a commission of 15.20 percent on ev ery television advertisement.

Thirdly, the government had brought the broadcast media under its control by coercively integrating commercial stations into the public service. Using such language as the responsibility and accountability of broadcasting, the government integrated four commercial radio stations and TBC-TV (Tongyang Broadcasting Company) into the KBS. In addition, the KBS obtained 65 percent of MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation) shares. Indeed, all of the nation's broadcasting systems were amalgamated under the control of the KBS. With this integration of broadcasting stations, Korean broadcasting entered the era of public service with two major public broadcasters (KBS and MBC) and minor religious radio stations (Kang 2002). Fourth, journalists were sacked for being critical of the government by media barons who were in no position to neglect government orders and pressures. The Ministry of Culture and Information secretly ordered press owners and presidents of public broadcasters to dismiss journalists who refused censorship. By carrying out a massive

dismissal of journalists, the government intended to tame insubordinate journalists. As the result of the coercive policy of the government, 305 journalists had to leave their work(Kang 2002). In the case of broadcasting, KBS and MBC sacked 135 and 111 employees respectively.

Finally, the government regulated the inflow of foreign news by integrating news agencies into the Yonhap News Agency. As a result, citizens were not able to hear and read foreign news which was detrimental to the government.

Along with above-mentioned coercive measures, the government used a 'carrot' policy by proposing economic benefits to media organizations and journalists. By building barriers to the entry of large companies into the media market, the government guaranteed stable growth of established media institutions. Tax benefits were also given to media lords and journalists: the government lowered the tariff from 20 percent to 4 percent as a favor to newspaper owners who imported high-speed rotary press machines; and journalists were given an exemption from taxation on 20 percent of their income (Joo et al., 1997: 187.8). Furthermore, KOBACO raised the so-called 'public fund', part of which was used to offer special favours to media organizations and journalists (Joo et al., 1997: 193.4).

With the integration of commercial broadcasting stations into the KBS in 1980, t he KBS, until then financed only by reception fees from the viewers, was allowed to b roadcast paid adverts which later became a major source of income. Public discontent with the dual financing system of the KBS contributed to the rise of a collective camp aign for the boycott of the television reception fee in the mid-1980s. This campaign w ill be dealt with in more detail later. More importantly, many prominent journalists joi

ned active politics at the request of the ruling party. With the inauguration of the 5th Republic, 23 journalists gave up influential careers to enter the Democratic Justice Party (Lee, 1989: 190). Thus, the government's control over the media had a great impact both on the actual work of journalists and on media owners.

The monopoly of the media market and the collusion between the government and media owners have contributed to the growing alienation of the audiences, and later to the rise of the public outcry for more freedom of the press and democratic broadcasting. So, throughout the early 1980s, there persisted increasing concerns and worries that the media, including the KBS, Korea's main public broadcasting company, were reflecting the interests of the government and businesses rather than that of the audiences. It would be no exaggeration to describe this state of affairs as a crisis of civic communication. However, on the other hand, it was increasingly clear that formidable pressures were building up from listeners and viewers to push broadcasting towards the democratic principles of fairness, objectivity and impartiality. The disillusionment of the audience, coupled with the unhealthy media environment, finally led to the massive collective movement of television reception fee boycotts in the mid-1980s.

國立政治大學 National Chengchi University

4.2.5.The 'Great June Struggle' of 1987 and Media

Under the 5th republic's iron-fist ruling, democracy reached its boiling point in June 1987. The civilian movement had often denounced the opposition parties having too narrow a definition of democracy by equating it only with direct presidential elections. However, a combination of two events in the early spring of

1987 served to bring the two sides together in mass protest. In April 1987, the authoritarian regime announced that it was suspending 'wasteful' debate on constitutional revision, and then a month later it was publicly disclosed that a Seoul National University student had been tortured to death during a police interrogation (Kim, 2000). These revelations served to enrage all segments of society and in what has been termed the 'Great June Struggle', about one million students and civilians took to the streets in demonstration.

The mass protests in June of 1987 showed serious signs of revolutionary potential. The middle class seemed to have finally lost their tolerance for the regime and they joined the students and labor radicals in the streets. The U.S. was also clearly fearful of the potential for a dramatic shift of control in Korean politics. The Reagan administration, in a highly unusual move, dispatched a career CIA officer to Seoul to be the American ambassador. However, the middle class and student alliance was only temporary and it disintegrated as soon as the government conceded to the public pressure and agreed to stage direct presidential elections. The middle class and its political representatives sought thereafter to keep their distance from the students. Cardinal Kim of the Catholic Church pleaded to students that they should shy away from "left-leaning radical ideology and the cry of revolution" (Park, 2002, p.11).

The student movement also became politically disoriented and after the brief putting aside of differences, once again divided up into their various ideological camps. This division was further accentuated when the two opposition leaders; Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam failed to unite and form a single opposition party. In the subsequent elections, both Kims ran independent campaigns against the military

government. This move proved disastrous for the left as one faction threw their support behind Kim Dae-jung; another tried to force one of the Kims to withdraw; and a third faction supported an independent people's candidate. Combined, the two Kims garnered the majority of the popular vote but because it was a split vote, former general and Chun's accomplice -Roh Tae Woo- emerged victorious. The United States rushed to congratulate Roh and trumpet Korea's "march to democracy" (Hart-Landsberg, 1989, p.67).

However, if the outcome of the June struggle had disoriented the student left, this was certainly not the case with radical labor. "Without addressing socioeconomic inequality and injustice democracy sounded rather empty to labor activists" (Kim, 2000, p.95). Taking advantage of the political space that briefly opened up after the June protests, workers went on strike to demand higher wages, better working conditions, and above all, the guarantee of democratic worker's rights. As Bruce Cumings (1999) notes in his book Parallax Visions, more strikes and labor actions occurred in the following year than at any other point in Korean history, or most national histories for that matter (p.114). This explosion of labor militancy caught student and academic revolutionaries off-guard. While these revolutionaries had played a pivotal role in raising workers consciousness about their basic labor rights, "they were not capable of transforming worker's illegal industrial action into a revolutionary uprising" (Park, 2002, p.11). This was because the student movement was lacking key central and national leadership at this point. President Roh soon put his foot down, crushing unions and imprisoning massive numbers of workers under the pretense of the National Security Law and by claiming that unions were destroying the country's exporting comparative advantage by bidding up wages.

The trigger of the Great June Struggle was one Korean college student's death, Park Jong-chul of Seoul National University. In January, 1987, Korean national police agency was arrest and tortured Park. During a harsh torture, he dead, and police agency was cover up this accident.

The events surrounding Park Jong-chul's death was suppressed at first. However, the Catholic Priests Association for Justice (CPAJ), revealed the truth to the public on May 18, further inflaming public sentiment. CPAJ planned a June 10th demonstration in his honor. And after, the JoongAng ilbo's one reporter was disclosure torture and death of Park. This news report was trigger of the great struggle(Kang 2002).

4.2.6.Citizen's boycott of government control broadcasting : The KBS-TV reception fee boycott movement

As the demand for democracy grew, so did the importance of the media for facilitating the process of societal democratization. Accordingly, democratic forces in society came to realize that societal democratization could be achieved through the democratization of the media. In other words, it was understood that democratization of the media could contribute to social change. Thus, understanding that broadcasting is a major terrain of struggle over democratization of society in general, citizens' groups began to establish media watchdog organs under their umbrella.

Following the tremendous shifts in the media environment in the early 1980s, the Korean media came under the control of the government. Thus, it came as no surprise that the media in the early 1980s were widely discredited by their audiences. The

audience's mistrust of the media is well reflected in a 1993 survey of freedom of the press, which found that respondents gave the 5th Republic the lowest mark of 30 points out of 100 whereas the 6th Republic.

Government earned 45 and 69 respectively (Korean Press Institute, 1993: 21). The subordination of the media to government influence inevitably caused civil protests against the media in general, and against the public service broadcaster KBS in particular. Clearly, in the early 1980s there existed public discontent with the KBS, which neglected to fulfill its commitment to public service.

In the 1st couple of years in the 1980s, we can hardly find any organized broadcasting audience movements. During this period witnessed growing discontent among television viewers about news bulletins biased in favor of the unpopular military government. In particular, there existed a widespread conviction in rural communities that the media had failed to portray farmers' economic situation faithfully. Despite farmers' economic hardships, the media repeatedly conveyed government propaganda by telling viewers that the standard of living had improved remarkably. It is noteworthy that the movement started in a rural area. In 1983, farmers in Wanju County, North Cholla Province, infuriated by the misleading reports, voiced strong displeasure with the KBS, and in turn refused to pay the television reception fee. This incident, though it has been assessed as the starting point of the movement, was not enough to serve as a catalyst for an immediate spread of the campaign on a nationwide scale.

Two years later, however, the movement became revitalized. It was the general election, held on 12 February 1985, that served as a decisive factor for the explosion

of the dormant public discontent. As the election approached, television news coverage became extremely biased in favor of the ruling party candidates. Not surprisingly, television stations were put under pressure to help the ruling party win the election. This became possible partly because pro-government figures were appointed as heads of the broadcasters. The tight collusion between politics and broadcasting was such that the Catholic Farmers' Association in Wanju issued a statement on 28 April 1985, titled 'KBS-TV reception fee should be collected only from the ruling Democratic Justice Party and the government!' Among 30-odd statements issued during the three years of the campaign, it is recorded as the first one (K.T. Kim, 1994: 381). Thus, politically biased news coverage can be listed as the main cause of the reception fee boycott campaign. However, closer examination of the causes of the movement reveals that other aspects have also contributed to its rise.

Together with the problem of fairness in reporting, KBS's excessive dependence on advertising for its budget came under attack. As viewers consistently raised questions about the validity of advertising on public service television, the KBS suffered an identity crisis. Audience groups asserted that excessive advertising on public television is against the idea of public service. Accordingly, television viewers sympathized with this reasoning to provide their support for the collective movement. The lack of balanced, quality programming was also criticized: viewers blamed the public service broadcaster's ruthless pursuit of commercial interests, seeing it as a dereliction of public service. There also persisted public outcry over the declining quality of children's programmes. In addition, viewers in mountainous areas refused to pay the fee on the grounds that they were not able to receive a clear picture. Poor reception areas thus provided an essentially reasonable and fair argument. These dissatisfactions with the KBS had been lying dormant until they erupted in 1986,

when the full-scale movement started.

Since the Pan-Christian National Movement Headquarters was established under the National Council of Churches (NCC) on 20 January 1986, the movement was placed on the track of progress in a more organized way. On 14 February, the Headquarters handed out 50,000 adhesive labels and 10,000 leaflets to people, which said: 'We Do Not Watch KBS-TV' (K.T. Kim, 1994: 382). Catholic churches also added force to the Headquarters by issuing a similar statement. The Catholic Committee for the Promotion of Justice and Peace, which was renowned for its outright antigovernment stance, officially staged a popular campaign for the reception fee boycott. A year later, on 25 June 1987, Buddhists, who initially had reservations, finally joined the movement. Thus, all major religious groups in Korea made a tremendous contribution to the development of the campaign. Given that, unlike other social organizations, religious groups had enjoyed relative autonomy from politics, the prompt and active participation of Christians and Catholics in the movement can be taken for granted.

Meanwhile, women's organizations went one step further by arguing that the reception fee was something that should be abolished rather than boycotted. On 25 April 1986, the Association of Women's Organizations adopted a resolution supporting the cause of the movement, which was echoed by the Seoul YMCA. These two groups have a significance in that, even though they took part in the movement later than the religious groups, they stayed in at the final stage to wrap things up. The other social groups had left the movement in 1987 to concentrate on the upcoming presidential election in December. It should also be noted that the experience of being in an organized movement provided a valuable opportunity for women to take a

leading part in the following viewers' campaigns in the 1990s.

The movement, which showed no sign of abating, had to face a new dimension in the second half of 1987. In June 1987, Korea experienced political turmoil resulting from the nomination of Roh Tae-woo, President Chun's classmate at the Korean Military Academy, as presidential candidate of the ruling party. College students and citizens as well as dissident politicians took to the streets, demanding sweeping democratic reforms including direct presidential elections and revision of the existing constitution.

The political crisis was resolved by Roh's surprise announcement of democratic principles on 29 June, which in turn marked a turning point in the broadcasting audience movement as well as in other social movements (Kim et al., 1994: 144). This government counter-attack took the steam out of the popular campaign. Not surprisingly, as civic groups gradually pulled out of the strategic alliance with audience groups, the movement, which reached its peak of influence in 1986 and the first half of 1987, followed a downhill path until it petered out in early 1989.

One cannot successfully see the characteristics of the movement without a clear understanding of its political context. Scrutiny of the political implications of the movement would lead us to conclude that, strictly speaking, the campaign began as political resistance rather than as an audience movement in the true sense of the word. As the movement originally aimed to correct biased news reports from the public service broadcaster, it was pursued as a means of political struggle to facilitate democratization of the society (D.K. Kim, 1996: 445). In other words, the boycott of the reception fee was not an ultimate goal of the movement. Rather, it was pursued as

an efficient surface means to its final aim of social democratization. Though the movement aimed to attain the democratization of society through the democratization of broadcasting, it had dealt a serious blow to the KBS. As the movement gathered popular support, the KBS came under increasing public criticism. The loss of credibility as a public service broadcaster was such that Lee Chul, a member of the National Assembly, denounced the KBS as a 'public enemy' in the National Assembly (Koo, 1992: 43). The public distrust of the KBS also led to a sharp decline in the morale of KBS employees. Indeed, as Chang, president of KBPA stated, throughout the 1980s 'the independence of broadcasting from governmental intervention was the greatest aim of journalists and producers'. Low morale had been latent, but it surfaced in April 1990, when KBS workers collectively challenged the government decision to appoint SeoKi-won, president of the pro-government Seoul Daily, as head of the broadcaster. On 12 April, the government responded to the resistance by arresting 171 employees who took part in the demonstration. Protesting against this coercive measure by the government, the KBS Union staged an unprecedented strike which included refusal of program production. On 30 April, the government answered the strike repressively again by sending riot police into the broadcaster to arrest all 333 workers who participated in the sit-in.

The serious impact of the boycott campaign on the KBS was the drastic fall in television reception fee collection. The collection, which amounted to 119.6 billion won in 1985, declined to 78 billion won in 1988. This can be construed to mean that 31 percent of viewers who had previously paid the fee participated in the movement (Koo, 1992: 42). Threatened by the collective boycott, the KBS came to depend increasingly on advertising for its finance. As Table 1 indicates, the reception fee, which had provided the bigger part of the KBS budget until 1983, yielded itsplace to

advertising in 1984. Since then, the reversal has accelerated, especially since 1986, when viewers collectively sympathized with the cause of the boycott.

The movement has also changed the way in which viewers see the relationship between broadcasting and themselves. Indeed, the boycott campaign of the 1980s marked a watershed as far as public consciousness about broadcasting was concerned. As Ju-on Woo of the Christian Ethics Movement of Korea observes, one of the legacies of the campaign is 'the understanding of possibilities of exerting impacts and influences on broadcasters through the collective power of the audiences when broadcasters failed to full-fill democratic responsibilities'. Until the popular resistance, viewers had existed only in name without any experience of exercising collective influence on broadcasters. It should also be noted that the experience of the campaign spawned many audience representative groups, which have activated broadcasting audience movements in the new broadcasting environment of the 1990s.

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5.Conclusion

Democracy still remains rare in Asia despite the optimism of 1990. Thus, the experiences of Korea and Taiwan, the only two Asian countries "third-wave" democracies, have much to teach us.

Both had important Japanese colonial periods during the first half of the twentieth century that led to some economic development and higher educational standards among the populations, though both suffered considerable violence from the Japanese colonial authorities. But Japanese imperial government’s rule in Korea and Taiwan was quietly different, so the peoples of two countries memory of Japanese colonial era also not same. After Japanese colonial era, both countries then suffered under strong authoritarian regimes that further stimulated economic growth.

For more than a decade, these two new democracies have regularly held free and competitive elections at all levels of their respective governments. Both nationally and locally, citizens choose the heads of the executive branches and the members of the legislatures thorough regularly scheduled electoral contests. Unlike many countries in the region, moreover, the two countries have peacefully transferred power to opposition parties, the Millennium Democratic Party(Former president Kim Dae-jung’s party) in Korea(1997) and the Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan (2000).

Accordingly, there is little doubt that the political regimes of Korea and Taiwan fully meet the democratic principle of popular sovereignty featuring free and fair

elections, universal adult suffrage, and multiparty competition.

Related to 1st Research Question,(two countries' same but different developing process) In this study, I have compared a number of aspects of the Taiwanese and Korean authoritarian regimes and their democratization processes in order to elucidate more clearly the developments that have taken place in the evolution of democracy in Taiwan in particular. The picture that emerges shows that the controlling regime in Taiwan was more preemptive than the Korean regime in its attempt to maintain political stability, and the democratization processes in Taiwan was slower and more faltering than in Korea.

The actual democratization processes differed in the two countries, but both shared at least seven factors that facilitated their democratic transitions including development under Japanese colonial rule, educational development, experience with authoritarian elections, increasing prosperity, important links between "reformers" in governmentand" moderates" in opposition, U.S. government pressure, and uncertainty following the fall of President Marcos. However, the democratic transitions of Korea and Taiwan also differed in at least three respects. Taiwan had numerous "liberals" in its authoritarian government, a non violent opposition, and substantial popular association activity, factors not apparent in Korea.

Since democratization, both Taiwan and South Korea have had very divided polities. Both also have highly politicized media that convey an even greater image of division. Yet, and this is the crucial point, virtually no one neither society wants to return to authoritarian rule. Thus, the prospects for these two East Asian "third wave" democracies to continue to mature remain great.

The mass media constitute the backbone of democracy. The media are supplying the political information that voters base their decisions on. They are also the watchdogs that we rely on for uncovering errors and wrongdoings by those who have power. It is therefore reasonable to require that the media perform to certain standards with respect to these functions, and our democratic society rests on the assumption that they do (Venturelli 1998; Kellner 2004; McQuail 1993; Skogerbø 1996). The most important democratic functions that we can expect the media to serve are listed in an often-cited article by Gurevitch and Blumler (1990). These functions include surveillance of sociopolitical developments, identifying the most relevant issues, providing a platform for debate across a diverse range of views, holding officials to account for the way they exercise power, provide incentives for citizens to learn, choose, and become involved in the political process, and resist efforts of forces outside the media to subvert their independence.

The relationship between the media and democratization is an important and mysterious issue. The media is not the only factor in explaining the current contentious state of Taiwan's democracy and politics, but it plays a key role.

In Taiwan during the 38-year martial law era(1949~87), the KMT practiced authoritarian rule. suppressing dissidents, dominating all resources, and setting the norms of morality. It deprived people of the right to participate in politics and silenced the critical voice of the media. This was the background behind the rise and development of Taiwan’s guerrilla media.

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Taiwan’s press has played an integral role in the transition of the island from authoritarianism to democracy. Taiwan’s media played a key role in the “emncipatory politics” campaign on the island in pursuit of transition to democracy. From 1949 to 1987, Taiwan was under martial law that was imposed by the KMT political party under the leadership of President Chiang Kai-shek. The KMT, which had lost power to the communists on mainland China in 1949 in a civil war, established a provisional government on the island of Taiwan to continue its campaign against communism. The imposition of martial law resulted in strict controls on mass media, although certain segments of them were not deterred from speaking out for reforms. The opposition voices initially came from underground publications and video productions of controversial events by dissidents in order to expose the excesses of the martial-law regime. Pirate radio stations also emerged to break the KMT’s broadcast monopoly and to promote political reform and democratization.

The alternative media played an important role in the history of Taiwan's democratization, ultimately breaking the ban on new newspapers and publicly challenging authority. The liberalization of the media has not improved the industry’s performance, and has not benefitted Taiwan’s democratic consolidation. Taiwan’s media became unprincipled and untrustworthy because of its involvement in political struggles and the fierce competition in the marketplace, and effective and respected oversight mechanisms are not in place. The public interest became the main loser.

In a normal democratic environment, the media should be a self-disciplined body without outside intervention. But past experiences tell us that when professional norms collide with commercial demands, the latter usually wins out. To achieve

self-discipline, the media requires institutionalized complementary control measures. Carefully designed rules to inform the public of the role of the media must be established so that players can follow the rules and compete fairly with each other in the market, yet also conform to the public interest and serve democracy.

Taiwan's Dangwai had launched the 1st pirate station. A number of the other alternative media had become active in 1970s and 1980s in advocating political reform and democratization, including the Independent Evening Post, the Capital Morning News, the Eighties. And the Formosa Magazine In Specially, after marital-law era, The Independence Morning Post began to openly support Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), formed illegally by the Dangwai movement in 1986. In this era, although there were international pressures on Taiwan to lift martial law, domestic pressures, especially campaigns by the opposition media, played a central role in the transition of Taiwan to democracy. Just over a decade after the legalization of the DPP, the opposition political party's candidate came to power in Taiwan in the March 2000 presidential election and was reelected in March 2004.

The history of press freedom in Korea has been characterized by periods of chaos. Since Japanese colonial rule, freedom of the press has been more often restricted than protected by the laws and policies. There have been four main features and forms of restriction since 1910: firstly, severe restriction during the Japanese colonial rule; secondly, experiencing freedom with unstable democracy under the American military rule and the First and Second republics; thirdly, oppression of the military regimes; and lastly, the struggle with capital power since the advent of civilian government. Several decades of Japanese colonial rule, American military

rule, and military dictators have influenced the Korean society and the media politically, economically, socially and culturally.

Many Korean media companies especially major conservative newspapers do not perceive their roles as agents of communication but as political power players. However, the media need to be responsible to the general public by playing their roles fairly and by serving citizens. The theory and practice of press freedom in Korea has been at times chaotic and changeable. The problems of Korean society should be solved with Korean laws and solutions. Basically, some laws and policies have been still existed from the authoritarian rule to the civilian governments. However, in practice, such laws vary in degree, depending on the ruling style of political leaders such as the president. This means that theory is not a core issue to democracy but how freedom lives and perpetuates in practice. However

Freedom of the press greatly influences, for better or worse, democracy. Press freedom without social responsibility by major conservative newspapers has led to a conflicted society and a threat to grassroots democracy in Korea and Taiwan today.

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6. Appendix : Chronicle from 1945 to 1990

Year	Taiwan	Korea
1945	Liberation from Japan	Liberation from Japan
1947	228 Incident	Cheju Island 4.3. Incident
1948	Beginning of the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion	Founding of the Republic of Korea
1949	Republic of China (ROC) Government relocated from Nanjing to Taipei, Martial law period begins	The murder of patriot Kim Gu
1950	U.S. Navy 7th fleet into the Taiwan Strait	The Korean War begins
1952	Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty(Taipei Treaty)	
1953		Korean Armistice Agreement
1954	Sino-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement	ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Agreement
1958	823 Kinmen Island Artillery War	Progressive Party Spy Incident
1959		The *Kyunghyang Shinmun* discontinuance Incident
1960	*Free China Magazine* Incident	4.19 Revolution
1961		Coup d'état of 16 May, 1st on-air of the KBS TV
1962	Establishment of TTV	
1964	A Declaration of Formosan Self-salvation Incident	Korean Army dispatch to Vietnam War
1965		Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the R.O.K
1970	Establishment of World United Formosans for Independence	
1971	R.O.C. expelled from UN, Establishment of College Magazine	Park Chung-hee 3rd elected president
1972	Chiang Ching-kuo inaugurated as a premier, Sino-Japan diplomatic relations terminated.	Declaration of the October Yushin, Martial Law begins
1974		*The Dong-A ilbo* Incident

1975	President Chiang Kai-Shek dies, establishment of *Taiwan Political Review*"	
1976		The Axe Murder Incident in Panmunjom, Joint Security Area
1977	Chungli Incident	
1978	Chiang Ching-kuo elected President.	
1979	Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations terminated, *The Formosa Magazine* Incident	Assassination of Park Chung-hee 12.12 Coup d'état
1980	Lin Yi-hsiung Family Massacre	5.18 Kwang-ju uprising
1981	Prof. Chen Wun-cheng Incident	The 5th Republic begins
1984	Chiang Nan (Henry Liu) Incident	
1986	Establishment of DPP	The 10th Seoul Asian Game
1987	Martial law lifted	The Great June Uprising
1988	President Chiang Ching-kuo dies, Bans on publishing newspapers lifted	Roh Taw-woo takes to President, The 24th Seoul Olympic
1990	March Wild Lily student movement	

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