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| Title: | 公司治理對企業使用避稅天堂的影響
The effect of corporate governance on the usage of tax havens |
| Authors: | 葉申誼
Yeh, Shen Yi |
| Contributors: | 蘇威傑
Su, Wei Jie
葉申誼
Yeh, Shen Yi |
| Keywords: | 避稅天堂
公司治理
Corporate governance
Tax haven |
| Date: | 2017 |
| Issue Date: | 2017-07-03 14:33:40 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 公司治理是否影響企業使用避稅天堂的程度？本論文想要探討到底是怎麼樣的公司治理情形會影響台灣上市公司到避稅天堂設立海外子公司。由於避稅天堂可以提供低稅率或甚至是免稅給予外國企業，且有著複雜且保密的交易活動讓政府不易察覺與監督，使得避稅天堂容易變成各國企業逃稅的秘密基地。在這樣的情形下，我認為專業經理人所經營的企業，通常擁有較佳的公司治理機制，因此會把企業帶向良好的發展方向，且有抑制企業進行非法或不道德等行為，所以專業經理人所經營的企業會較少使用避稅天堂；反觀大股東持股數愈多或是家族企業可能會為了自己利益，造成公司的治理機制變差，讓公司處在道德風險高的經營環境中，因此我推論這樣的公司使用避稅天堂的程度也會較高。本研究蒐集自公開資訊觀測站與台灣經濟新報(TEJ)資料庫，進行負二項回歸分析，實證結果顯示家族企業比非家族企業更容易在避稅天堂設立海外子公司；專業經理人治理企業比非專業經理人控制企業更不容易使用避稅天堂；大股東持股數愈多的企業會更容易在避稅天堂設立子公司。因此台灣政府更應該關注家族企業及大股東持股數多的企業，且家族企業可以多聘用專業經理人讓公司治理情形變更加完善。
Does corporate governance affect the usage of tax havens? Establishing offshore companies in tax haven is an ethically controversial business practice, enabling companies to evade tax or hide illegal activities. Because tax havens offer a favorable tax to its taxpayers and they maintain a system of financial secrecy, numerous companies choose tax haven as a way to reduce or avoid tax. The purpose of this study is to examine what kind of corporate governance will make companies be more likely to set offshore companies in tax havens. I argue that corporations with professional managers compared with other companies would have a better corporate governance. Generally, professional manager possess professional managing abilities that can inhibit companies from processing illegal or unethical practice, so it will take companies to a good direction. As a result, I argue that companies with professional managers are less likely to set affiliated companies in tax havens. Nevertheless, family corporation or the companies with controlling shareholders have a worse corporate governance. Since they might deprive public profits for private interests so that their corporate governance would become worse. Therefore, I argue family corporate and companies with large shareholders are more likely to establish offshore companies in tax haven. The evidences show that family corporations and companies with large shareholders are more likely to set up companies in tax haven; however, professional managers’ companies are less likely to set offshore affiliates in tax haven. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
國際經營與貿易學系
104351023 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104351023 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [國際經營與貿易學系 ] 學位論文
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