|Abstract: ||本論文要研究的是當代新儒家的主體觀,並以牟宗三為主要代表。當代新儒 家如何論述道德主體性,以及如何建立道德形上學?這種主體觀有何限制?其學 理背後的預設為何?如何因應當代多元文化的挑戰?我將在本論文中討論這些 問題。
自受到西方文化和哲學的影響以後,儒學在闡釋其義理的過程中,吸收進西 方哲學的概念是理所當然的;而在此過程中,這些概念在儒家詮釋工作上也可能 產生新的意義。例如,牟宗三基於其對康德與中國哲學的疏解,論證儒家能把握 人的「主體性」及「內在道德性」,指出儒學之有進於康德者乃在於其能充盡主 體性的義薀。康德論述的主體性是一種以人所具有的理性及其願為自己立法之意 志為實踐基礎,超越特定歷史脈絡之普遍而超驗的 (transcendental) 主體性。 但相較而言,黑格爾卻認為這樣的主體性是抽象且空洞的而認為主體的自由,必 須在具體的歷史進程下才能完成。
依循儒家傳統的當代新儒家之詮釋下,自我似乎主要被視為是以可獨立於歷 史與社會脈絡的一種道德主體。然而,我在本論文中更關注的問題是:當代新儒 家的自我觀是否只能是一種先驗式,或無限心的道德主體觀?或者是在某些情況 下,這種主體觀有必要容納不同詮釋觀點所產生的主體觀,作為它的一種補充? 本論文前三章,主要在界定、釐清以及辯護以牟宗三為主之新儒家以道德性為核 心的主體觀。接下來,我論證了補充和修正這種的主體觀的必要性,我稱之為「詩 性主體」。此一詩性主體,並不同於作為單純的藝術性或美感經驗的主體,而是 一種同時涵攝了感性、知性和理性之多層次,故以「詩性」之體悟和經驗去統稱 的主體。儘管我對這種主體觀的多數構想,仍來自牟宗三等新儒家學者的哲學思 維,惟迄今此一詩性主體觀並未被完整地呈現,而這正是本論文在第四章之後的 幾章中主要進行的工作。
幾個重要的線索是:首先,由於康德同時作為牟宗三哲學系統,以及西方現 代哲學的重要參照點。因此,一方面牟宗三最重要的哲學成就,相當程度上也可 被視為是對康德「物自身」難題和道德形上學的超克。另一方面,在西方康德以 後的德國哲學家,如席勒、賀德林和晚期海德格等人,也未嘗不以此為各自的重 要目標。其中,他們所致力的哲學工作,我從「詩性主體」的進路加以勾勒,以 論證這種進路可作為突顯有限心(情境心)和所謂儒家「詩性主體」的對比。這 是本論文在第四章的工作。
其次,牟宗三對康德美學的闡釋,真善美的分別說與合一說的區分,有助於 讓我們注意到:如果只將儒家的主體觀詮釋為道德性的面向將有所偏頗。由於牟 宗三的「合一」說,並不是康德所說的「以美學判斷溝通自由與自然之兩界合而 為一諧和統一之完整系統」之合一,而是「於同一事也而即真即美即善之合一。」 因此,從牟宗三自己所指引出關於「合一」的見解,不同於康德,美並不足以促 成「合一」之境界,以含有創造意義的「詩性」概念來促成「合一」,似乎更恰 當。在第五章中,我除了論證從牟宗三對「美善合一」和「文化生命」之外,也 指出徐復觀對「藝術精神主體」和唐君毅對「美感價值與心靈境界」,均有助於 印證詩性主體的合理性。
為了進一步探索「詩性主體」的內涵,我特別關注所謂「情境心」的理論, 即重視「在當下的展現並非先驗、無限的,而是在「生活世界」的概念為何?或 是「存在於生活世界的社會實踐之主體」,以及「知性、想像及感觸直覺」等說 法。我論證了蔣年豐在幾篇論文裡,非常透徹地闡釋了詩教與所謂的「興的精神 現象學」之間的密切關係,可印證新儒家在闡述道德形上學以及建構道德主體方 面的工作時,所涵蓋在「詩性」- 即精神和語言方面所展現的想像力和創造性, 以及它們所能產生的作用,沒有受到充分關注的一個面向。其中,我同意他對《詩 經》、《周易》、《春秋》之間的互通,以及它們同樣以「志的興發」來彰顯個別的 義理;在討論《孟子》中的情況時,標誌出從經典詮釋所捻出「仁心詩興」的原 理,以及蔣教授所提出的「志意-形氣-軀體」之結構。這是本論文在第五章的工 作。
在第六章,我在此採取了一種哲學方法上的類比,從羅姆巴赫之結構論,來 替代氣論的思路被收納進主體內的可能性,因為蔣年豐所謂「志意-形氣-軀體」 的架構,與羅姆巴赫發展的結構現象學頗有可相契合之處。至於在敘事性主體與 道德創造性的討論中,我則根據呂格爾的敘事性理論,以及學者對呂格爾的「意 志的詩性」所提出的「詩性的道德自我」,進一步豐富儒家的詩性主體觀。本論 文最後,我則意圖呈現個體生命與詩性自我的關係,所以分別嘗試定義三位新儒 家學者所謂「存在的感受」,並從他們自述中所提及之儒家文化生命的「重大召 喚」,來為儒家詩性主體的探討作一結尾。
This thesis is to study the conception of subject in contemporary neo-Confucianism and make an exploration based mainly on Mou Zongsan who as its principal representative. I will discuss these issues: How does contemporary neo-Confucianism discuss moral subjectivity and how does it construct the thery of moral metaphysics? What is the restriction of this subjectivity? What is the theoretical presupposition? Can it respond to the challenge on contemporary multiculturalism?
After influenced by Western culture and philosophy, it is a matter of course that Confucian absorb many the concepts of Western philosophy into their theoretical interpreting works. The new meanings of these concepts were also inspired in this process. For example, Mou Zongsan, based on his understanding of Kant and Chinese philosophy, argues that Confucianism can illuminate the "subjectivity" and "inner morality" of a person, and indicates that Confucianism can even contribute to Kant's philosophy for adequately clarifying the meaning of subjectivity. Kantian discourse on subjectivity is a kind of transcendental subjectivity that is based on the rationality of man and his will to legislate for its own moral practice, beyond the specific historical context. But, in contrast, Hegel argues that such subjectivity is hollow and buncombe, whereas subject's liberty must be achieved in a concrete historical process.
In the interpretation of the contemporary Neo-Confucianism, which follows the Confucian tradition, the Self seems mainly regarded as a moral subject that can be independent of history and society. However, what I am concerned about is: whether the contemporary Neo-Confucianism can only be a moral subjectivity of transcendental, or “infinite heart”? Or in some cases, it is necessary to accommodate the different interpretations of the subjective as its supplement? My work in first three chapters is mainly to define, clarify and defend the Confucianism’s, especially Mou Zongsan’s conception of subject. Next, I argue that it is necessary to supplement and revise this subjective with what I call "poetic subject". This poetic subject is different from the subject of mere artistic or aesthetic experience, but a subject that simultaneously mingle the sensibility, understanding and reason, so that it can be the subject of "poetic" contemplative understanding and living experience. Although most of the ideas of this kind of subjectivity are still inspired by the thoughts of Mou Zongsan and other neo-Confucian scholars, but it was not been expounded completely before. This will be discussed after the fourth chapter.
The several important clues of poetic subject are: Firstly, since Kantian philosophy is a significant reference both for Mou Zongsan's philosophy system and Western modern philosophy. Thus, on the one hand, Mou Zongsan’s the most important achievement can be regarded as a solving the problem of “thing-in-itself” and “metaphysics of morals” left by Kant. On the other hand, the philosophers such as Schiller, Hőderlin and Late Heidegger, after the Kant, were also tackling Kant’s problems as their respective goals. I try to sort out their works with the "poetic subject" approach, and to argue that this approach can to a contrast to the “sentimental heart” and so-called Confucian "poetic subject". This is the work of Chapter 4.
Secondly, Mou Zongsan's interpretation of Kant's aesthetics, the distinction between the “divisional view” and the “syncretic view” on truth, goodness and beauty, can help us to notice that it is biased if Confucian interpretation of subjectivity only toward to moral aspect. According to Mou Zongsan's “syncretic view”, “the unity of true, goodness and beauty” is not what Kant says "beauty as the transition from nature to freedom and it become a complete system" but is “true, goodness and unity are the same and the one. " Therefore, from Mou Zongshe's own thought on the "unity", different from Kant, beauty is not enough to unite truth and goodness. In my opinion, it is more appropriate to promote “unity” with the “poetic” concept which containning significance of creativity. In the fifth chapter, I also expound that Mou Zongsan’s discourse on "cultural life", and that Hsu Fukuan’s on the "subject of artistic spirit ", and Tang Junyi’s "aesthetic value and spiritual realm", to prove the justifiability of poetic subject.
In order to further explore the connotations of "poetic subject", I pay attention to the so-called "sentimental heart" theory, that is, the emphasis on "what is present at this moment, and the concept of "living world" Or "the subject of social practice that exists in the living world", as well as "intellectual, imaginative and intuitive". I also argue that Jiang Nianfeng's profound explanation for the close relationship between poetic bildung and so-called "spiritual phenomenology of will inspiring" can also prove that what Neo-Confucianism lack of in imagination and creativity of spiritual and linguistic aspects when they interpreting the moral metaphysics and morla subject. I agree with Jiang’s elucidation on coherence among "Book of Songs", "Book of Change", "Spring and Autumn" in the discussion of "Mencius", he marked the principle of “kind heartness exalt poetic mood” from the classic interpretation, as well as his proposed the structure of "will - shape - body". This is the work of Chapter 5.
In chapter 6, I have adopted a broad philosophical analogy. I suggest that when discussing the inner possibility of Confucian subject, we can replace the idea of “theory of chi” with Rumbach's “theory of structure”. As for the discussion of narrative subject and moral creativity, I further enrich the Confucian poetic self with Recoeur’s narrative theory. At the end of this thesis, I attempt to present the relationship between individual life and poetic self, so try to define the so-called "feelings of existence" of the three neo-Confucian scholars, and the "great summons" of the Confucian cultural life mentioned in their self-narrative works.