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| Title: | 薪資報酬委員會中獨立董事之組成比例對於盈餘管理之影響 |
| Authors: | 吳冠興 |
| Contributors: | 郭弘卿
吳冠興 |
| Keywords: | 薪酬委員會
獨立董事
盈餘管理
Compensation committee
Independent director
Earnings management |
| Date: | 2018 |
| Issue Date: | 2018-07-20 17:39:23 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 我國證券交易法於二○一○年新增第十四條之六，規範上市及上櫃公司應設置薪資報酬委員會（下稱「薪酬委員會」），以健全董事、監察人與經理人薪資報酬制度，並進一步強化公司治理。有別於他國之規範，我國薪酬委員會之成員不一定為獨立董事，論者質疑薪酬委員如非獨立董事，對於公司平時之運作疏於了解之情況下，恐難知曉董事及經理人之實質貢獻，進而妥適判斷其薪酬之合理性。再者，公司之薪資報酬制度若以會計盈餘作為衡量指標時，將有可能使董事及經理人為了個人利益，透過盈餘管理提升經營績效，以獲得較高之薪酬，而忽略公司長期目標。有鑑於此，本研究欲探討薪酬委員會中獨立董事之組成比例與盈餘管理之關聯性，實證結果發現上市公司薪酬委員會獨立董事佔比越高，越能抑制盈餘管理。
Article 14-6 of the amendment of Securities and Exchange Act of Taiwan, which was newly added in 2010, requires listed and OTC companies to establish compensation committees. However, Article 14-6 does not require that all members of compensation committee to be independent directors, which is different from some other countries. For the non-independent director members sitting in the compensation committee, it is criticized by some scholars that the performance of directors and managerial officers is hard to be evaluated by them, who have no knowledge of the operation of the company. Moreover, earnings-based compensation system may induce directors and managerial officers to adopt earnings management methodology for their own interest other than the long-term interest of the company. Accordingly, this study is to discuss the connection between the proportion of independent directors in the compensation committee and earnings management. The results suggest that companies with more independent directors in compensation committees are less likely to manipulate earnings. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
105353112 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105353112 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| DOI: | 10.6814/THE.NCCU.ACCT.028.2018.F07 |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
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