Loading...
|
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/111308
|
| Title: | 商品的不可分割性與逃漏稅決策
Indivisibility of goods and tax evasion decision |
| Authors: | 吳東翰
Wu, Tung Han |
| Contributors: | 翁堃嵐
吳東翰
Wu, Tung Han |
| Keywords: | 不可分割性
外生所得
風險趨避者
社會福利
租稅逃漏
Indivisibility
Exogenous income
Risk-averter
Social welfare
Tax evasion |
| Date: | 2017 |
| Issue Date: | 2017-07-24 11:59:55 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 由於傳統探討逃漏稅行為之文獻皆假設商品之消費可無限細分，然而假設商品之消費皆可無限細分並不符合現實世界的情況。因此，本文設定一模型包含了可無限細分之財貨及不可無限細分之財貨，目的在於探討納稅人在存在不可無限細分之財貨的環境下是否會改變其逃漏稅決策，進而得出不同於傳統逃漏稅文獻之結論。而為了與傳統逃漏稅文獻相對應，除了商品具不可分割性的假設之外，其餘參數仍沿用傳統逃漏稅文獻之設定：所得、稽徵機率和處罰倍率皆為外生。
透過模型設定，本文得到了三個和傳統逃漏稅文獻十分不同的結論。第一，在商品不可無限分割之下，納稅人願意進行逃漏稅的條件相對於藉由傳統逃漏稅模型所得之條件寬鬆，甚至是願意在對其不利的條件之下進行租稅逃漏。第二，逃漏稅額與稅率之間不全然為單調遞減的關係，其方向並不明確。因而可以改善傳統逃漏稅模型預測最適逃漏稅額與稅率之間為單調遞減關係之結果，使其更加符合現實世界的情況。
第三，在商品具有不可分割性的假設之下，納稅人的風險偏好會因而改變使其不為一純粹的風險趨避者。因此，本文發現若是政府藉由調降政策變數以允許納稅人進行租稅逃漏，則政府之預期稅收會因為允許納稅人逃漏稅而提高，進而得以提升整體之社會福利。最後，在本文的設定之下，最適的處罰倍率不必然為無窮大。
Traditional tax evasion researches all assumed that consumptions of goods are divisible, but those assumptions do not conform reality. Thus, our research set a model include one divisible good and one indivisible good in order to inquire that if taxpayers change their tax evasion decision under the assumption. In order to correspond to traditional tax evasion researches, our model still practices the settings of traditional tax evasion researches, which include exogenous income, fine rate and probability rate.
Through the setting, our research obtained three important conclusions that are different from traditional tax evasion researches. First, under our assumption, taxpayers are more willing to evolve in tax evasions even the conditions are unfavorable to them. Second, the relationship between tax evasion and tax rate is no longer monotone decreasing. Therefore, the conclusion is able to reform the impractical conclusion obtain by traditional tax evasion researches.
Third, under our setting, taxpayers are no longer pure Risk-Averter. Hence, we discover that if government slash the policy parameter to encourage taxpayers evolve in tax evasions, expect revenue of government will rise. Since the expect revenue of government rises, social welfare rises as well. |
| Reference: | Allingham, Michael G. and Agnar Sandmo (1972) "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, 1, 323-338.
Andreoni, James (1991) "Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty. Fit the Crime? ," RAND Journal of Economics, 22(3), 385-395.
Andreoni, James, Brian Erard and Jonathan Feinstein (1998) "Tax compliance," Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 818-860.
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1970) Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing, Amsterdam: North Holland.
Becker, Gary S. (1968) "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169-217.
Bergstrom, Theodore C. (1986) "Soldiers of Fortune," In Social Choice and Public decision Making, ed. by Heller et. al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Clotfelter, Charles T. (1983) "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, 65(3), 363-373.
Crane, Steven E. and Nourzad Farrokh (1987) "On the Treatment of Income Tax Rates in Empirical Analysis of Tax Evasion," Kyklos, 40(3), 338-348.
Dixit, Avinash (1973) "The Optimum Factory Town," Bell Journal Economics, 4, 637-51.
Dowell, James (1982) "Risk Preference and the Work-Leisure Trade-Off," manuscript, Monash University.
Joulfaian, David and Mark Rider (1996) "Tax Evasion in the Presence of Negative Income Tax Rates," National Tax Journal, 49, 553–570.
Lee, Kangoh (2001) "Tax evasion and self-insurance," Journal of Public Economics, 81, 73-81.
Malik, Arun S. (1990) "Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement," RAND Journal of Economics, 21(3), 341-353.
Marshall, John M. (1984) "Gambles and the Shadow Price of Death," American Economic Review, 74(1), 530-35.
Ng Yew-Kwang (1965) "Why do People Buy Lottery Tickets? Choices Involving Risk and the Indivisibility of Expenditure," Journal of Political Economy, 73(5), 530-535.
Poterba, James M. (1987) "Tax Evasion and Capital Gains Taxation," American Economic Review, 77(2), 234-239.
Riley, John G. (1973) "Gammaville-An Optimum Town," Journal of Economic Theory, 6, 471-82.
Rubin, Paul H. and Paul Chris W. (1979) "An Evolutionary Model of Taste for Risk," Economic Inquiry, 17, 588-96.
Stigliz, Joseph E. (1982) "Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient," Journal of Public Economics, 17, 213-240.
Ueng, K. L. and C. C. Yang (2006) "Tax evasion and limited liability," Journal of Public Economic Theory, 8(3), 323-338.
Weiss, Robert L. (1976) "The desirability of cheating incentives and randomness in the optimal income tax," Journal of Political Economy, 84, 1343-1352.
Yitzhaki, Shlomo (1974) "A note on income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, 3, 201-202.
Yitzhaki, Shlomo (1987) "On the Excess Burden of Tax Evasion," Public Finance Quarterly, 15(2), 123-137. |
| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
104255009 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104255009 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [財政學系] 學位論文
|
Files in This Item:
| File |
Size | Format | |
|---|
| 500901.pdf | 2326Kb | Adobe PDF2 | 100 | View/Open |
|
All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.
|
