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    题名: 論語中仁與禮關係新詮
    作者: 馮耀明
    Fung, Yiu-Ming
    关键词: 仁;禮;論語;邏輯行為主義;意向性;意向行動
    Analects;logical behaviorism;intentionality;intentional action
    日期: 2009-01
    上传时间: 2016-08-11 15:58:01 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 孔子「仁」一概念的心性論化乃是思孟一系的一大發展，至於宋明道學、理學及心學之出現，則可說是儒學的劇變。雖然宋明儒及當代儒者聲稱可「調適而上遂」、可得「先秦之真緒」，然而先秦的血脈傳至宋明，已發生了典範的變革，此中原因，實在於孔子的道德思考不必有後儒所理解的思孟之形上心性論的預設，而形上心性論亦不必納入宋明儒及當代儒者所主張的本體宇宙論之故。\\r 七十年代西方分析哲學家 Herbert Fingarette 認為不可以孟子的心性之說來理解孔子在《論語》中的思想。他利用 John Austin 的語文行為理論 (speech act theory) 和 Gilbert Ryle 的邏輯行為主義 (logical behaviorism) 觀點，對孔學提出了一個嶄新的解釋。他認為西方哲學與佛教傳統所強調的心身之分與內外之別的觀點，並不適合用來分析孔子在《論語》中的道德思想。並以一般中外學者的主觀心理主義的解讀為錯誤，不能真實掌握孔學的要旨。 本文的目的，主要是針對新儒家形上的心性天道論的解釋與 Fingarette 的邏輯行為主義的解釋，剖析這兩種觀點與文本不相應之處，從而將《論語》中的仁與禮的關係納入意向性 (intentionality) 及意向行動 (intentional action) 的框架中來理解，並嘗試提出一種異於上述二說的新解釋。
    The mentalistic interpretation of Confucius’s concept of “ren” (benevolence) provided by the school of Zi-si and Mencius is a great development of Confucianism. In terms of their metaphysical readings, the Song-Ming Confucians and the contemporary Confucians claim that they are the true successors of the Pre-Qin Confucianism. However, I think that the moral thinking of Confucius does not necessarily have the presuppositions in the metaphysical theory of mind and nature as recognized by the later Confucians. And the mentalistic theory of mind and nature provided by the school of Zi-si and Mencius is not necessarily and appropriately incorporated into the onto-cosmology of the later Confucians. Herbert Fingarette provides a new and non-psychological interpretation of the Analects that is not only radically different from the traditional one but also controversial in regard to the issue whether some key terms in Confucius’s moral philosophy have reference to mental content. He rejects to treat ren as a mental concept which is based on the inner-outer or internal-external distinction. Based on John Austin’s theory of speech acts and Gibert Ryle’s logical behaviorism, he provides a new interpretation of Confucius’s thought in the Analects. He argues that all psychological interpretations do not provide a correct reading of the Analects. In this paper I want to provide some counter examples to demonstrate what is wrong both in the reading of the later Confucians and in that of Fingarette. I try to put the relation of ren and li into a framework of intentionality and intentional action and provide a new interpretation which is beyond the above two existent interpretations.
    關聯: 政治大學哲學學報, 21, 129-158
    The national Chengchi university philosophical
    数据类型: article
    显示于类别:[政治大學哲學學報 THCI Core] 期刊論文

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