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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/112621
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/112621


    Title: 企業避稅與併購
    Corporate Tax Avoidance and Acquisitions
    Authors: 黃雅雯
    Contributors: 陳嬿如
    Chen, Yenn Ru
    黃雅雯
    Keywords: 避稅
    併購
    Tax avoidance
    Acquisitions
    Date: 2017
    Issue Date: 2017-09-13 14:14:44 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究使用代理人問題來解釋企業避稅對於公司購併決策的影響。我們以不同方法來衡量公司是否有避稅的行為。當企業進行避稅,經理人會有謀取公司資源/利益行為(Managerial rent diversion)的存在。公司存在代理人問題,我們從中探討是否會影響公司進行購併的決策,實證結果發現企業避稅對於公司的購併為負相關,原因為公司經理人有謀取利益行為而導致資訊不透明,經理人不願意揭露更多資訊給外部人,因而避免進行購併活動,此外,文獻指出市場對於避稅會給予折價,進而導致公司減少購併行為。藉由將樣本區分成最積極避稅的公司及最不積極避稅的公司,去觀察兩組樣本的平均累積異常報酬是否有顯著差異,實證結果顯示積極避稅公司相較於不積極避稅公司,兩組樣本的宣告效果有顯著的差異,實證結果顯示,市場投資人對於積極避稅公司給予負面宣告效果,原因來自當公司存在經理人自利行為,經理人所進行的購併為價值減損的活動,市場對於企業避稅的宣告效果為顯著負面反應,顯示避稅對於公司購併活動,市場給予較負面的宣告效果。
    In this paper, we examine the effect of tax avoidance on corporate acquisition decision through agency cost perspective. Prior researches have shown that corporate tax aggressive is positively related to managerial rent diversion. Once managers have rent diversion behaviors, they are supposedly unwilling to disclose extra firms’ information to outside investors. Managers are presumed unwilling to incur external monitors when firms with agency problems. Firms with information opacity, outside investors have highly potential to discount firms’ stock prices. Under the circumstance, managers tend to engage less acquisitions. The results show that the most aggressive tax avoidance firms have significant lower CAR than the lowest tax avoidance firms. Since managers with resource diversion behavior are more likely to engage value decreasing acquisitions. The empirical result show that firms with tax avoidance have negative announcement effect on firms’ bidding activities.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理研究所
    104357020
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0104357020
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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