針對上帝誡命理論的眾多常見批評中，有一個被稱為「自律反對論點」：接受上帝誡命的道德權威與Immanuel Kant所強調的道德自律是不相容的。本文就Jeffrie Murphy對這個反對論點的回應予以評析。Murphy主張，根據一個對康德式自律較合理可信的說明，「自律」係指「總是依據自身能擁有最好的道德理由行事」，而按照這個定義，上帝誡命理論與道德自律是相容的。筆者以Kant關於自律的論述為依據，指出Murphy所肯定的自律說明並未掌握Kant的自律概念。筆者將從Murphy對Kant的兩個自律觀點的批評作回應，指出Murphy誤解了「自我立法」的概念，也混淆了「自律」與「出於義務的行為」，以致誤把「感性動機都是他律的」認為是Kant的主張。筆者指出，由於Murphy不能正確理解Kant將上帝誡命理論判為他律的真正理由，因此他嘗試調和康德式自律與上帝誡命理論的努力是落空的。 According to many skeptics and atheists, Immanuel Kant famously, and perhaps conclusively, argues that divine command theories are without exception heteronomous. This article attempts to present a critical analysis of Jeffrie Murphy's response to this socalled ＂autonomy objection＂ to divine command theory. Having dismissed two accounts of autonomy as unKantian, Murphy argues that on a third and more plausible account, which defines an autonomous person as one who always acts in accordance with the best set of moral reasons available, divine command theories are compatible with moral autonomy. I criticize Murphy's criterion of a Kantian account of autonomy as lacking clarity, and by referring to Kant's texts, I argue that the account of autonomy recommended by Murphy fails at grasping Kant's concept. In addition, I examine Murphy's criticisms of two theses attributed to Kant, namely, that moral obligations are laws that one gives unto oneself, and that sensuous inclinations are heteronomous. I argue that Murphy has misread the fi rst thesis while wrongly attributed the second to Kant. I conclude that divine command theorists should fi rst ascertain what Kant means by the concept of autonomy before responding to the autonomy objection.