共產國家的國內市場受到政府干預或操縱，並不受市場法則控制，其國內市場的正常價值（Normal Value）是否足以成為認定傾銷差額的基準或有疑問。因此 WTO 容許會員在對此種非市場經濟體國家的廠商進行反傾銷調查時，不採其國內市場資料，而形成特殊待遇。然而非市場經濟體待遇之形成有其特殊的歷史與經濟背景，今日共產經濟制度國家紛紛轉型，與非市場經濟體待遇的原始預設有所出入，針對基於經濟體制差異所生的特殊待遇之內涵及其正當性，有進一步研究的必要。本文第一部分將討論非市場經濟體特殊待遇的起源，以及其與市場經濟體區別的法律基礎，並探討該等區別待遇的必要性與正當性；本文第二部分將進一步透過相關條約解釋，並參諸相關條約之內容、目的以及實務上運作，探尋非市場經濟體地位之判斷標準；第三部分將討論非市場經濟體國家國內「正常價值」之認定方式，探求在法律上如何還原所謂「失真」的正常價值；最後，本文將總結非市場經濟體待遇的內涵，檢視目前國際上慣行的「替代第三國模式」是否合理，並提出適用上可能產生的問題。 The domestic markets of communist courtiers were controlled by the governments and do not play by the rules of market. Therefore, it is questionable whether the investing authorities still have to take the domestic normal value as the basis for comparison. The WTO anti-dumping rules allow the members to exclude, under certain conditions, the relevant information in these NMEs from the determination of dumping. In other words, the NME are subject to the special treatment that deviates from the general principles of anti-dumping rules. However the legitimacy of NME treatment should not be presumed. This article addressed the content of the NME treatment and how to apply the NME treatment properly. In section I, the origin of the NME treatment is elaborated and legitimacy and necessity of such treatment is analyzed. Section II tried to discover the criteria of the NME status, which were never clearly provided in the WTO anti-dumping rules, by referring to the relevant provisions, objects and purposes of the anti-dumping rules, and the practices of the members. Section III focused on the methodologies to determine the normal value in NME. By virtue of the findings in the previous sections, the “surrogate mode”, which is the most widely adopted methodology to determine the normal value in NME, is the be reviewed in the last section.