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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124670


    Title: 企業現金持有與租稅成本之關連: 以海外營收為例
    Association between Corporate Cash Holdings and Tax Costs: Evidence from Overseas Sales
    Authors: 廖嘉怡
    Contributors: 潘健民
    廖嘉怡
    Keywords: 海外營收
    現金持有
    Overseas sales
    Cash holdings
    Date: 2019
    Issue Date: 2019-08-07 15:54:55 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 日本對於日本企業之所得係針對全球所得課稅，且其法人所得稅率在OECD國家中亦是名列前茅，課徵時點係海外盈餘匯回本國時，讓日本跨國企業為降低租稅成本，有誘因將盈餘保留在境外，進而持有較多現金。本研究主要探討日本企業之超額現金的多寡是否會受到租稅成本影響。本研究檢驗海外營收的多寡與企業超額現金持有的關係。結果發現，當日本企業海外營收規模越大時，其持有的超額現金越多。
    The government of Japan taxes firms’ worldwide income. Income tax rate to the Japanese firms is top compared to its counterparts other OECD countries. Thus, Japanese firms have incentive to retain their revenue overseas instead of repatriating to Japan. With this tax system, Japanese firms would have incentive to hold more cash in other countries. This study aims to investigate whether tax costs of firms influences their cash holding decisions. Using Japanese firm level data, I examine the association between overseas sales and firms’ cash holding. The empirical results show that if firms have more overseas sales, they hold more excess cash. However, I find no association between excess cash holdings and existence of overseas sales.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    106353111
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106353111
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/NCCU201900152
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Accounting] Theses

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