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    政大典藏 > College of Commerce > Department of Finance > Theses >  Item 140.119/111313
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/111313


    Title: 機構投資人交易頻率與主併公司購併宣告效果之關聯
    The trading frequency of institutional investors and M&A announcement returns
    Authors: 李佳諺
    Contributors: 吳啟銘
    李佳諺
    Keywords: 購併
    機構投資人
    M&A
    Institutional investor
    Date: 2017
    Issue Date: 2017-07-24 12:00:58 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 全球產業以及經濟局勢瞬息萬變,不斷的出現各種破壞式創新的產品與商業模式,也因此企業積極的尋求購併擴張的機會,以達到永續經營和極大化股東財富的目的。而近年來機構投資人在台灣證券市場扮演著重要的腳色,因此本文將探討機構投資人的持股穩定度與購併宣告效果之關聯。
    本論文以機構投資人(外資、投信、自營商)對主併公司的持股比例穩定度為依據,分類為被長期與短期機構投資人持有之主併公司,並以台灣市場2003年起至2016年底,排除掉金融相關產業的購併案件為研究樣本,探討機構投資人是否對主併公司發揮監督效果,同時觀察長短期機構投資人是否對主併公司之公司特性以及購併交易案之交易特性有無偏好。
    本文研究結果指出,不論在三日、五日或是七日的事件窗口之下,長期機構投資人所持有之主併公司的累積異常報酬都顯著大於被短期機構投資人所持有之主併公司,顯示長期機構投資人確實對主併公司發揮了監督功能。而被長期機構投資人持有之成長型公司獲得的累積異常報酬顯著優於被短期機構投資人所持有之成長型公司。亦發現短期機構投資人偏好能夠明顯提升主併公司盈餘的購併案件。
    This study investigates the relationship between institutional ownership stability and the announcement effect of merger and acquisition, instead of the proportion of institutional ownership, which is very common in last few years. This research is based on acquiring firm listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange which announced merger and acquisition between 2003 and 2016. We classify the sample into two groups according to the standard deviation of the proportion of institutional ownership. The first group is the acquiring firm owned by long-term institutional investor, which means the standard deviation of the acquiring firm in group one is relatively small. By contrast, the second group is the acquiring firms owned by short-term institutional investor. First, we found the long-term institutional investor demonstrated the ability to monitor the acquiring firm because the first group’s CAR is significantly higher than the second group. Second, the growth stock owned by long-term institutional investors also has a significantly higher CAR than the growth stock owned by short-term institutional investor. Third, we also found that the short-term institutional investors prefer the merger and acquisition cases which can increase the net income of the acquiring firm.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理研究所
    104357021
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104357021
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Finance] Theses

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